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Abstract
This thesis studies Kenyan households' use of savings accounts and malaria testing and treatment
technologies.
The first chapter studies whether or not married couples use savings accounts strategically. In
the absence of commitment, the availability of a "private" savings technology (a device that is only
accessible by a single owner) may incite individuals to take costly strategic savings action in order to
manipulate the time path of consumption. This chapter presents a model that formalizes this idea
and derives several testable theoretical implications. In particular, households where husbands and
wives are well matched in terms of time preference should make greater use of joint (public) accounts,
less use of individual (private) accounts, and make more efficient investment choices as compared
to their poorly matched peers. The model informed the design of a field experiment where married
couples in rural Kenya were given the opportunity to open joint and individual bank accounts at
randomly assigned interest rates. The behavior of individuals in the experiment is inconsistent with
ex-ante Pareto efficiency and a variety of alternative models of intrahousehold resource allocation,
but consistent with the proposed model of strategic savings. Savings misallocation due to strategic
behavior may be substantial: in the experiment poorly matched couples forgo at least 64 percent
more interest than well matched couples.
The second chapter studies the impact of reducing bank account transaction costs. Free ATM
cards were offered to a randomly selected subset of newly opened formal bank accounts in Western
Kenya. The ATM card reduced withdrawal fees by over 50 percent (from $0.78 to $0.38) and
enabled account holders to make withdrawals from their accounts at any time of the day. The
cards also enabled accounts to be accessed without the in-person verification of a national identity
card. Targeting ATM cards to joint accounts and accounts owned by men substantially increased
savings rates (by 39 percent) and average daily balances (by 16 percent) in the bank accounts. In
contrast, the intervention had a negative impact when targeted to individual accounts owned by
women. This gender difference appears to be driven by differences in bargaining power within the
household: the positive treatment effect for men is concentrated in households where men have
above median bargaining power, whereas the negative treatment effect for women is concentrated
in households where women have below median bargaining power.
The final chapter (co-authored with Jessica Cohen and Pascaline Dupas) uses data from a
randomized controlled trial conducted with over 2,900 households in rural Kenya to study the
tradeoffs between the affordability of effective antimalarials (ACTs) and overuse. We compare a
95-percent ACT subsidy (currently under consideration by the global health community) to an
alternative policy regime that explicitly acknowledges the problem of overuse by providing access
to a subsidized rapid diagnostic test for malaria (RDT) in tandem with subsidized ACTs. We find
that ACT access increases by 60 percent in the presence of an ACT subsidy of 80 percent of more.
Under the proposed 95-percent ACT subsidy, however, only 56 percent of those buying an ACT at
the drug shop test positive for malaria. We show that targeting could be substantially increased
(without compromising access) when the ACT subsidy is reduced to 80 percent but accompanied
by an RDT subsidy.
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Chapter 1
Intrahousehold Preference Heterogeneity,
Commitment, and Strategic Savings:
Theory and Evidence from Kenya
1.1 Introduction
Informal and semi-formal savings devices abound in the developing world, even though they are
generally characterized by high costs, illiquidity, and substantial risk (Rutherford 1999; Rutherford
2000).1 Moreover, households often use a variety of such arrangements (Collins, Morduch, Ruther-
ford, and Ruthven 2009), even though storing savings at home should be essentially costless in
the absence of complications. As such, the popularity of these devices presents a puzzle - what
constraints make these costly practices attractive? Recent research reveals three central themes:
the need to protect savings from oneself (as in Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006), the need to pro-
tect savings from appropriation by members of the community (as in Baland, Guirkinger, and Mali
2007), and the need to protect savings from other members of the household, especially one's spouse
(as in Anderson and Baland 2002). This final theme presents a particular challenge to traditional
economic representations of the household - since members share a unified budget constraint and
interact repeatedly, they should be able to contract with one another in a Pareto efficient manner,
even when they have different preferences (Browning and Chiappori 1998). While a growing number
of papers have documented evidence of households behaving in ways incompatible with Pareto effi-
'A stark example is that of deposit collectors. Deposit collectors regularly visit their clients to take savings
deposits. They are free to do what they wish with the deposits while they store them, and they often charge fees for
the service. Steel and Aryeetey (1994) document that in Ghana, these fees amount to an annual return of negative
54 percent. Another popular informal device is rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). ROSCAs consist
of a group of individuals who meet at predetermined intervals (e.g. weekly, monthly) to put a fixed amount of money
into a common pot. At each meeting, a different member of the group receives the pot. ROSCAs are by nature
illiquid and often quite risky, as group members can defect before the ROSCA cycle is completed.
ciency (see, for example, Ashraf 2009; de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009; Duflo and Udry 2004;
Robinson 2008; Udry 1996), the underlying causes of these inefficiencies remain poorly understood.
To make progress on this front, this paper abstracts from all but one potential driver of inefficient
household savings behavior: intrahousehold heterogeneity in rates of time preference, coupled with
an inability to commit to binding contracts. The idea here is that when one household member is
very impatient, he may be tempted to spend any readily accessible savings, even if he promises not
to do so. In this case, other household members may resort to saving in a "private" device (such
as an individual bank account) that cannot be accessed by the less patient individual, even if using
this device is very costly (because it offers a negative rate of return, for instance). To formally
study this mechanism, we develop a model of a two person household where individuals have access
to two classes of savings devices: a private savings device and a "public" savings device (such as a
joint bank account), which can be accessed by any member of the household. These savings devices
may also differ in terms of rates of return and transaction costs.
We show that when discount factors within the household differ, implementing the ex-ante
Pareto efficient consumption allocation requires the ability to commit to binding intertemporal
contracts. When individuals cannot commit, they may be tempted to make strategic use of private
accounts in order to manipulate the time path of consumption. The model underscores that both
agents in the household may privately benefit from saving strategically. The more patient agent
would like to push additional consumption into the future, while the less patient agent would like
to push additional consumption into the present - in both cases it may be possible to achieve these
goals through the use of private accounts. Moreover, the model illustrates that impatient individuals
may be willing to take costly action to deny the household higher return savings devices. In this
context households may make intensive use of lower return, higher transaction cost savings devices,
even when more attractive (from a rate of return perspective) alternatives are readily available.
This model informed the design of a field experiment, which was conducted in Western Kenya in
the Summer of 2009. We gave 597 married couples the opportunity to open three savings accounts at
randomly assigned interest rates: an individual account for the husband, an individual account for
the wife, and a joint account. We also asked each respondent in the experiment a battery of questions
designed to elicit discount factors, which are used to calculate measures of intrahousehold discount
factor heterogeneity. By applying our theoretical results to the context of the experiment, we are
able to derive a series of testable predictions of the private savings model. A central theoretical result
is that couples who are well matched in terms of discount factors invest their resources efficiently,
while poorly matched couples savings decisions are distorted by strategic action. A key feature of the
experimental design is that it created random variation in relative rates of return, even conditional
on an account's own interest rate. Our theory has sharp predictions regarding patterns of account
use by match quality and the shape of well matched couples' response to relative rates of return,
both of which we test in the data.
Consistent with our theory of strategic savings, we find that couples who are well matched in
terms of rates of time preference make more intensive use of joint accounts, less intensive use of
individual accounts, and respond to relative rates of return in a manner consistent with investment
efficiency. In contrast, poorly matched couples are completely insensitive to relative rates of return.
These differences in behavior have financial consequences for poorly matched couples - interest rate
losses on this group's newly opened bank account deposits were 64 percent larger than those of their
well matched peers. The empirical results also suggest that transaction costs play a very important
role in determining bank account choice and use in our sample.
Overall, our results are consistent with our theory of strategic savings behavior and inconsistent
with ex-ante Pareto efficient bargaining. The results do not appear to be driven by a correlation
between discount factor heterogeneity and other characteristics of couples. Moreover, the patterns
in the data are not consistent with other theories of household saving such as mental accounting or
rules of thumb.
We also investigate an alternative theory that could generate the patterns we observe in the data:
hidden savings. While our model presumes complete information, agents may use private accounts
to systematically hide resources from other household members (as in Anderson and Baland 2002).
We make use of a randomized information treatment that we implemented as part of the field
experiment, as well as spousal cross reports of income and savings device use to examine the role
that hidden information plays in household savings decisions. We find evidence that households
with poor information flows are more likely to choose individual accounts, less likely to choose joint
accounts, and more likely to reduce savings in response to the information treatment. However,
these concerns are unrelated to our initial findings regarding preference heterogeneity; well matched
couples have no better information flows than poorly matched couples, and the empirical results
are unchanged when accounting for intrahousehold information sharing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 presents our model of strategic
savings behavior, Section 1.3 outlines the experimental design and derives testable implications of
the theory, Section 1.4 presents main results, Section 1.5 extends the analysis to account for hidden
information, Section 1.6 discusses alternative explanations, and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 A Model of Strategic Savings
We are interested in understanding how heterogeneity in discount factors impacts individuals' in-
centives to engage in costly savings behavior. To do so, we develop a strategic model of a household
consisting of two agents with potentially differing discount factors, who must decide how much to
consume and how much to save in a portfolio of public and private savings devices. In this section
we set up the model and characterize the ex-ante Pareto efficient savings allocation. We then show
that when discount factors differ, individuals will have incentives to deviate from this allocation.
Given this observation, we then characterize the equilibrium of the strategic model and close the
section by deriving comparative statics with respect to discount factor heterogeneity and interest
rates. Then in Section 1.3, we feed these results through the experimental design to derive testable
predictions that can be taken to the data.
1.2.1 Model Setup
1.2.1.1 General Economic Environment
The household consists of a husband (M) and a wife (F). They live in a two period world with
one personal consumption good, c. Individuals have deterministic income streams {yM, yf } and
must decide whether or not to save any of their income for the second period. Though individuals
can save for the future, there is no borrowing in this economy. 2 Agents have perfect information
regarding own and spousal income streams, preferences, savings strategies, and rates of return
earned on savings.
1.2.1.2 Savings Technologies
Households have access to three different savings technologies:
" A public/joint bank account, which yields rate of return Rj > 1
* A private/individual husband's bank account, which yields rate of return RM > 1
* A private/individual wife's bank account, which yields rate of return RF > 1
What makes the "public" account public is that any member of the household can deposit and
withdraw funds. In contrast, "private" accounts can only be accessed by their owner (though
balances are known to all members of the household).
Financial markets in developing countries are often characterized by very high transaction costs
(Karlan and Morduch 2010). To capture this, we add two types of costs to the model. First, while
it is free to make deposits into all accounts, withdrawals incur a fee, w > 0. Second, accounts have
time and travel costs associated with them, which we refer to as "banking costs". The idea here
is that the bank is located in town, while most individuals live outside of town. If individual i is
going to town for some other reason in period t, the cost of travelling to the bank is low. However,
if the individual must travel to town specifically to go to the bank, the cost is high. An important
advantage of a joint account is that the couple can always send the spouse with the lowest travel
cost to the bank. To capture this intuition with minimal complexity, we assume that travel costs
are nonstochastic, but that the cost of travel for an individual account, b, i E {M, F}, exceeds the
cost of travel for a joint account, b (i.e. b' ; b>).
2 A perfect savings and credit market without transaction costs would eliminate all scope for strategic behavior.
However, our model would generalize to an environment with an imperfect credit market - this would just put
constraints on some types of strategic behavior.
1.2.1.3 Preferences
Both members of the household i E {M, F} have CRRA preferences over the personal consumption
good c' (we note that the results would be unchanged if we generalized preferences to be a CES
aggregate of a personal consumption good and a public, nonrival consumption good):
U =Et E 3 iT-t I
-rT 1-0-
Without loss of generality, we will assume that the wife is more patient than the husband (6F 6 M)
for the rest of the theoretical discussion.
The agents in the model act in self interested ways whenever possible. When an individual has
proprietary access to a resource, we assume that he can make a unilateral decision regarding that
resource - as a result, he will take the decision that maximizes his own utility without regard for
spousal welfare. We refer to these choices as private decisions. In the context of the model, saving
in individual accounts is a private decision, as resources stored in these accounts cannot be accessed
without the consent of the owner.
However, some decisions in the household need to be made collectively (we refer to these as
public decisions). If both members of the household can freely access a resource, then it cannot be
distributed unless both spouses agree on the allocation. In order to reach a consensus, we assume
that spouses bargain cooperatively with one another. We assume that the husband's bargaining
power can be represented by p E (0, 1) and is a function of a variety of time invariant distributions
factors (as in Browning and Chiappori 1998).3
Savings allocated to the joint account is a public decision. This is because either spouse can
access the joint account at any time; in order for funds to be deposited and remain in the account,
the deposit must be determined by consensus. Similarly, the distribution of consumption between
husband and wife is a public decision. In other words, we assume that the majority of consumption is
akin to food eaten at home - since any household member can put more food on his or her plate, the
final allocation must be determined by collective agreement. Note that this holds regardless of the
source of the resources used to finance consumption (current income vs. joint saving vs. individual
saving). Even when consumption is financed out of private savings, the act of transforming financial
resources into the consumable good makes the resources appropriable by both spouses and therefore
subject to collective bargaining.
3 One potential issue with our model is the assumption that distribution factors do not change over time. Indeed,
the observation that distribution factors can shift unexpectedly has inspired a large body of empirical work (e.g.
Angrist 2002; Bobonis 2009; Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix 2002; Duflo 2003; Lafortune 2010; Lundberg, Pollak,
and Wales 1997). We could easily expand our framework to accommodate unexpected innovations in bargaining
weights. A bigger issue is if the act of allocating savings to individual or joint accounts alters the bargaining weight
(presumably by shifting outside options). We discuss whether the availability of such deviations could be driving our
empirical results in Section 1.6.
This assumption is important, as it eliminates any scope for private accounts to be used to
increase individual shares of aggregate per-period consumption. In practice, not all consumption
choices are public decisions. However, while some consumption goods are undoubtedly best thought
of as private (many "vice" goods such as alcohol and cigarettes have this property), these goods
account for a small share of total expenditures of poor households in developing countries, particu-
larly when compared to general food expenditures, which make up around two-thirds of all spending
(Banerjee and Duflo 2007). In this context, private consumption concerns may be inframarginal
to the savings motive and therefore ignorable from a modeling perspective. Moreover, ruling out
private consumption motives allows us to focus on strategic action driven by differences in rates of
time preference, which is the primary goal of our model. That said, private consumption deviations
may well be important determinants of savings behavior, so we discuss whether such concerns could
be generating our results in Section 1.6.
1.2.1.4 Timing and Strategic Actions
Within a given period, the model proceeds as follows:
1. Incomes (yM, yf) and returns from any previous period's savings are realized.
2. The husband and the wife simultaneously make private savings decisions. Denote private
savings by individual i E {M, F} at time t as s'. An individual cannot save more than
yt + Ris_ 1 - b in any period (resources he or she has proprietary access to, less the cost of
going to the bank).
3. The husband and wife observe total resources available, as well as resources saved privately,
and jointly decide how much to consume (ct). Any additional savings is placed in the joint
account - denote this "household" saving as saf. The spouses also decide how to apportion
consumption between husband and wife subject to ct + cf = ct.
4. Consumption takes place and the period ends.
1.2.1.5 Solution Concept
We solve for subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the private savings game. The strategy set for
spouse i at time t is SJ = [0, y' + Ris- 1 - b']. The strategy set for the couple at time t is given by
S -= [0, Y (s') - bj], where Y (si) denotes period t resources net of private savings. A strategy
for actor a E {J, M, F} is given by a probability distribution o over St.
In some cases, the private savings game will have multiple equilibria. To refine the set of
equilibria that we need to consider, we make the following assumptions:
Al. Pure strategy equilibria will always be chosen over mixed strategy equilibria.
A2. If there exists more than one Nash equilibrium of a given type (pure/mixed), but one equilib-
rium Pareto dominates the others, then the couple will always choose the dominant equilib-
rium.
When there are no transaction costs and more than one account bears the highest rate of return,
there will be some cases in which a continuum of pure strategy equilibria exists, with each involving
saving the same aggregate amount in different accounts. This result is not very robust - as we will
see later on, as long as there is an arbitrarily small transaction cost associated with each account,
at most one account will used in any implemented pure strategy Nash equilibrium (this is a result
of imposing Assumption A2). To eliminate this knife edge multiple account case, we make the
following assumption:
A3. There is always some (potentially arbitrarily small) transaction cost associated with banking:
either w > 0 or b > 0 Va E {J, M, F}.
1.2.2 Efficient Bargaining
Before studying the strategic solution, we establish an efficient benchmark by which to measure the
behavior of households in our model. Since this is a multiperiod setting, we adopt the standard of
ex-ante Pareto efficiency. Any ex-ante Pareto efficient allocation can be captured by writing the
optimization problem of a social planner who puts weight q on the husband's utility and weight
(1 - q) on the wife's utility. By varying 77 over [0, 1], we trace out the Pareto frontier. Here we set q
equal to y (the husband's bargaining power in the collective allocation problem) - this solves for the
allocation that would result if the husband and wife could write intertemporally binding contracts
with one another. Then the planner's problem (or the "efficient bargaining" problem) is:
T=2 1-a T=2 F) 1-Or
max y =+ (1 - p)M/I E o( 6_1 (cY ) (EB)
(ct, ct, st, st, st It1 t=1 t=1
subject to
Yt + yt + E max { asi - w - , 0} ct cF (s > 0) (s, + b")
aE{J,M,F} aE{J,M,F}
s > 0 Va E {J, M, F}
where 1 (.) is the indicator function. Due to nonzero transaction costs, this problem is not convex.
However, we can imagine the planner solving for the optimal savings allocation conditional on
paying each relevant combination of transaction costs, and then selecting the plan that generates
the highest utility. Since each conditional problem is convex, first order conditions will be necessary
for an interior optimum. Taking first order conditions with respect to ct' and cf we see that
M (ca 1-- p( t-1
U F (cf) c P ( FMI (1.1)
so when 6F > SM, the ex-ante Pareto efficient sharing rule necessitates that for a given ct = c M +CF$ increase over time.4 We can use equation 1.1 to solve for the ex-ante Pareto efficient consumption
Ct
sharing rule in each period:
cM = ptct and c= (1 - pt) ct where pt =
(poA1t ) ((1 - F) o c1)
Note that pt monotonically increases with p, the husband's bargaining power. When 6M < SF,
p1 > P2. In contrast, when SM = SF, pt is time invariant and equal to (it)
(t) 1+(1-A)-!
1.2.3 Incentives to Deviate from the Efficient Allocation
It may be difficult to enforce the ex-ante efficient allocation when pt evolves over time. In fact,
when discount factors differ, there are incentives to deviate at both the private savings and collective
bargaining stages of the game. First we show that individuals could make themselves better off by
deviating from the efficient savings path. When so > 0, first order conditions from the efficient
bargaining problem require that (c)6 = SiRa (ci) 4. But when SM < SF, the wife's marginal
utility of an e increase in s? is
- (c F) (1 - P1) + SFRa (cF) - (1 - P2) ] > 0
and the husband's marginal utility of an e decrease in sa is
[(c) pi - SMRa (c2M)- P 2 6 > 0
where both inequalities use pi > P2. In contrast, if 6M SF then pi = P2 and there are no individual
incentives to deviate. A linear consumption sharing rule is essential for this result. If the sharing
rule also depended on the level of consumption, there could be incentives to deviate in the absence
of discount factor heterogeneity. We purposefully abstract away from this complication in order to
focus on discount factors. However, it is important to note that assuming a linear sharing rule puts
strong restrictions on individual utility functions: the per-period sharing rule will be linear if and
only if puM (ct') + (1 - p)UF (cF) is homothetic (indeed, we could easily rewrite our model with
more general utility functions under this assumption).5
4This observation reflects broader issues associated with aggregating individual preferences with differing discount
factors. In particular, aggregated preferences will be time inconsistent as long as positive weight is placed on at least
two agents with og 4 og (Jackson and Yariv 2010). In our context, it is straightforward to show that when 6F > 6 M
the effective discount factor governing the ex-ante efficient allocation asymptotes to 6 F as T -+ oo. Other studies
that address this aggregation problem include Feldstein (1964), Marglin (1963), Caplin and Leahy (2004), Gollier
and Zeckhauser (2005), Weitzman (2001), and Zuber (2010).
5This highlights an important point: in practice intrahousehold heterogeneity in discount factors may be correlated
with heterogeneity in utility functions. As such, we will not be able to rule out that some part of the patterns we
Second, the couple may have difficulty enforcing the time varying consumption sharing rule.
Imagine the spouses collectively decide upon a consumption path at t = 1. Then if they were given
the opportunity to reoptimize at time r > 1, they would choose to do so whenever 6M # 6F, and
would reallocate a larger share of time r consumption to the less patient spouse such that pr = pi.1
Since only the less patient spouse stands to benefit from this reallocation, there may be some natural
barriers to renegotiation (Ligon 2002); however, in the long run it seems implausible that households
would be able to enforce allocations where one member gets an ever shrinking share of aggregate
consumption. Indeed, the results in Duflo and Udry (2004), Mazzocco (2007), and Robinson (2008)
all suggest that couples cannot commit intertemporally.
We therefore assume that all agents "live in the moment", in that if reoptimization is attractive
in period t, they will reoptimize. Then the sharing rule will be governed by p = pi. This assumption
also implies that if an individual can make himself better off by deviating from the allocation that
he would collectively choose with his spouse, he will do so. To see if this has bite, we solve (EB) for
the optimal savings path imposing a time invariant, linear sharing rule. Denote cm (ct) = pct and
cF (ct) = (1 - p) ct. Then if the couple were to collectively choose s' > 0, the following equality
would be satisfied for individual i
(C) = Ra6i (c')~O + Ra (1 - ci' (c2)) (6_i - 6i) (c ) (1.2)
Note that when 6F > 6M, the remainder term on the right hand side is negative for the wife and
positive for the husband, which implies that (cf) - < Ra6F (cF' and (cM)-' > Ra3M (c2 ')
In this case, if individuals do not take strategic action and the couple saves, the collective outcome
will leave the wife feeling savings constrained and the husband feeling borrowing constrained - both
would like to alter the time path of consumption if possible. It therefore seems likely that households
with discount factor heterogeneity will exhibit strategic behavior. The next subsection characterizes
this behavior and derives comparative statics with respect to preference heterogeneity and interest
rates.
observe in the data are driven by more general preference heterogeneity. Section 1.6 discusses whether it seems likely
that other forms of preference heterogeneity are driving our results.
6 This temptation to reoptimize reflects the fact that when discount factors differ, the household has time incon-
sistent collective preferences (Jackson and Yariv 2010). This type of temptation problem is similar to the internal
temptation problems studied by a large literature where either time inconsistent preferences or differential prefer-
ences between different "selves" lead to distorted consumption and savings behavior (examples include Banerjee and
Mullainathan 2010, Fudenberg and Levine 2006, Gul and Pesendorfer 2004, Harris and Laibson 2001, Laibson 1997,
and O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999). We also note that heterogeneity in discount factors is not a necessary condition
for a time inconsistent household: Hertzberg (2010) proposes a non-cooperative model of the household where two
agents with identical exponential discount factors behave like a single time inconsistent agent.
1.2.4 The Strategic Solution
1.2.4.1 Incorporating the Sharing Rule
It is convenient to use the sharing rule to rewrite individual utility functions so that they are defined
over aggregate per-period consumption ct:
UM -T=2 1-O
1 - =Et1z~ /M~tr]
F)l 'T=2 1 _a '0jt = UtF _ Et (f- o c',
(1 - p), 1 -0,
Since the couple bargains cooperatively over joint savings, it will choose a Pareto efficient alloca-
tion (subject to the time invariant p). This choice can be represented by the maximization of a
"household" utility function
H _p tM -1-P t Et T= rC
QO _rUt )o 1-F
where Qt = pp 1- -1+ (1 - p) (1 - p)- 6t. Note that
Q1 tip 1--M + (1 - A) (1 - P)1-' JF
-- = = = OM + (I - p) 6 F
The "household" discount factor, Q, is just a weighted average of individual discount factors, where
the weights are given by each individual's share of aggregate consumption (also recall that p is just
a rescaling of the bargaining weight, I).
1.2.4.2 The Collective Allocation Problem
We solve the model by working backwards. In the second (final) period, all parties would like to
maximize consumption. Therefore agents optimally set s* s** = 0. Then the collective
t = 1 saving problem is given by:
)1-0-S- aE{J,M,F} (s > 0) (S b)
arg max J 11 +
(Y1 ZEJ,,}1 -- ~ > )mx{ae-w-bo)'
)1--y2 + aE{JMF}1 (Sa > 0) max ( Ra- -U 0
Q ( ~ 1 - or
subject to sf > 0
where sj and sf are taken as given. Again, this problem is not convex due to transaction costs.
As before, we can examine the convex subproblem by assuming that joint banking and withdrawal
costs are paid, solve for the optimal s, conditional on the costs being paid, and compare the utility
of this allocation to the utility of setting sJ = 0. Then if the couple saves in the joint account, the
following household Euler condition holds:
c = QRjc2 (1.3)
1.2.4.3 Characterization of Optimal Strategies
Both individuals know the cooperative outcome given any private savings allocation s= [sf, si']'
and endowment y = [y1, y2]'. Since we do not focus on changes in the endowment, we refer to
the couple's optimal joint savings choice given a private savings allocation si as sJ (si).7 Before
characterizing individual strategic behavior, it is useful to consider how each spouse can use his or
her private account to manipulate consumption streams. The wife's goal is to increase consumption
in the second period. She can achieve this by "oversaving" in her individual account - as long
as she has sufficiently large yr, this will be a viable strategy even when her individual account is
dominated (in terms of rate of return) by the joint and/or husband's account.
In contrast, the husband's goal is to increase consumption in the first period. Here, his optimal
strategy will depend on the context. Suppose that in the absence of strategic behavior, the couple
would collectively choose to save in his account because he has access to the best interest rate.
In order to increase first period consumption he could either save less than the desired collective
amount in his account, even to the point of refusing to save at all. Even when his account is
dominated by the joint and/or wife's account, he may still be able to manipulate consumption
streams in his favor. For example, suppose the couple would collectively choose to save in the joint
account if he took no action. Then the husband could rush to the bank and preemptively save "just
enough" in his account to prevent the couple from travelling to the bank again to save jointly. If
this "just enough" amount results in increased first period consumption, a sufficiently impatient
husband will find this deviation profitable. Note that in this case, the presence of transaction costs
is essential - in their absence, this type of deviation would always result in decreased consumption
in both periods. This is an important insight, particularly given our focus on developing countries:
transaction costs greatly expand the scope of private savings deviations available to the less patient
spouse.
We begin our characterization of optimal strategies by showing that at most one bank account
will be in use in any implemented pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This will give us a very simple
way to determine which households will save privately and which will not. First, we establish the
following lemma:
Lemma 1 Let si = [M, sF]' be a pure strategy private savings allocation. If s' is part of a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium and either sm > 0 or s F > 0, then s' (si) = 0.
7When convenient, we will write sJ (si) when considering only one private savings choice.
Proof. See Appendix A. m
This lemma highlights that it is never optimal to save individually such that the couple travels
back to the bank at the collective allocation stage. With this result in hand, we are prepared to
show the following:
Proposition 1 No couple will choose a pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the private savings game
where more than one account is in use. Moreover, when RMSM :A RF0F, no such pure strategy
equilibrium exists.
Proof. See Appendix A. *
Given this result, it is straightforward to determine which households will save privately. For
each individual i, we need only check if he or she would find a pure strategy private savings choice
profitable when sl = 0. If neither member does, Proposition 1 and Assumption Al imply that
households default to s = sf = 0. If one or both members strictly prefer to save privately
assuming their spouse does not, then any Nash equilibrium must involve the use of individual
accounts with positive probability. If a pure strategy Nash equilibrium can be constructed where
just one spouse saves, the household will choose this over any mixed strategy by Assumption Al. If
such an equilibrium cannot be constructed, both individuals in the household will randomize over
private savings choices.
1.2.4.4 Preference Heterogeneity and Account Choice
We are now prepared to analyze how heterogeneity in rates of time preference impacts the efficiency
of household investment choices. As a baseline, we show that perfectly matched households always
invest their savings efficiently:
Proposition 2 If oM = 6F, then a solution to the ex-ante Pareto Efficient planning problem (EB)
will always be chosen by the household in the private savings game.
Proof. See Appendix A. m
To explore how preference heterogeneity impacts savings behavior, we fix incomes, the average
household discount factor (Q), banking costs (ba), and interest rates. This lets us consider a subset of
households who would all choose the same allocation in the absence of individual strategic behavior,
and study how the chosen allocation changes with preference heterogeneity. The benevolent planner
would also choose the same savings allocation for all these households if he were restricted to the
time invariant consumption rule given by p. This allocation also corresponds to the outcome of the
private savings game when 5M = SF = Q (Proposition 2). This concordance is a useful result of
choosing utility functions that result in a linear consumption sharing rule, and provides a natural
benchmark for efficient behavior. 8
8 However, note that these households would not all choose the same allocation if they could implement time
varying consumption rules. This is easily seen by comparing the solution to (EB) for a household where 6m = 6F = Q
In order to derive comparative statics with respect to discount factor heterogeneity and account
use, we need a way to index couples according to match quality. To do so, we define Y> 1 such
that 3 m (-y) = and 5F (Y; P) = (^(-P). When -y = 1, 6M = 6F = Q - a couple is perfectly
matched. By varying -y and p conditional on Q, 8F - 5M can be made arbitrarily large (note that
6 F - 6M , which is strictly increasing in -y when -y 2 1), all while ensuring that 6M E (0, Q]i-p
and 6F E
To move forward, we need to put a bit more structure on the types of private savings choices
that might be profitable for an individual. To do so, take all feasible private savings choices (the set
Si), discard choices that lead to a strictly Pareto dominated consumption allocation (as compared
to s' = 0) and assign the remaining choices to two sets, depending on how the choices change the
time path of consumption relative to the "household alternative", which prevails when s = 0:
Definition 1 Given s7', a temporally advantaged private savings choice for individual i is any
sc C S' that results in increased consumption in the first period when i = M or the second period
when i = F, relative to the household alternative.
Definition 2 Given si, a temporally disadvantaged private savings choice for individual i is
any s, E S' that results in increased consumption in the second period when i = M or the first
period when i = F, relative to the household alternative.
Note that temporally advantaged choices favor an individual's relatively preferred period (t = 2
for the wife and t = 1 for the husband). In contrast, temporally disadvantaged choices favor the
opposite of the relatively preferred period. Denote individual i's set of temporally advantaged
private savings choices given s-i as A' (sji) and the analogous set of temporally disadvantaged
private savings choices as D' (si). When it does not cause confusion, we drop the dependence on
sj' and simply refer to A' and D'. When s' > 0 results in the same consumption allocation as
s' = 0, we assign A' to both A' and D'. Given this setup, we are now prepared to characterize how
the profitability of private savings changes with preference heterogeneity.
To do this, we establish "preference heterogeneity thresholds" for private savings. Specifically,
we show that when temporally advantaged deviations are available, there exists a level of preference
heterogeneity (indexed by -y) above which couples will always save privately. We also show that
there exists a separate threshold for temporally disadvantaged deviations below which couples will
always save privately. The following proposition formalizes this result:
Proposition 3 Fix Q, y, ba, and interest rates. Then the following preference heterogeneity thresh-
olds for private savings obtain:
to a household where 6 m = 0 and 6F - . The household with greater preference heterogeneity will save more, all
else equal.
1. Suppose AF (0) is nonempty. Then 3 p* E [0,1) s.t. V p E (p*,1) 7 ,y(p) c [1,oo) s.t.
all households with sharing rule p and -y > * (p) will exhibit private savings in any Nash
equilibrium.
2. Suppose Am (0) is nonempty. Then E * E [1, oc) s.t. all households with - > -y* will exhibit
private savings in any Nash equilibrium.
3. Suppose DF (0) is nonempty. Then Vp E (0,1) -y* (p) ; 1 s.t. all households with Y <
-y* (p) will exhibit private savings in any Nash equilibrium. It may be that yp* (p) = 1, in
which case no element of DF (0) will ever be profitable for the wife.
4. Suppose DM (0) is nonempty. Then 3 -y* > 1 s.t. all households with -Y < -y* will exhibit
private savings in any Nash equilibrium. It may be that -y* = 1, in which case no element of
DM (0) will ever be profitable for the husband.
Proof. See Appendix A. m
The first two thresholds apply to temporally advantaged choices. A key insight of this proposition
is that no matter how wasteful a temporally advantaged private savings choice may be, we can always
find a preference heterogeneity threshold beyond which an agent will find this choice profitable.
This is intuitive: as 6 M -+ 0 (OF -+ oc), the agent only cares about the first (second) period.
Since temporally advantaged choices favor this relatively preferred period by definition, in the limit
agents will prefer them to si = 0 even when these choices incur higher transaction costs and/or
require the use of substantially lower interest rates. At the same time, it is important to note that
private savings choices need not be inefficient - this will depend on the parameter values under
consideration.
The final two thresholds apply to temporally disadvantaged choices. Here, the sign of the
inequalities are reversed: since these choices favor the opposite of the agent's preferred period, they
become less attractive as preference heterogeneity increases. Intuitively, one may expect that the use
of individual accounts increases with preference heterogeneity, all else equal. However, the different
thresholds necessary for temporally advantaged and disadvantaged deviations highlight that this
may not always be the case. Indeed, the next proposition illustrates that individual account use
will only be increasing in preference heterogeneity when the less patient spouse's bank account is
dominated by the joint account.
Before presenting that result, we must introduce some notation. When there are differential
banking costs (i.e. it is more costly to travel to the bank to use an individual account than a joint
account), a perfectly matched couple (-y = 1) will always strictly prefer the joint account to individ-
ual account i bearing the same interest rate. To size the banking cost gap, define Ri (Rj; Q, y, ba) to
be the individual interest rate that makes a couple composed of two agents with J = Q, endowment
y, and banking cost vector ba indifferent between individual account i and the joint account. When
it does not cause confusion, we shorten the notation to Ri (Rj). If parameters are such that this
couple would not save given Rj, let Ri (Rj) = -oo.
Proposition 4 Fix Q, p, y, ha, and interest rates. Then the following hold:
(a) If private savings is weakly preferred by the wife given sM = 0 and discount factor 6 F ,
then it will be strictly preferred by wives in all households with ' > y.
(b) Suppose RM < RiM (Rj). Then if private savings is weakly preferred by the husband given
sF = 0 and discount factor 6 M (-y), it will be strictly preferred by husbands in all households
with y > y.
(c) Suppose RM RM (Rj). The relationship between the husband's preference for private savings
and y given sj = 0 need not display upward monotonicity.
Proof. See Appendix A. m
The most important result here is that whenever RM < RM (RJ) (i.e. a perfectly matched
couple would prefer the joint account to the husband's account), households' use of individual
accounts will be upwardly monotonic in preference heterogeneity - this follows directly from parts
(a) and (b) of Proposition 4. For these households, strategic private savings action will always entail
saving in an individual account: wives will "oversave", forcing more consumption into the future,
while husbands exploit banking costs by running to the bank and saving in order to prevent the
couple from returning to the bank to save in the joint account. Since the attractiveness of these
deviations is increasing in discount factor heterogeneity, individual account use is also increasing in
heterogeneity.
In contrast, part (c) of the proposition highlights that when the husband's account dominates
the joint account, account use patterns need not be monotonic in preference heterogeneity. Recall
that when the husband has the most attractive account, his best strategy may be to undersave
(relative to the collective optimum) in his account. As preference heterogeneity increases, he may
wish to undersave to the point of not saving at all, so this can lead to a negative correlation between
individual account use and preference heterogeneity. Moreover, for some parameter values it may
be that as preference heterogeneity increases, first the husband undersaves, then he refuses to save
(forcing the couple to save jointly), and then makes use of the "save just enough" deviation. This
would lead to a nonmonotonic relationship between individual account use and match quality, as
indexed by y.
Also note that in the proof, we show that temporally disadvantaged choices are never optimal
for wives. As such, we do not analyze -y** going forward.
Propositions 3 and 4 characterize the prevalence of private savings over a range of preference
heterogeneity given interest rates, and identify conditions under which individual account use will
be increasing in preference heterogeneity. We now study how changes in interest rates impact the
incidence of private savings. We do so by studying the impact of one interest rate on the hetero-
geneity thresholds established in Proposition 3, conditional on the relevant alternative interest rate.
First consider changes in Ri. Denote individual i's preference heterogeneity thresholds (conditional
on Q, p, y, and Rj) for private savings given Ri as 'y* (Ri) and y** (Ri).
Proposition 5 Fix Q, p, y, ba, and Rj. Suppose the private savings threshold for individual i
is s.t. 4'(Ri) c (1,oo). Then -y(R') < 'y|(Ri) VR' > Ri. Suppose -Y*(RM) E (1,oo). Then
g (R') > 7** (Rm) VR'y > Rm.
Proof. See Appendix A. *
The movements of -y,* and -y* illustrate that increasing the individual interest rate (conditional
on Rj) makes private savings more attractive. Moreover, if we limit our attention to cases where
temporally disadvantaged deviations are never optimal (i.e. RM < RM (RJ)), then Proposition 5
implies that individuals in households with greater preference heterogeneity are willing to accept
lower rates of return on individual accounts than their counterparts in better matched households.
We now perform the analogous comparative statics exercise, this time fixing Ri and changing
the joint rate. Since we now vary Rj, we refer to preference heterogeneity thresholds as 'Yi (Rj)
and y** (Rj).
Proposition 6 Fix Q, p, y, ba and Ri. Suppose ^y (Rj) C (1, 00). Then y (R') < y* (RJ)
VR' < Rj. In contrast, the comovement of 7*y (Rj) and -y** (Rj) with Rj is ambiguous, unless
< 0.
ORj
Proof. See Appendix A. s
For the wife, the result here mirrors that of Proposition 5. An increase in Rj always increases
8Jsecond period consumption under the household alternative, even when L < 0. So as Rj increases,
more wives will find the household alternative attractive (and therefore 7) increases). The key
difference for husbands is that increasing the joint interest rate could actually make the household
a J
alternative less attractive when 6 M < Q, since first period consumption decreases whenever 891 > 0.
An interesting implication of Proposition 6 is that when given a menu of joint account interest rates,
wives would always choose the highest rate. In contrast, a husband may prefer a lower joint rate
if this serves to reduce the couple's savings. This is closely related to our earlier observation that
a husband may sometimes refuse to save in his private account when it bears the highest rate of
return. These results imply that less patient spouses may sometimes be willing to take costly action
to block a household's access to higher return savings devices.
Our analysis has characterized how preference heterogeneity impacts account use given a set
of interest rates, and how the prevalence of private savings changes given changes in individual
and joint interest rates. While we cannot randomly assign preference heterogeneity to couples to
test our theory, we can randomly assign interest rates to bank accounts. This observation inspired
the design of a field experiment we conducted in Western Kenya, where married couples were
given the opportunity to open three bank accounts (two individual accounts and one joint account)
with randomly assigned interest rates. The following section describes this experiment in detail,
and then derives testable implications of the theory by overlaying the above propositions with the
experimental design.
1.3 Experimental Design and Testable Implications
1.3.1 Experimental Context
Our experiment was conducted in Western Province, Kenya, in areas surrounding the town of
Busia. Busia is a commercial trading center straddling the Kenya-Uganda border. The town is
well served by the formal banking sector, hosting over six banks at the time of field activities. It
is only recently, however, that major banks have begun to offer products suitable for low income
individuals. Traditionally, Kenyan bank accounts required opening balances upwards of Ksh 1,000
(approximately equal to $12.50 at an exchange rate of Ksh 80 per $1, or $19.23 using a PPP
exchange rate of Ksh 52 per $1) and charged monthly maintenance fees around Ksh 50 ($0.63).9
However, recently banks have begun to target lower income individuals, and several banks currently
offer lower fee alternatives to traditional bank accounts.
The financial partner for this study is Family Bank of Kenya. The bank currently has over
600,000 customers, 50 branches throughout the country, Ksh 13 billion ($167 million) in assets,
and actively targets low and middle income individuals as part of its corporate strategy. All study
participants were offered Family Bank's Mwananchi accounts. This account can be opened with
any amount of money, though a minimum operating balance of Ksh 100 (approximately $1.25)
cannot be withdrawn. The account pays no interest, but deposits are free of charge and there are
no recurring maintenance fees. The only fees associated with the account are withdrawal fees, which
are Ksh 62 ($0.78) over the counter and Ksh 30 ($0.38) with an ATM card. Account holders may
purchase an ATM card for Ksh 300 ($3.75), though this is not mandatory.
1.3.2 Experimental Design
1.3.2.1 Targeted Population
The experiment targeted low income married couples who did not currently have an account with
Family Bank but were potentially interested in opening one. At the outset of the study, we identified
communities surrounding 19 local primary schools, which would serve as group meeting grounds.
These schools were located between 0.2 and 7.7 miles from Family Bank's Busia branch, which is
located in the town's commercial center. Targeted communities were situated either on the outskirts
of Busia town or in nearby rural areas. Figure 1 illustrates the location of the schools relative to
Family Bank and our field office on a map.
All experimental activities were conducted in group meetings. Trained field officers recruited
households in communities surrounding a study school the day before each meeting. With the help
of a local guide, they made door-to-door visits to households headed by married couples and issued
meeting invitations to eligible households. To be eligible for invitation, a household had to be
9 For comparison, the median household in our sample reported Ksh 1,200 in combined income in the week before
the survey.
headed by a married couple, with both spouses present and able to attend the meeting. In addition,
only households where both spouses had a valid Kenyan national ID card were admitted to the
meetings, as Family Bank requires this document of all account holders. 10
In order to compensate respondents for their time and to provide an additional incentive to
attend the meetings, each individual who participated in the study received Ksh 100 in cash at the
end of the meeting. Approximately 29 percent of issued invitations were redeemed over the course
of the study. While far from universal, takeup rates are high enough that our sample represents a
nontrivial fraction of targeted married couples in our catchment area.
1.3.2.2 Interventions
All couples attending our group meetings were given the opportunity to open up to three Family
Bank accounts: an individual account in the name of the husband, an individual account in the
name of the wife, and a joint account. To maximize takeup, we funded each opened account with the
Ksh 100 ($1.25) minimum operating balance (this amount could not be withdrawn by participants
- it simply made opening an account costless). Participants were eligible to be randomly allocated
into two core interventions, which are described below.1 1
Intervention 1 - Interest Rates Figure 2 illustrates the design of the interest rate intervention.
Before deciding which accounts they wanted to open, couples drew three random interest rates (one
rate per potential account). All interest rates were quoted to respondents as the 6-month yield
on the average daily account balance. These interest rates were temporary, and expired after six
months - respondents were told that the interest was a special promotion to help them save. 12 Since
many respondents had low levels of education, enumerators explained what an interest rate was and
provided numerical examples for each interest rate that was drawn. Since some of our theoretical
results are only unambiguous when the joint interest rate dominates the individual interest rate of
the less patient spouse, we designed the experiment so the joint account had a greater probability
of bearing the highest rate of return than an individual account: individual accounts could bear
either 0, 2, 6, or 10 percent 6-month yields (with equal probability), and joint accounts could bear
either 2, 6, or 10 percent 6-month yields (with equal probability).
10 This requirement is common to all banks in Kenya. The majority of individuals in Kenya have a national ID
card as it is legally required of all adult citizens and necessary in order to vote, buy or sell land, and seek formal
employment.
"A subset of opened accounts were also randomly selected to receive free ATM cards. A description and analysis
of this treatment is presented in Schaner (2010). We do not discuss this intervention here, as accounting for it has
no impact on any of the results presented in this paper.
2 After the six month period, balances earned no interest, which is standard for the Mwananchi account and other
current accounts in Kenya. These interest rates were very high compared to market alternatives: small scale savings
balances could earn at most 0.5-2.0 percentage points of interest annually given bank accounts available in Busia at
the time of the experiment.
The three interest rate draws were completely independent of one another, and therefore created
random variation in the return of account a relative to its alternatives, even conditional on account
a's interest rate. We define the "excess" interest rate on account a for couple c to be
excessac = Rac - max{Rac : # a} (1.4)
That is, the excess interest rate is the difference between account a's rate and the best alternative
rate. The interior cells of Figure 2 illustrate the variation in the excess rate for joint, husbands' and
wives' accounts respectively.
After observing their interest rates, couples were separated and each spouse was administered a
baseline survey. One concern is that randomizing the interest rates before conducting the baseline
influenced survey responses. However, interest rates are not systematically associated with baseline
self reports of savings levels or savings device use, nor are they associated with self reported decision
making power regarding consumption and saving. We therefore expect that the randomization had
little impact on survey responses. After the baseline, couples were reunited and decided which
accounts they wanted to open.
In order to make interest rates as salient as possible, couples were given reminder cards for each
account that they opened. All cards, including those given to individuals opening accounts that
did not bear any interest, featured a reminder to save. Cards given for accounts bearing interest
prominently featured the interest rate and several numerical examples of the 6-month return on
different balances. If couples opened more than one account, enumerators marked the cards with
the account type so couples could remember which account bore which rate of return. All cards
were translated into Swahili, since individuals in the study area are generally more proficient in
Swahili than English. Figure Al illustrates the interest rate reminder cards and a translation of the
text.
Intervention 2 - Extra Statements While not captured by our theory, a leading alternative
model for why costly individual savings devices are popular in the developing world is that these
devices enable individuals to hide resources from other household members, which in turn increases
individual utility (Anderson and Baland 2002). In order to test whether the ability to hide savings
was an important driver of individual account use in our sample, we randomly selected 50 percent
of participating couples for an "extra statements" offer.13 If a selected couple decided to open an
individual account for (without loss of generality) the wife, the enumerator processing the couple's
paperwork asked if they would consent to allow the husband to receive extra statement cards. The
cards, if presented by the husband at the bank, entitled him to learn the current balance of his
wife's account. These cards were only valid for 6 months, and were not given to couples unless both
spouses gave their consent.
1
3 Extra statements were not offered to the 97 couples (16 percent of our sample) in the first 6 experimental sessions.
1.3.3 Testable Implications
We now apply our theoretical results to the experimental design to generate three key testable
implications, which we will take to the data in Section 1.4. To mimic our experimental context,
consider a finite population of households where there is some nondegenerate distribution of pref-
erence parameters, bargaining weights, income, and banking costs, given by f (y, Q, p, y, ba).14 As
in the field experiment, all households in this population have access to three bank accounts with
randomly assigned interest rates: RM, RF, and Rj. Let all interest rates vary over the range [R, P].
Our theoretical discussion highlighted that certain types of inefficient private savings choices
will always be profitable as long as preference heterogeneity in the household is large enough. In
practice, f (-) could be such that inefficient choices are never profitable for any individual in the
population. Since we are interested in deriving predictions for the case where inefficient strategic
behavior is observed among a nontrivial share of couples, we make the following assumption:
A4. The distribution of preference heterogeneity, as governed by f (-), is such that for any interest
rate draw [Rj, RM, RF] (where each Ra E [R, 7?]), there exists a positive mass of couples with
y > 1 who save in individual accounts in any Nash Equilibrium.
For convenience, we also assume the following:
A5. bm = bF > bJ
Given our rural Kenyan context, it is essential that we account for banking costs when deriving our
testable implications. Recall our definition of Ri (Rj; Q, y, ba): it is the individual interest rate that
would make a couple composed of two agents with 6 = Q, endowment y, and banking cost vector
ba indifferent between individual account i and the joint account. If parameters are such that the
couple would not save given Rj, Ri (Rj; Q, y, ba) - -oo. Similarly, define Rj (Ri; Q, y, ba) to be
the joint interest rate that would make a perfectly matched couple indifferent between individual
account i and the joint account. If parameters are such that the couple would not save given Ri,
let RJ (Ri; , y, ba) = 0.
Since we consider a finite population, we can bound banking costs, incomes, and the average
household discount factor. Then for a given Rj we can define the maximum individual interest
premium in the population to be:
Ej (Rj) = max Ri (Ri, Q, y, ba) I Rj - Rj
Similarly, for a given Ri we can define the maximum joint interest discount in the population to be
Ei (Ri) = Ri - min { j(R, Q, y, ba) I Ri}
"Variation in banking costs is due to, for example, variation in distance from the bank and occupational mobility.
Given this setup, we analyze the savings choices of two groups of households - one consisting
of a population of perfectly matched couples given by the distribution f (-y, Q, p1 y, I -y = 1), and
another population of poorly matched households given by the distribution f (-Y, Q, p, y, ba -Y> 1).
Our first testable implication characterizes patterns of overall account use by match quality. The
central idea behind the private savings theory is that badly matched couples make strategic use of
individual accounts to manipulate consumption streams. Intuitively, one would therefore expect
that perfectly matched couples make more intensive use of joint accounts, while poorly matched
couples make more intensive use of individual accounts. This is true in many instances, but not
always: the theoretical discussion highlighted that in some cases a husband in a badly matched
couple may find it profitable to refuse to use his account when it bears the highest rate of return. 15
Fortunately, our formal characterization of private savings behavior enables us to identify a subset
of the population for which the initial intuition always holds.
To do so, condition on Q, y, and banking costs, ba. Proposition 2 states that perfectly matched
couples will always invest their savings optimally. Consider interest rate draws where a perfectly
matched couple would save jointly. Propositions 3, 4, and Assumption A4 imply that a positive
mass of poorly matched couples will save in individual accounts. The same argument applies to
interest rate draws where a perfectly matched couple would not save at all, subject to the caveat
that some poorly matched couples will be observed saving jointly due to mixed strategy equilibria.
To the extent that the share of couples who must implement a mixed strategy is small (in practice,
our empirical results support this) mixed strategies will not substantively impact our results. Next
consider interest rate draws where a perfectly matched couple would prefer to save in an individual
account. Proposition 4 implies that when RM < RM (Rj), all poorly matched couples would also
save in an individual account with positive probability (again subject to the mixed strategy caveat).
Though RM (RJ) is unobservable, limiting the sample to those couples for whom RM Rj will
ensure that well matched couples are more likely to use the joint account, since Rj is always less
than RM (Rj) by Assumption A5. Then our first testable implication follows:
T1. Consider the population of couples for whom RM < Rj. Conditional on Q, y, and ba, well
matched couples will be more likely to save in the joint account, while poorly matched couples
will be more likely to save in the individual account.
Our next testable implication characterizes couples' responses to relative rates of return on their
bank accounts. Here we exploit the fact that conditional on an account's interest rate, Ra, our
experiment generated random variation in its relative rate of return, captured by excessa. Since
perfectly matched couples always invest efficiently (Proposition 2), they will always save in the
highest return account available, while poorly matched couples will sometimes make inefficient
choices. However, due to differential banking costs, we cannot simply compare savings rates in
i5 Here we refer to the account of the less patient spouse as the husband's account for rhetorical convenience. In
practice, this account could belong to either the husband or the wife.
accounts where excessa ;> 0 and excessa < 0 by match quality: in some cases, the joint account will
offer the highest return net of transaction costs, even when excessj < 0. Instead, we characterize
how savings rates change over a range of excess interest rates for a population with heterogeneous
banking costs. We first describe the efficient response of perfectly matched couples, and then the
response of poorly matched couples.
Panel A of Figure 3 graphs the average response to excessi conditional on Ri. Note that perfectly
matched households will never save in account i if excessi < 0 (here we use Assumption A5). 16 At
an excess rate of zero, if there is a mass of households who have RM = RF but Rj < Rj (Ri), we will
observe a discrete jump up in the savings rate. Since our field experiment generated lumpy variation
in the set of interest rates presented to a couple, the existence of such a mass seems reasonable.
As the excess interest rate increases beyond zero, the share of households saving in account i will
increase, until excessi = Ei (Ri). By definition, at this point account i will dominate account -i
and the joint account for all perfectly matched households who are willing to save at interest rate Ri.
Note that conditional on (Q, y), the slope of the graph over (0, Ei (Ri)) will be driven by the CDF
of Rj (Ri); perfectly matched couples' response to the excess interest rate reflects the distribution
of banking costs in the population. However, this result is only conditional - integrating over the
distribution of Q and y will also impact the shape of the graph.
Panel B of Figure 3 illustrates average savings responses for the joint account. The shape is
essentially the same for perfectly matched couples - however, since the joint account has lower
banking costs than individual accounts, perfectly matched couples begin to save at excessj =
-Ej (Rj), and all choose the joint account once excessj reaches zero. Notice that we should
observe a positive slope only for positive excess rates when considering individual accounts and a
positive slope only for negative excess rates when considering joint accounts. This asymmetry is a
striking implication of efficient investment in the presence of heterogeneous banking costs.
The behavior of poorly matched households is more difficult to characterize. By Proposition
3 and Assumption A4, strategic behavior will lead a mass of poorly matched households to save
in individual account i even when excessi < 0. We also expect to see a positive mass of joint
accounts in use when excessj < 0. (This will include a mix of couples who save jointly because
individual banking costs are too high, and couples where the less patient spouse has the highest
return individual account but refuses to use it). It is also clear that a positive mass of couples will
save in each type of account when the excess interest rate is positive.
It is not clear that the share of badly matched couples saving in account a will monotonically
increase as as excessa increases. One issue is how the excess interest rate effects the prevalence of
mixed strategy equilibria. The impact that this has on the graph in Figure 3 will depend on the shape
of f (.). If we assume that mixed strategy equilibria do not meaningfully impact our predictions,
161f we allow for bM bF, then the share of perfectly matched couples using account i may increase as excessi
increases even when excessi is negative. However, the share of couples using account i when excessi < 0 should be
small, as in many cases account i will be dominated by the joint account.
then we still have an ambiguous result for individual accounts, as illustrated by Proposition 6.17 In
contrast, Proposition 5 implies that the share of joint accounts in use should monotonically increase
as excessj increases.
We also note that we do not have a clear prediction for when or whether the share of couples
saving in account a will be higher for perfectly matched as compared to poorly matched couples, as
this will depend on f (.). Ultimately, the response of poorly matched couples to the excess interest
rate is largely an empirical question. We are now prepared to state our second testable implication:
T2. As illustrated by Figure 3, the share of well matched couples saving in individual accounts will
begin to increase around an excess interest rate of zero and continue to increase until a plateau
is reached at a positive excess interest rate. The share of well matched couples saving in the
joint account should peak, then plateau, around an excess interest rate of zero. In contrast,
poorly matched couples will not exhibit such breaks in behavior around an excess interest rate
of zero.
Our final implication uses the result that perfectly matched couples invest efficiently. Suppose that
in addition to actual interest rates, we were able to observe Rj (Ri). Then perfectly matched savers
would always choose to save in the account associated with max Ri, Rj (RM) , RJ (RF) } - if we
could calculate the "banking cost adjusted" rate of return on their savings, they would bear no
interest loss. In contrast, poorly matched couples would not always choose the account with the
highest effective rate of return - as a group they would bear a positive interest rate loss. This leads
to our final testable prediction:
T3. Poorly matched couples will bear larger banking cost adjusted interest rate losses than per-
fectly matched couples.
We now describe the data used to test T1-T3.
1.3.4 Data
We use two data sources for this project - survey data from one-on-one baseline questionnaires ad-
ministered during the group sessions (spouses were separated for the interviews), and administrative
data on account use from the bank. The baseline survey collected basic demographic information,
as well as information on rates of time preference, decision making power in the household, income,
current use of a variety of savings devices, and cross reports of spousal income and use of savings
7 Increases in the excess rate driven by decreases in Rj may make private savings less attractive to the less patient
spouse, which could push the share of households saving privately down as the excess interest rate increases. However,
this would be counteracted by the effect for the more patient spouse, which would push the share of badly matched
households saving privately up as excessi increases. Changes in the excess interest rate due to changes in R-i would
also work to generate a positive slope. Since more forces favor a positive slope, we illustrate this in Figure 3.
devices. The administrative data provided by the bank includes the first six months' transaction his-
tory of all accounts opened under the auspices of the project. Each entry in the transaction history
includes the deposit or withdrawal amount, any fees, and the type and time of the transaction.
1.3.4.1 Measuring Rates of Time Preference
We chose to elicit time preferences using choices between different amounts of money at different
times, as opposed to different amounts of goods at different times. We made this choice for two
reasons. First, Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) find that while time preference parameters esti-
mated using choices between money, rice, and ice cream were all correlated, only the parameters
estimated using money choices significantly predicted takeup and use of a commitment savings
product. Second, cash lotteries made intuitive sense to respondents given that the group meetings
revolved around bank accounts and savings.
We framed all questions as a choice between a smaller amount of money at a nearer time t (xt)
and a larger amount of money at a farther time t + r (xt+r) .18 In order to make choices salient,
respondents were given a 1 in 5 chance of winning one of their choices. Enumerators also used
calendars to visually show respondents the number of days they would have to wait for both the
smaller and larger amount of money.
In total, participants responded to 10 tables of monetary choices, with each table consisting of 5
separate choices between a smaller Ksh xt E {290, 220, 150, 80, 10} and larger x'+r = Ksh 300. This
was a sizeable amount of cash for the study participants. (For comparison, median reported daily
earnings in our sample were Ksh 100 for men and Ksh 43 for women). The 10 (t, t + r) pairs were:
(4, 1) , (4, 2) , (4, 3) , (1, 4) , (}, 8) , (}, 12) , (2, 3), (2,4), (4, 8), and (4, 12) weeks. We chose to set
the lowest near term t to "tomorrow" (4) instead of "today" (0) to avoid confounding our discount
factor estimates with differences in transaction costs of obtaining the funds in the near versus far
term, or degrees of trust as to whether the money would be delivered (Harrison, Lau, Rutstrom,
and Sullivan 2004). If a respondent won one of her choices, she had the option of having the funds
deposited directly in her bank account, or picking the cash up at our field office, also located in
Busia town. 19
While our data allow us to calculate (# - 3) quasi-hyperbolic preference parameters, we focus
on calculating a single exponential discount factor, as motivated by our two period model. As
18This method is common to most empirical studies that attempt to measure rates of time preference in developing
countries. Examples include Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006), Bauer and Chytilovico (2009), Dupas and Robinson
(2011), Shapiro (2010), and Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010).
19Despite the fact that the field office and Family Bank were proximately located, and that accessing cash deposited
in an account would entail paying a withdrawal fee, the majority of cash winners (79 percent) chose to have their
payments deposited in a bank account. The bank account may have been attractive because the respondents did not
have to remember to pick up the funds at any specific time, because the bank was more conveniently located (in the
commercial center of town), because the withdrawal fee was seen as a commitment device not to spend the money
frivolously, or because the individuals intended to use their new accounts for saving anyway.
in Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010), we use nonlinear least squares to estimate the discount
factors. For each individual we assume that utility is linear in money amounts over the range
Ksh 0-Ksh 300. Then the utility gains of the near and far amounts for person i considering
choice q can be expressed as AUj (zi) = and AUi (xi+r + 6 Txr + eig where we assume
eiq ~ Logistic (0, pi) .20 Then
1
Pr (xt >- x = Pr (5x > St+rxt+T + eiq) = 11 + exp (-pi (6ixt - 6f+o 3 0 0 ))
A substantial mass of men and women either always chose the nearer option or always chose Ksh 300
in the future. 2 1 For these individuals, the discount factor is not identified. To obtain an estimate,
we assume that all respondents would prefer Ksh 300 in the future to Ksh 0 sooner, and that all
respondents would prefer Ksh 300 sooner to Ksh 300 in the future. Adding these two imputed
questions to our tables leaves us with 70 responses for each individual. Define the dummy variable
nowiq = 1 (xt >- x+r) . Nonlinear least squares solves
70 2
{$iI Ai) = arg min n Towiq-( ) asr (=1 + exp ( (o xt -q 3 0 0 )))
The nonlinear least squares algorithm converged for all but 1 individual in the sample. We dropped
the couple where the algorithm failed for one of the spouses. We also topcoded oi at 6, the value of
6i obtained via nonlinear least squares when nOWiq = 0 for every question, and bottomcoded 6i at
6, the value of Si obtained when nowiq = 1 for every question. 22
As a robustness check, we also computed discount factors using a simple ad hoc bounding
strategy similar to that found in Meier and Sprenger (2010). Specifically, suppose that for individual
i, xq - 300t~r, but that 3 0 0 t+r xq+1 (where xq > xq+ 1 ). We then assume that the individual is
indifferent between Ksh 300 at time t + T and the midpoint of the two amounts at time t, tq,q+1
g+1. Using this midpoint, we can then calculate the implied discount factor 3 q,q+1 300
We do this for each table, obtaining 10 discount factor estimates, and take the simple average
of them. The correlation coefficient between the nonlinear least squares estimates and the ad hoc
estimates is 0.97 and results in this paper are generally very robust to using this alternative method.
One concern with the discount factor estimates is that responses could reflect collective rather
than individual preferences. Even though respondents answered questions separately from their
spouses, their decisions may reflect the intrahousehold resource allocation process. If ex-ante com-
20 Results assuming normally distributed eig are essentially unchanged. Results using alternative discount factor
estimates are available from the author upon request.
2126 percent of men and 22 percent of women always waited for Ksh 300 in the future, while 15 percent of men
and 14 percent of women always wanted the smaller, nearer amount.
2 2This led to the censoring of 19 estimated discount factors from below and 53 estimated discount factors from
above.
mitment describes the household, spouses should make identical choices. Even when action is strate-
gic, if our monetary amounts are inframarginal to the savings decision then choices should reflect
the discount factor used to determine savings allocations. If our respondents answered questions
in this way, the majority of intracouple variation in discount factors would be due to measurement
error. This would generally bias us towards rejecting T1-T3.23 It is also possible that our discount
factor estimates capture other aspects of individual preferences, such as risk aversion - unfortu-
nately, while we can control for heterogeneity in observable characteristics, we cannot account for
heterogeneity in discount factors driven by unobservable aspects of preferences.
1.3.4.2 Sample Characteristics
Our baseline sample consists of 597 non-polygamous married couples where both spouses had valid
national ID cards, valid estimates of 6J, and no pre-existing accounts with Family Bank.2 Table
1 presents baseline characteristics of the sample. Respondents are of relatively low socioeconomic
status - husbands average 8 years of schooling, and their wives average just under 6 years. While
most men are literate (86 percent), one third of women cannot read and write. On average, men
reported earning Ksh 1,348 (about $17) in the past week, while women reported earning Ksh 798
($10). However, median reported weekly incomes are substantially lower, at Ksh 700 and Ksh 300
for husbands and wives respectively.
Almost all respondents reported using at least one savings device at baseline. Most common was
saving cash at home, reported by 85 and 90 percent of husbands and wives respectively. Reported
savings levels at home were substantial and approximately equal to average weekly earnings. Half of
men and two-thirds of women reported participating in at least one ROSCA, corroborating earlier
studies demonstrating that ROSCAs are generally more popular among women than men in East
Africa (Anderson and Baland 2002; Dupas and Robinson 2011). Savings accounts with formal banks
were less common, particularly for women - while 30 percent of men reported owning a savings
account (and those men reported substantial savings in their accounts), just 12 percent of women
reported owning a savings account.
Pronounced gender patterns are also present in responses to questions regarding decision making
power within the household. The majority of individuals reported that either the husband made
most consumption decisions (47 percent of men, 38 percent of women) or that both spouses jointly
made consumption decisions (39 percent of men and 38 percent of women). In contrast, individuals
were most likely to report that the wife was primarily responsible for making savings decisions in the
household. In addition, only 10-11 percent of individuals reported that they jointly made savings
2 3A notable exception is if measurement error were correlated with cognitive ability. This could potentially generate
patterns in the data consistent with T1-T3. To test for this, we will present regression specifications that control for
spousal levels of and heterogeneity in education and literacy.
2 4We dropped 179 polygamous couples from our sample since strategic behavior may be very different in households
with more than one wife. However, our results are robust (though in some cases somewhat attenuated) to including
them.
decisions with their spouse, substantially less than the share of individuals reporting joint decision
making regarding consumption.
Finally, Table 1 reports the average estimated discount factor (the distribution of these discount
factors can be seen in Figure 4). On average, study participants appear to be very impatient, with
weekly discount factors averaging 0.80 for men and 0.79 for women. These discount factor estimates
are lower than estimates in studies of individuals in developing countries in Asia (Tanaka, Camerer,
and Nguyen 2010; Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006; Bauer and Chytilovi oe 2009; Shapiro 2010).
However, Dupas and Robinson (2011) find very impatient preferences among a Kenyan sample of
low-income entrepreneurs. 25
Next we examine the correlation between the discount factor estimates and observables. Table
2 presents results of regressing estimated discount factors on demographic and economic charac-
teristics.26 While demographic characteristics are essentially uncorrelated with estimated discount
factors, variables related to savings are more significant. Most importantly, estimated discount fac-
tors are positively correlated with observed savings levels in Family Bank accounts, and significantly
so for women. 2 7 These correlations are reassuring and suggest that the estimated discount factors
are capturing preferences over savings levels. While the correlations are generally insignificant for
men, this may be due to distortions in savings behavior stemming from strategic action - the cor-
relation between discount factors and Family Bank savings deposits is positive and statistically
significant for both genders when we limit the sample to well matched couples.
1.3.4.3 Randomization Verification
All randomization was conducted in the field, by allowing study respondents to draw folded envelopes
from tins. Enumerators were carefully trained not to allow any participants a second draw from
the tin if the participant was unhappy with his or her result. To ensure that this protocol was
followed, we check the deviation of treatment shares from their theoretical probabilities in addition
to checking to see if treatments are correlated with observables.
Table 3 presents the randomization verification exercise for interest rates, extra statements, and
cash prizes. Panel A presents the actual proportions of each treatment observed in the sample.
P-values from a binomial test that the observed proportion equals the theoretical proportion (1/4
for individual accounts, 1/3 for joint accounts, 1/2 for extra statements, and 1/5 for cash prizes)
2 5 1t is not essential that our estimated discount factors reflect the actual level values that govern individuals'
intertemporal decisions. What we require is that the intracouple heterogeneity in our estimates reflects true hetero-
geneity in the sample.
2 6 Missing demographic characteristics were recoded to zero and dummied out. This convention is held for the
remainder of the paper.
2 7 One concern is that the act of giving cash for discount rate elicitation choices, which could be deposited into
Family Bank accounts, would mechanically cause this correlation. However, the correlation for women remains
statistically significant at the 95 percent level when dropping all couples where at least one spouse was randomly
selected to receive a cash prize.
are presented in braces. While couples were somewhat less likely to be selected for extra statements
and cash prizes than expected, the results suggest that enumerators and participants respected the
experimental protocol.
Panel B presents chi-square test statistics and associated p-values from tests for the equality
of treatment distributions across demographic characteristics. The first two columns are limited
to either the husband or the wife, whereas the last three columns use both husband and wife
demographic characteristics. Overall, the randomization appears to have functioned well. The
number of coefficients significant at the 90 and 95 percent level are approximately equal to the
expected number due to chance, and there are no systematic patterns across the different treatments.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Account Takeup and Interest Rate Responses
While couples had the option of opening all three bank accounts and incurred no costs in doing
so (aside from the cost of additional time spent filling out paperwork), most couples chose to open
only one or two accounts. Although all couples opened at least one account, only 5 percent of
couples in our sample opened all three accounts. Fifty-six percent of couples chose to open only
the joint account, 3 percent of couples only opened one individual account, 29 percent of couples
opened two individual accounts, and the remaining 7 percent of couples opened a joint account and
one individual account. When we informally asked couples why they decided not to open all the
accounts, most couples stated that they did not have the resources to maintain three accounts, or
that they only had use for the account(s) that they chose to open. The additional time spent doing
paperwork may have been enough to dissuade couples from opening accounts that they were very
certain they would never use - since we explained that our Ksh 100 opening balance could not be
withdrawn from the accounts, there was no strategic reason to open all three accounts in order to
earn additional cash.
Table 4 examines the impact of interest rates on account opening and use. We present results
from regressions of the following form:
yac = ao + intac# + 3 + Eac (1.5)
where Yac is the outcome of interest, intac is a vector including interest rate dummy variables, a
joint account dummy, and interactions between the joint account and interest rate dummies, and y,
are experimental session fixed effects. (We include experimental session fixed effects for continuity
with the results involving preference heterogeneity - however, results are essentially unchanged if
we do not include them). We constructed several measures of account use for Table 4. Using
the Family Bank transaction data, we calculated the average daily balance of account a owned by
couple c using 6 months of data from the day of account opening (this covers the period where the
account was eligible to earn interest). The average daily balance nets out the Ksh 100 minimum
operating balance deposited into every open account, since this amount could not be accessed and
was deposited on behalf of the respondents. All unopened accounts were assigned an average daily
balance of zero. In addition to the average daily balance, we also created a savings indicator for
accounts with positive average daily balances, and calculated total deposits and withdrawals over
the 6-month study period, the total number of account transactions, and the total amount of fees
charged to the account.
Though the impact of the interest rate on saving is theoretically ambiguous, the income effect
should be very small since our interest rates were temporary. We therefore expect that higher
interest rates will be associated with greater savings. Table 4 confirms that higher interest rates
are associated with significantly higher rates of account opening and use. For example, individual
accounts with 10 percent interest were 66 percent more likely to be opened, more than twice as likely
to receive savings deposits, and had 3.3 times the average daily balances of individual accounts that
bore no interest. The table also illustrates that joint accounts were much more popular among
our study couples than individual accounts. For example, at 2 percent interest, 60 percent of the
couples chose to open a joint account, while only 34 percent of couples chose to open an individual
account. This pattern carries over to account use as well. The interest rate interaction terms reveal
that while level use of joint accounts is much higher, the slope with respect to the interest rate does
not differ between the two account types. 28
The relative popularity of joint accounts in our sample could reflect large differential banking
costs. In addition, couples may have been biased towards joint accounts because they decided
which accounts to open together. However, since use of joint accounts is higher even conditional
on opening (42 percent of open joint accounts were used for saving while 25 percent of opened
individual accounts were used for saving), it seems unlikely that social pressure at the meeting is
entirely responsible for the high rates of joint account use.
1.4.2 Discount Factor Heterogeneity and Account Use
As illustrated by Figure 4, there is substantial variation in estimated discount factors within our
sample. For couple c, define preference heterogeneity to be the difference between the male and
female estimated discount factors: hetc = Sc - SF . Figure 5 presents the histogram of hetc. While
13 percent of couples have identical discount factor estimates, many couples have estimates that
differ substantially.
Our three testable implications involve comparing the behavior of couples who are perfectly and
poorly matched in terms of discount factors. To approximate this empirically, we choose a rule of
2 8 Since free ATM cards were only issued to open accounts (and are therefore correlated with the interest rate), we
also checked to see if the results in Table 4 were driven by the free ATM treatment. Accounting for this treatment
has little effect on estimated coefficients and does not change the result that couples robustly respond to the interest
rate. These results are available from the author upon request.
thumb that divides the sample into three equal sized groups: "wife more patient", "well matched",
and "husband more patient". We label the 1/3 of the sample with the most closely aligned discount
factors as well matched and refer to the remaining couples as badly matched. 2 9 This corresponds to
C- 3' <0.081 (this is equivalent to the couple's discount factors being within 0.366 standard
deviations of one another). These well matched couples are delineated by dashed lines in Figure
5. Our results are similar when using a variety of alternative measures, including defining well
matched couples to be the best matched 1/2 or 1/4 of couples, and to using isf - as a measure
of preference heterogeneity.
Our first testable prediction outlined in Section 1.3 (prediction T1) is that well matched couples
make more intensive use of joint accounts, while poorly matched couples make more intensive use of
individual accounts. Recall that this prediction is only unambiguous when the less patient spouse's
account bears an interest rate that is weakly lower than the joint interest rate. Figure 6 explores the
relationship between account choice and preference heterogeneity, using the subsample of couples
who meet this criterion. The figure presents results of the following local linear regression
Ye =- g (hetc) + sc (1.6)
where yc is the outcome of interest and hetc= f - F. Panel A graphs savings rates by account
type. Average joint account savings rates are higher for well matched couples, who are demarcated
by the grey vertical lines in each panel. In contrast, the savings rates for both individual accounts
are U-shaped, with higher savings rates among badly matched couples. This pattern also emerges
when limiting the sample to savers and examining the fraction of total savings that are stored in
each account (Panel C). Patterns for average daily balances (Panel B) are similar though somewhat
less clear, but this is not entirely surprising. Account balances are generally low with some very
large outliers (for example, among couples who saved, the median average daily balance deposited
in all accounts was Ksh 290, while the 9 5 th percentile was Ksh 4,639 and the 9 9 th percentile was
Ksh 9,794). As such, outliers have large impacts on means.
In order to test the significance of these results and to control for potentially confounding factors,
we run the following regression:
ye = 0 + #1matchc + #2joint devc + int'6 + x'A + 7Ys + ec (1.7)
where yc is the outcome of interest, matche indicates well matched couples, jointdeve, indicates
badly matched couples where the less patient spouse's account has a strictly higher return than the
joint account, inte is a vector of dummy variables for each account's interest rate, xc is a vector
of additional controls, and -y, are session fixed effects. The omitted match quality group is badly
matched couples where the less patient spouse's individual account does not dominate the joint
account in terms of the interest rate. The private savings theory predicts that this group will have
2 9 Table Al illustrates demographic differences between well matched and poorly matched couples.
the highest rate of individual account use and the lowest rate of joint account use. Note that although
matche and jointdeve are generated regressors, the null hypothesis specifies that #1 = 02 = 0.
In this case, traditional standard errors are consistent (Newey and McFadden 1994). Throughout
the paper, we therefore present either heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (for couple level
regressions) or standard errors clustered at the couple level (for account level regressions).
Table 5 presents estimates of #1 ("Well Matched") and 12 ("Joint Deviation"), with four separate
control sets. Our "basic" control set, in Panel A, only includes interest rate dummy variables and
session fixed effects. This regression essentially mirrors the results of Figure 6. Panel B then adds
additional controls related to rates of time preference. To account for general differences in patience
levels between well and poorly matched couples, we control for L linearly.30 Our discount
factor estimates are censored for all couples who answered that they either always preferred the
later, larger amount (they always waited) or that they always preferred the nearer, smaller amount
(they always wanted the funds as soon as possible). This censoring would flatten the curves presented
in Figure 6. To address this, we include dummy variables for each spouse indicating that he or she
always chose to wait, analogous dummies for spouses who always wanted the sooner amount, and
separate dummy variables indicating that spouse i in couple c had his or her discount factor top
or bottomcoded because the nonlinear least squares estimate went outside the bounds implied by
always-patient and always-impatient responses.
In Panel C we add controls for a variety of demographic characteristics. Panel D adds additional
controls for economic characteristics. To ensure flexible accounting for both levels and intracouple
heterogeneity, for non-binary characteristics we include the linear and squared terms for both hus-
band and wife, as well as the interaction between the linear values for husband and wife. For binary
variables, we include the dummy variable for both husband and wife as well as the interaction. 31
Since adding demographic and economic covariates has little impact on our results, we take the
estimates in Panel B as our baseline specification. As predicted, well matched couples are signifi-
cantly less likely to save in individual accounts (75 percent, 8.6 percentage points) and significantly
more likely to save in joint accounts (41 percent/11.2 percentage points) when compared to their
poorly matched counterparts. Moreover, we observe that poorly matched couples with available
"joint deviations" are indeed more likely to use joint accounts and less likely to use individual
accounts when compared to poorly matched couples where such a deviation is never profitable.
(However, these differences are generally insignificant and our results are substantively unchanged
if we pool all poorly matched couples). Limiting the couples to savers, we also see that well matched
3 Choosing a 50/50 weighting for the average discount factor in a couple is somewhat ad hoc, as the true weighting
should be related to the individual bargaining weights. However, results are robust to a wide variety of different
weighting schemes, including proxying the bargaining weight with relative income shares and using self reported
savings decision making power to construct weights.
3
'Demographic controls include age, years of education, an individual literacy dummy, and the number of children
reported by each spouse. The economic controls include individual income, dummies for mobile phone ownership,
and dummies indicating that an individual is either a subsistence farmer or has no job.
couples store a lower share of balances in individual accounts (58 percent/11.6 percentage points)
and a greater share of balances in joint accounts (40 percent/24.2 percentage points). Estimates for
average balances are also large and directionally correct, though generally insignificant.
We now consider our second testable prediction (T2). First we generate the empirical analog of
Figure 3 by running the following regression separately for well and poorly matched couples:
savedac = #0 + ex'aco + zacA + Eac (1.8)
Where savedac indicates that couple c saved in account a, exac is a vector of dummy variables for
the excess interest rate on account a, and zac is a vector of dummy variables for account a's interest
rate.32 We then calculate predicted values of savedae for each value of the excess rate, assuming
equal distribution of the sample at each interest rate (0, 2, 6, and 10 percent for individual accounts;
2, 6, and 10 percent for joint accounts). Figure 7 presents the result of this exercise. The dashed
lines are regression lines fit to the point estimates, where each point is weighted by the inverse of
its standard error. Recall from Figure 3 that individual account use by well matched couples could
jump discretely up at excessac = 0. Since -2 is the largest negative value of the excess interest
rate in our sample, we therefore fit separate lines for excessac < -2 (this slope should be zero) and
excessac -2 (this slope should be positive). In contrast, the slope for joint accounts should be
positive below an excess rate of zero and flat thereafter, so our lines are drawn above and below
excessac = 0.
Panel A presents account use for well matched couples. The results for individual and joint
accounts are both consistent with theoretical predictions. Specifically, the share of couples using
individual accounts is essentially flat until the excess interest rate reaches zero, where the share
saving jumps up. Beyond this point the share increases, though we do not observe a subsequent
plateau. For joint accounts, the share of well matched couples saving slopes upward when the excess
interest rate is negative and then plateaus after an excess rate of zero. We do not, however, observe
an initial plateau at a low savings rate when the excess interest rate is negative.
These "missing" plateaus suggest that the variation we created in the excess interest rate was
not large enough to reach the thresholds Ei (Ri) and -Ej (Rj) illustrated on Figure 3; in other
words, the excess interest rate was never large enough to dominate differential banking costs for
the vast majority of couples in our sample. This is conceivable given the temporary nature of the
interest rates and the low savings levels of our couples - the 7 5 th percentile total average daily
3 2As a result of the experimental design, some values of the excess interest rate were only realized for a very small
number of accounts: 14 accounts had an excess interest rate of 2, 12 accounts had an excess interest rate of 6, and
13 accounts had an excess interest rate of 10. For each of these values, we downcode the excess interest rate by two
percentage points (results are invariant to simply dropping these accounts). Similarly, we pool excessac = -10 and
excess.c = -8 as the omitted category in our regressions. We do this in order to identify all interest rate dummy
variables, as accounts with zero percent interest had excess interest rates unique to them. Results are essentially
unchanged if we drop all accounts with a zero percent interest rate.
balance among savers was Ksh 789. Even foregoing 10 percentage points of interest would only cost
the 7 5 th percentile household Ksh 79. In comparison, the cost of round trip travel to and from the
bank meets or exceeds Ksh 100 for over half of our study households. Given this observation and
the patterns in the data, we infer that interest rate differentials only trumped banking cost concerns
for couples with small banking cost differentials.
Panel B of Figure 7 examines the behavior of poorly matched couples. Their rates of saving
are completely insensitive to the excess interest rate. While the response to the excess interest
rate is theoretically ambiguous for individual accounts, our theory predicts a positive slope for
joint accounts. However, it is possible that the variation in the excess interest rate was simply not
large enough to incite a substantial change in behavior for these couples. Since interest rates were
temporary and average balances small, private savings deviations are "cheap" in terms of interest
rate losses. In this case, it could be that the majority of badly matched couples with small differential
banking costs chose to save privately, while poorly matched couples with large differential banking
costs chose to save jointly, and very few marginal couples were swayed by the excess interest rate.
We now test the significance of the patterns exhibited by well matched couples in Figure 7. To
do so, we generate splines in the excess interest rate. Consistent with Figure 7, we place a knot at
excessac = -2 for individual accounts and a knot at excessac = 0 for joint accounts. We then run
the following regression among well matched couples:
savedac = 3o + 01 (below x indiv)ac + 02 (above x indiv)ac + (1.9)
13 (below x jointac + 04 (above x joint)ac + z Ca + x'c  + Ys ± &ac
where belowac is the spline capturing the slope below the knot, aboveac is the spline capturing the
slope above the knot, indivac is an individual account indicator, jointac is a joint account indicator
Zac is a vector including interest rate dummies, the joint account dummy, and joint x interest rate
interactions, Xac is a vector containing the control sets used in Table 5, and y, are experimental
session fixed effects. To test whether well matched couples' responses to the excess interest rate
are significantly different from poorly matched couples, we also present a specification where we
include both types of couples, include a badly matched indicator, estimate 31-,34, and A separately
for well and poorly matched couples (by interacting the relevant variables in equation 1.9 with the
badly matched indicator), and constrain the remaining coefficients (a and -ys) to be the same for
all couples. Table 6 presents the results.
Panel A examines well matched couples. The first two coefficients report the response to excess
interest rates on individual accounts. As expected, the coefficient on the lower spline in the excess
interest rate is very close to zero and insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient on the upper spline
is much larger, positive, and significant. The pattern for joint accounts is, as expected, reversed.
The coefficient on the lower spline is large, positive, and significant, while the point estimates for
the upper spline are much smaller in magnitude and insignificant. The coefficients reveal very
large responses to the excess interest rate. For example, the final column of panel A implies that
increasing the individual excess interest rate from 0 to 10 results in an 18.2 percentage point increase
in the savings rate, while increasing the joint excess interest rate from -10 to 0 results in a 38.4
percentage point increase in the savings rate. These impacts are very large when compared to
dependent variable means (6 percent for individual accounts and 34 percent for joint accounts).
Panel B presents the results for all couples pooled together. The responses for well matched
couples can be read off of the main effects - we see that pooling all couples has little impact on
the original estimates. Examining differential responses for poorly matched couples reveals that
their aggregate responses (which are given by the sum of the main effect and the badly matched
interaction) are very close to (and not significantly different from) zero. Furthermore, the responses
of well and poorly matched couples differ significantly where expected based on the patterns in
Figure 7 (the upper spline of individual accounts and the lower spline of joint accounts).
Taken together, the results in Tables 5 and 6 are incompatible with a model where couples can
commit intertemporally. Specifically, we only observe evidence of efficient investment among well
matched couples. Though badly matched couples' lack of a response to the excess interest rate
could be rationalized if they had substantially larger differential banking costs, we observe them
making more intensive use of individual accounts. Moreover, Table Al, which illustrates individual
demographic characteristics by match quality, reveals that these two groups of couples are very
similar with respect to most observables, including distance to the bank and baseline bank account
ownership. This suggests that badly matched couples' response to the excess interest rate reflects
inefficient investment rather than demographic differences. Thus, our results add to a body of
literature demonstrating that households in developing countries often make decisions that are not
Pareto efficient. 33
1.4.3 Proxying Banking Costs
Our results suggest that banking costs are an important concern for couples in our study - both well
and poorly matched couples were much more likely to use joint accounts, and the excess interest rate
responses among well matched couples in Figure 7 imply that even an excess rate of 8 (for individual
accounts) or -8 (for joint accounts) did not outweigh banking cost concerns for a nontrivial share of
the couples in our sample. Moreover, the positive slopes in Figure 7 imply a distribution of banking
costs in the population; if all couples had identical banking costs, we would observe an initial flat
plateau, then a discrete jump up followed by another flat plateau at a positive savings rate.
The unobservability of differential banking costs makes our final testable implication (T3), that
well matched couples invest their resources more efficiently than poorly matched couples, difficult
to analyze. In order to make some adjustment for unobservable banking costs, we attempt to proxy
them with observables. We conjecture that those couples who travel to Busia town very frequently
3 3 Studies documenting inefficient behavior include Ashraf (2009), de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009), Duflo
and Udry (2004), Robinson (2008), and Udry (1996).
for non-bank related reasons and those couples who have low travel costs to town will have smaller
differential banking costs. This should be negatively correlated with distance from the bank and
economic activity (here we assume that subsistence farmers and the unemployed are less likely to
take frequent trips to town). Moreover, pre-existing use of a formal savings account should signal
lower differential banking costs. Here we include both bank accounts and SACCO accounts as formal
accounts.3 4 To aggregate these measures, we used principal components analysis to extract the first
principal component of the data matrix formed by the above-listed variables. We then normalized
this component to construct a "banking costs index", which runs from zero (lowest hypothesized
banking costs) to one (highest hypothesized banking costs). Table 7 checks to see if the cost index
is correlated with account behavior in ways predicted by our theory. The first three columns present
couple-level regressions of the following form:
yc = io + #1indexe + ' + ec (1.10)
where ye is the outcome of interest, indexc is the banking cost index, and xc is a vector of controls.
We use the same control sets as in previous regressions, but we exclude the subsistence farming
indicators from the economic control set, as this variable is used in the creation of the cost index.
Since session fixed effects absorb distance from the bank, we exclude these as well.
It is likely that the cost index is correlated with both absolute banking costs and differential
banking costs. To test the former hypothesis, the first column of Table 7 examines the correlation
between the banking cost index and a dummy variable for whether or not a couple saved in any
bank account. Indeed, couples with the highest costs are significantly less likely to save in any bank
account. The next two columns limit the population to couples who saved in at least one account,
and examine the correlation between use of the joint account and the cost index.3 5 Here, higher cost
savers are significantly more likely to save jointly as compared to lower cost savers. These results
are relatively robust to adding observable controls - though the results examining joint account
use are substantially attenuated upon including economic controls, the coefficients are still large in
magnitude. This is encouraging, and suggests that the cost index is in part capturing differential
banking costs.
Earlier, we argued that well matched couples' response to (and poorly matched couples' lack of
response to) the excess interest rate suggest that interest rate losses only impacted the decisions of
well matched savers with relatively low differential banking costs. We can use our proxied banking
3 4SACCO stands for "savings and credit cooperative". SACCOs function like credit unions, and are generally
organized around higher paying professions, such as teaching and commercial farming.
3 5Since the cost index is correlated with absolute banking costs, the correlation between the index and joint
account use is technically ambiguous. In the absence of a selection effect (i.e. conditional on b), larger differential
banking costs will push couples to make more intensive use of joint accounts. However, larger absolute banking costs
will select out smaller scale savers. Since the hypothesized costs are fixed and not proportional to balances, these
savers will be more likely to opt for joint accounts, all else equal. Therefore this selection effect would bias us away
from finding a positive correlation between joint account use and the cost index.
costs to test this hypothesis directly: in this case well matched couples with low proxied banking
costs should respond robustly to the excess interest rate, while well matched couples with large
proxied banking costs should be much less responsive to the excess rate. To test this, we limit the
sample to well matched couples, define a couple to have high banking costs if their index value is
above the sample median, and run the following regression:
savedac = #0 + 31highe + #2excessac + #3highe X excessac + #4jointac + (1.11)
/35 (joint x high)ac + z'cA + Xz'6 + Lac
where highc is a dummy variable indicating high banking costs, excessac is the excess interest rate
on account a for couple c, jointac is a joint account indicator, Zac is a vector of interest rate dummies
and their interactions with jointac, and xe is a vector of the same control sets used in the earlier
specifications in Table 7.
The fourth column of Table 7 presents results of this regression. As expected, the response to
the excess interest rate is positive and highly significant for couples with lower proxied banking costs
and very close to zero for couples with higher proxied banking costs. One issue with this regression
is that we constrain A (the vector capturing interest rate responses) to be the same for high and
low cost couples. The final column of Table 7 presents an alternative specification where we add
interactions between Zac and the high cost dummy. Although this decreases precision somewhat,
the point estimates are essentially unchanged. We also note that the p-values on an F-test that the
interest rate-high cost interactions are equal to zero range from 0.76-0.97, so imposing the restriction
seems reasonable. Overall, these results suggest that our index is a reasonable proxy for differential
banking costs, and that couples' responses to the excess interest rate are in fact being driven by
banking costs.
1.4.4 Investment Efficiency by Match Quality
Our results suggest that poorly matched couples invest less efficiently than well matched couples,
as per implication T3. We now use our proxied banking costs to estimate the magnitude of mis-
allocation by poorly matched couples. A simple technique to compare the investment efficiency of
well and poorly matched couples would be to calculate the maximum interest rate that each saving
couple could have earned on their balance, compare this to the actual interest rate they earned, and
then check to see if interest rate losses are greater for poorly matched couples. However, since lower
return joint accounts may be more efficient than higher return individual accounts when banking
cost differentials are large, this comparison may overstate the degree of savings misallocation among
well matched couples. Our theoretical discussion highlighted that given an average household dis-
count factor, Q, a vector of banking costs, ba, an endowment y, and an individual interest rate, Ri,
we can calculate the joint interest rate that would make a well matched couple indifferent between
saving jointly and individually, Rj (Ri). The "joint interest discount", Ri - R (Ri) then reflects
the importance of differential banking costs.
In this spirit, we calculate "banking cost adjusted" actual and maximum interest earnings for
all savers. To do so, we adjust individual interest rates downward to account for banking costs
using the cost index that we constructed in the previous subsection. To perform the adjustment we
simply multiply the cost index by a maximum joint interest discount (Ei), and adjust individual
interest rates by the resulting product.
While this method is somewhat ad hoc, conducting the analysis for a range of Ei should give a
general idea of differences in savings misallocation between well and poorly matched couples. Table
8 presents the results of this exercise. The first column sets Ei to zero - this column makes no
banking costs adjustment whatsoever. Here we see that if poorly matched savers had always chosen
the highest return account available, the average saving couple would have earned 8.3 percentage
points of interest. In practice, these couples averaged 6.0 percentage points of interest, leading to
an interest loss of 2.3 percentage points. In contrast, well matched couples could have earned a
maximum of 8.3 percentage points of interest and actually earned 6.9 percentage points. Therefore,
the "loss gap" between poorly and well matched couples is 0.9 percentage points of interest, which
is significantly different from zero. Even without accounting for differential banking costs, poorly
matched couples appear to suffer from greater savings misallocation - their losses are 64 percent
larger than their well matched peers.
The next four columns repeat this analysis with different values of Ei, ranging from 5 to 20
percentage points (recall that well matched couples' response to the excess interest rate in Figure
7 suggests that Ei exceeds 8). The estimated loss gap increases as Ei increases, though poorly
matched losses as a percent of well matched losses peak at Ei = 5, where they are 162 percent
larger. These losses are very large in percentage terms, but relatively small in absolute terms. A
loss of 3 percentage points in interest amounts to Ksh 24 for the 7 5th percentile saving couple.
However, since banking cost differentials persist for the life of the account, long run absolute losses
due to inefficient individual account use could be large.
Taken as a whole, our results fit the predictions of the private savings model very well. A key
feature of this model is the assumption of perfect information: individual accounts are valuable
because they offer security of savings. However, individual accounts may also enable agents to hide
savings from their spouses, which could be used to manipulate the time path of consumption, or
to finance hidden consumption. This theory is similar to the theory of private savings, but rests
on the assumption that in equilibrium, spouses are (and benefit from) concealing information from
one another. If the benefit of hiding savings is correlated with preference heterogeneity, this could
generate the patterns we observe in the data. The next section presents evidence of hidden savings
in our data and demonstrates that the empirical results are robust to accounting for hidden savings
concerns.
1.5 Hidden Information and Account Use
Hidden information appears to be important in households in developing countries. For example,
Anderson and Baland (2002) find that women's use of ROSCAs in Kenya is consistent with a model
of hidden information. Boozer, Goldstein, and Suri (2009) analyze spousal cross reports of food
expenditure in Ghana and find evidence of hidden consumption. Ashraf (2009) finds evidence that
the informational environment has significant impact on the investment decisions of spouses with
low levels of financial control in the Philippines and de Laat (2008) finds that individuals in split
migrant couples in Kenya are willing to expend considerable resources to acquire information about
one another. In contrast, Mani (2010) finds that changing the information environment in a lab
experiment in India had little impact on spousal investment decisions.
Moreover, there is evidence of hidden savings in our data. For example, when considering
spousal cross reports for saving at home (which is the most common method of saving among our
households, and arguably the most observable), 52 percent of individuals in our sample asserted
that they either did not know if their spouse saved at home or did not know how much money their
spouse saved at home. Among those individuals who had a spouse guess his or her savings amount,
48 percent of the spouses underestimated relative to the individual's self report, while 25 percent
of the spousal reports were overestimates (the other 27 percent matched their spouse's report -
these were mostly instances where the individual and spouse reported no savings). Similar patterns
appear when considering weekly income and savings in other devices, such as bank accounts and
ROSCAs.
If the return to hiding savings from a spouse is increasing in intracouple discount factor hetero-
geneity, then hidden savings concerns could be responsible for our empirical results (though it is not
obvious that such a correlation should exist). We added the "extra statements" treatment to our
field experiment in order to assess the importance of hidden savings in our study population, and to
gauge if hidden savings concerns are correlated with preference heterogeneity. We only present the
extra statements analysis for a subset of couples in the data, as some enumerators did not follow the
proper protocol when offering extra statements. Appendix B discusses how we identified protocol
problems and the creation of the extra statements analysis sample.
We also make use of baseline spousal cross reports of income and savings device use to identify
couples who are most likely to find hiding financial resources beneficial. The assumption here is
that couples in which individuals are poorly informed about spousal finances are more likely to
value hidden information. To construct an "information sharing" index, we considered responses
to baseline survey questions addressing income earned least week, bank accounts, savings at home,
SACCOs, and ROSCAs, creating five subindices. The subindices range from 0 (perfect information)
to 1 (most misinformation). If cross reports exactly matched own reports, we coded the index to
0. If an individual reported that they did (did not) use a device, but the spouse reported that they
did not (did), we coded the index to 1. If a spouse asserted that they did not know if an individual
used a given device, or if they did not know how much savings was in the device, we also coded the
index to 1. For other instances where we had an own report and a cross report of the amount (or in
the case of ROSCAs, the number of ROSCAs), we coded the index to equal min {lownic-crosslci
We then created a household-level information index equal to:
.i4f 1 xindex"' + indexh + d ank + n edecacco + indexoscaiudexe = 1 2c 5CIc
iE{M,F}
where a value of 1 represents a perfectly informed household and a value of 0 represents a poorly
informed household. Figure 8 graphs the distribution of the index among the 516 couples for whom
we have nonmissing values.3 6 We then code a couple as "well informed" if their information index
is above the sample median.
Table 9 presents the results of the extra statements intervention. All regressions are of the
following form:
yic = #0 +#iesc + ht'A + xc6+7 +eic (1.12)
where yic is the outcome of interest, esc indicates that the couple was selected for (or, in some
specifications, consented to) extra statements, xc is a vector of time preference, demographic, and
economic characteristics, and -y are session fixed effects. To examine treatment effects by preference
heterogeneity and household information sharing, in some specifications we also include the vector
hte, which includes a dummy for well matched couples, a dummy for well informed couples, and the
interaction of these variables with the extra statements indicator.3 7
The first two columns of Table 9 verify that, as per experimental protocol, the probability of
opening an individual account is uncorrelated with extra statement selection. We see that this is
in fact the case, and for the remaining specifications we limit our analysis to opened individual
accounts that were eligible to be randomly selected for the extra statements offer.
The next two specifications examine extra statement consent rates among open individual ac-
counts. We see that only 60 percent of individuals who were presented with the extra statement
offer consented - this suggests that informational concerns are important to a sizeable fraction of
couples choosing individual accounts. Column 4 reveals interesting differences in consent rates by
household information sharing. Well informed households are 26 percentage points more likely to
consent to extra statements, which is statistically significant in Panel A, though additional controls
reduce precision.
Columns 5-8 of Table 9 examine the reduced form impact of the extra statement offer on savings
rates and average daily balances of open individual accounts. The aggregate estimated impact of ex-
36 We could not construct the index for couples where at least one spouse refused to answer one or more of the
relevant questions, or had a missing response for other reasons.
3 7When the information sharing index is missing, we recode the well informed dummy to zero and include a dummy
variable indicating that the index is missing, as well an interaction set that parallels any interactions included for the
well informed dummy. Simply dropping these couples does not change the results.
tra statements (columns 5 and 7) is relatively small, insignificant, and actually positive upon adding
controls. Given the low consent rate to extra statements, this is not very surprising - although the
standard errors are large enough that we cannot rule out nontrivial negative impacts of extra state-
ments, these results suggest that the extra statement treatment had little overall impact on savings
behavior. However, columns 6 and 8 suggest that this aggregate zero impact may mask differ-
ences by information sharing. In particular, the extra statements intervention significantly reduced
savings rates for poorly informed and poorly matched couples, while having no impact on well in-
formed and well matched couples. Patterns for average balances are similar, though more imprecise.
Since consent was partial, we also present two stage least squares estimates where extra statement
consent (and its interactions with the well matched and well informed dummies) are instrumented
with random assignment to the extra statement treatment and the relevant interactions. These IV
results are presented in columns 9-12. We note that the estimated impacts on poorly matched,
poorly informed households are substantial - the baseline specification suggests that consenting to
extra statements reduces the probability of saving by 83 percentage points. (This point estimate is
implausibly large when compared to the dependent variable mean and is most likely driven by our
relatively small sample size. However, the 95 percent confidence interval contains a range of more
reasonable estimates).
Overall, the extra statements intervention suggests that the ability to hide savings from other
household members is indeed an important concern for at least some households in our sample.
Moreover, our information index appears to successfully identify couples for whom hiding informa-
tion is more valuable. As such, if our earlier results were driven by hidden savings concerns, we
would expect to see two things: First, the information sharing index should be lowest among poorly
matched couples. Second, properly accounting for information sharing in our previous analyses
should dilute the impact of preference heterogeneity. However, the information index is totally un-
correlated with preference heterogeneity (the correlation coefficient between the information index
and the absolute value of the difference in individual discount factors is 0.015). This foreshadows
our finding that accounting for information sharing has no impact on our results.
We check to see if accounting for information flows changes our findings regarding match quality
and joint versus individual account use. Table 10 presents the regression described by equation
1.7 augmented to include the well informed indicator. We make two observations - first, our
initial results pertaining to preference heterogeneity are robust to controlling for information flows.
Second, the well informed indicator has predictive content for household account choice conditional
on preference heterogeneity. As we would expect, better informed households are more likely to
use joint accounts and less likely to use individual accounts, though these results are attenuated
by additional controls. Moreover, additional specification testing not shown here confirms that
information sharing is not driving our results regarding responses to the excess interest rate.
Overall, our results are compatible with the theory that hidden information concerns impact
household savings decisions. However, to the extent that these concerns are important, they appear
to be largely orthogonal to preference heterogeneity. This is plausible - hiding savings is likely
valuable because it allows individuals to increase their share of consumption, or tilt consumption
towards goods that they favor. If the benefit of doing so is equally large for individuals in well
matched and poorly matched households, accounting for it should leave our results unchanged,
which is what we observe. To complete our discussion of robustness, the following section considers
other alternative explanations for the patterns in our data.
1.6 Alternative Explanations
Perhaps the most obvious concern with our results is that discount factor heterogeneity is irrelevant
for behavior, but correlated with other unobservables (in terms of demographic characteristics and
preferences) that drive account choice. Indeed, our theoretical analysis suggests that heterogeneity
in other aspects of preferences could generate incentives for strategic behavior, even in the absence of
discount factor heterogeneity. While we cannot address unobservables, the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of controls accounting for both levels of and intracouple heterogeneity in observables,
including education, income, and distance from the bank (through session fixed effects), suggests
that this is not the case. Furthermore, it is not clear that discount factors should be strongly
correlated with other important aspects of preferences: Dupas and Robinson (2011) elicit estimates
of discount factors and risk aversion in a Kenyan sample very similar to our own and find very
low correlations between the two measures (0.12 for men and 0.06 for women) (Pascaline Dupas,
personal communication).
Another possibility is that individual accounts are desirable because large pools of individual
savings can be used to shift the bargaining weight, allowing an agent to secure a greater share
of consumption for herself in the future. Similarly, individual accounts may allow agents to make
unilateral private consumption choices (or restrict spousal private consumption). If the benefit of
individual accounts is correlated with discount factor heterogeneity, this could explain the patterns
in our data. Both cases suggest that individual accounts would be more popular than joint accounts,
and that both spouses would save simultaneously in their individual accounts. However, we do not
find either of these patterns in our data - 29 percent of joint accounts were used for saving during
our study horizon, as compared to 11 percent of individual accounts with an interest rate of 2
percent or better. Moreover, only 28 percent of households who opened both individual accounts
and saved in at least one account saved in both individual accounts. In contrast, the private savings
theory predicts that most couples will only make use of one bank account (Proposition 1). Indeed,
89 percent of couples who saved only saved in one account. On the other hand, individual accounts
could be valuable even if ownership (without use) increases an individual's option value outside the
marriage. However, in this case it is not clear that savings decisions should be distorted as long as
couples remain together.
Furthermore, our results are not well rationalized by mental accounting, which is frequently
cited as motivating intrahousehold resource allocation in the developing world. The theory of
mental accounting, as described in Thaler (1990), specifies that households earmark funds saved
in different accounts for different types of consumption. Duflo and Udry (2004) present evidence
of such behavior among households in C6te d'Ivoire. If households have good outside options for
individual investment technologies and poor outside options for joint technologies, mental accounting
could help explain why joint accounts were more popular among our study households. However,
there is no clear reason why mental accounting would generate differential behavior by preference
heterogeneity, particularly with respect to the excess interest rate and investment efficiency.
Another possibility is that poorly matched couples chose savings accounts based on rules of
thumb, while well matched couples optimally chose accounts taking account of relative rates of
return. An example of a model that could generate such behavior is one where household bargaining
is costly, and this cost increases as the preferences of household members diverge. If costs are large
enough, households could develop rules of thumb for how to manage savings in order to avoid
repeated bargaining costs. However, poorly matched couples' lack of response to the excess interest
rate is still somewhat of a puzzle in this model - if savings management were tasked to a single
individual, he or she should still optimally take account of excess interest rates when deciding
between his or her individual account and the joint account.
1.7 Conclusion
We develop a model of household decision making in which agents can strategically use private
savings accounts to manipulate consumption streams. We show that costly strategic action can be
beneficial only when individuals in the household have differing rates of time preference. In order
to test our model, we conducted a field experiment in Western Kenya, where married couples were
recruited to group meetings and given the opportunity to open joint and individual bank accounts
with randomly assigned interest rates. By overlaying our model with our experimental design, we
derived three testable implications: (1) well matched couples will make more intensive use of joint
accounts while poorly matched couples will make more intensive use of individual accounts, (2) well
matched couples will take account of relative rates of return on accounts in accordance with Figure
3, and (3) well matched savers earn higher rates of return on their savings than poorly matched
savers.
Our results support all three of these predictions. This is, of course, subject to the caveat that we
cannot randomly assign preference heterogeneity in the field. As such, we cannot completely rule out
the hypothesis that our results are driven by some other omitted characteristic that is correlated
with estimates of preference heterogeneity. However, the stability of our results to the inclusion
of flexible demographic and economic controls, and to the inclusion of a measure of household
information flows, is comforting and suggests that the results we observe are indeed driven by
inefficiencies due to conflicting rates of time preference.
We also find some evidence that informational concerns impact account use and account choice
among our couples. Couples who are poorly informed about one another's financial activities respond
most adversely to a randomized information treatment and are also more likely to gravitate towards
individual bank accounts. However, our treatment of hidden information is largely a robustness
check. Understanding how information sharing impacts household decision making, particularly
from a theoretical perspective, is an area in need of additional research.
Our results add to a growing body of literature that rejects a Pareto efficient model of the
household, while presenting a theory that sheds light on specific mechanisms that could be driving
this inefficiency. Several recent papers find that individuals make strategic investment decisions
when they report little control over finances in the household (Ashraf, Aycinena, Martinez A.,
and Yang 2010; Chin, Karkoviata, and Wilcox 2010; Ashraf 2009). Our results dovetail with
these papers, as perceived "control" could be a function of how closely an agent's preferences
align with collective decisions. (Indeed, Table Al shows that individuals in well matched couples
are significantly more likely to state that they make decisions regarding saving - here, perceived
decision making power may reflect how closely actual outcomes are aligned with an individual's
preferences.)
The private savings theory has interesting implications for financial product design for the
poor. In order to achieve the ex-ante Pareto efficient allocation, households need a way to commit
themselves to binding intertemporal contracts. A savings device that committed future consumption
to specific individuals in the household could help enforce such contracts. While designing such a
product does not seem particularly feasible, a savings account that committed resources to particular
types of consumption could approximate this product if members of the household favor different
goods. Indeed, women and men in developing countries do appear to have differential preferences
(Bobonis 2009; Duflo 2003; Thomas 1994). As such, savings accounts that constrain balances to
be used for certain goods such as education, health, or home improvement could be useful tools for
improving intrahousehold contracting.
L.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. It is given that s' is part of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and that
s > 0. Now assume that s{ (si) > 0 and that this allocation is a PSNE. We show that this always
leads to a contradiction.
If sJ (si) > 0 then the household Euler relation given by equation 1.3 must hold. First consider
the case where Ris < w + bt . Consider the deviation si - 0. Since this increases t = 1 resources,
the couple will always save in the joint account after this deviation, so equation 1.3 will continue
to hold. In order for the Euler to hold before and after the deviation t = 1 and t = 2 consumption
must both be higher when s' = 0. In this case, the original si cannot be part of a PSNE because
si = 0 makes individual i strictly better off.
Next consider the case where Ris, > w + b. We consider the subcases Rj > Ri and Rj < Ri
in turn. When Rj ;> Ri, consider the deviation 81 = 0. The household will continue to save, so
equation 1.3 will continue to hold. Since Rj ;> Ri, this is only possible if consumption in both
periods strictly increases (we use Assumption A3 when Rj = Ri). Then si = 0 is a profitable
deviation, which implies the original s, was not a Nash best response.
When Ri > Rj, consider the deviation s' = sJ +s' +bV. It is clear that the couple would choose
s{ (si) = 0, so t = 1 consumption would stay the same, while t = 2 consumption would strictly
increase. This is a profitable deviation, which implies that the original s1 was not a best response.
U
In order to prove Proposition 1, we first establish two useful lemmas.
Lemma 2 Suppose ] a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where s' > 0 and s, > 0. Then 6 MRM =
OFRF and ci" = JiRic2j" for i e {M, F} must hold in the equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. We will establish the result by showing that for each individual i, it must
be that c" = Ridic2 o. First, note that for any pure strategy Nash equilibrium where both spouses
save, Lemma 1 implies that s J (si) = 0.
Suppose instead that c-' < RioSc-o. Since s{ (si) = 0, the Euler inequality implies that
individual i would be strictly better off increasing s'. This contradicts the definition of a PSNE and
therefore cannot be the case. Next suppose that c-' > Rioic-o and the preference to set s{ = 0 at
the household allocation stage is strict. Then the Euler inequality implies that individual i would
be strictly better off decreasing s, which cannot be the case if s' is part of a PSNE.
Next suppose that c-" > Rioic-o and the preference to set si' 0 at the household allocation
stage is weak (the couple is just indifferent between .s{ > 0 and sJ = 0). Given Assumption A3 it
must be that cio < RjQco = RjO > Rio. For this case, we consider i E {M, F} separately. First
consider i = F. Note JF >- Q Rj > RF. If the wife were to reduce sf by e, then the couple would
strictly prefer to save jointly (and t = 2 consumption would increase). Since Rj > RF, the couple
would be better off under the deviation. Since 6F > Q and t = 2 consumption increases, this would
be profitable for the wife. Since sF is part of a PSNE, this cannot be the case, so it must be that
ci = SFRFC2 0. Next consider i = M. Using the result we just established for the wife, it must
be that cV" = FRFCJ" < RjQc2" = Rj > RF. By the same logic we used for the wife's case, it
would again be profitable for the wife to reduce sf by e to induce joint savings. Since sf is part
of a PSNE, this cannot be the case. Then it must be that ci = JMRMc2". Combining the result
for the husband and the wife we have ci" = mRMc 6 FRFC2 ', which implies MRM = SFRF-
This completes the proof. m
Lemma 3 Suppose QRj < 6FRF = 6 MRM and sF > 0. If 9M > 0 is a best response given 4',
then the 9M > 0 that satisfies " = RM 3Mou j will be a best response given sf = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. Optimality of 9m, combined with QRj < 5MRM implies Z-' = RM 6 Muo
(otherwise the husband would have a profitable deviation available to him). Then when 9 F= 0 1
9M > 0 that satisfies
(y1 - 9M - bM) "= 6MRM (Y2 + RM - w - bM)U (1.13)
It is clear that 9 is strictly preferred to any other s, > 0. Then to prove that 9M > 0 is a
best response to sF = 0, we just need to show that sj > 0 is strictly preferred to sm = 0. For
the remainder of the proof, we refer to the allocation that results when sf = si = 0 as the joint
alternative/regime, and the allocation that results given Am > 0 as the husband's allocation/regime.
Now we establish some notation. Denote period t consumption under the husband's regime
given endowment y as cm (y). Similarly denote period t consumption under the joint regime given
y as cf (y). Then the difference in husband's utility under the two regimes can be written as
Sc(y) 1-a M I- c'(y)l-" c CHy)"
Am (y) =_c Y +6M -2 (Yog Y1-or 1-0, 1-0 1-
Next, note that changing the wife's strategy from si to s1 = 0 is isomorphic (from the perspective
of the husband) to switching from endowment yO = [yO, yO]' (where yo = Yi - sf - bF and yo =
Y2 + max {RFs - bF - w,0}) to endowment y1 = [V1, y1]' (where yi = yi and yi y2). Note
> y and y1 < y. It is clear that I > 0 and - < 0: this implies that saving under bothY1>Y n Y y - aY2
the husband's and joint regimes must be higher at y' as compared to y0 (weakly so, for the joint
regime).
Since §M is a best response, Am (yo) > 0. To complete the proof, we will show that AM (y0 ) >
0 => AM (yl) > 0. When Am (y 0 ) > 0 there are two cases: (a) the husband's allocation generates
weakly higher consumption in both periods at yo, and (b) the husband's allocation generates strictly
higher consumption in one period and strictly lower consumption in the other period at yo.
First consider case (a). Since desired savings under both regimes is higher given yi and since
QRj < SMRM -> RM > Rj, it must be that Am (yl) > 0. (Noting that increasing sm by
the increase in joint savings would yield more consumption in both periods relative to the joint
alternative makes this clear). This implies Am (Y 1 > 0 in case (a). Next consider case (b). It
must be that c M (yO) < cf (yo) and cm (yO) > cH yO) (Euler equations cannot support the other
possibility). Then (with some abuse of notation, as Am (y) will jump discontinuously at one point
if 6 M < Q and sJ (y 0 ) = 0 but sf (y') > 0):
91 80S
AM (y+) = AM (yA) + ( dy - A (Yi, y2) dy2
y AM yy Od2
Suppose the couple switches from sJ = 0 to s{ > 0 at some y*. If 6 m < Q then AM (y) will
discontinuously increase at y*. Since the presence of this point only helps our argument, we ignore
it going forward. Then for all non-discontinuous points we have (using the Envelope Theorem for
the husband's private savings response):
AM (yi, y [) = c (yi)-" - cH (yi)~] + a8 [cH (y1)-0 - 6 MRJCH (y1)]
ay1 9y
AM (yiy2) = M c2 (Y2) - C' (y2) c (Y2) - 6MRJc (y2B9Y2A YY) [C22 9212
Whenever s{ > 0, 5M Q => (c K) - > 6MRJ (cH) 0. Then the second bracketed terms in each
equation will always work to make private savings more attractive, so we ignore them going forward.
Begin at yo and consider increasing yi from y to y'. Since cm (y0 ) <c 1 (y0 ) , -AM (yiy2>
0. If cM (y) c' (y) Vyi E [y, y1) then Am (yl,yo) > 0. Suppose instead that at some y
cj (y*, yO) > c' (y*, yo). For this to be the case, the joint alternative must involve s, > 0, which
implies
c' (y*,y ) = 6 MRMc (y*, y') < c' (y*,yo) "= QRMc2 1
Cm (y*, yo) > c (y*, yo) and cm (y*, yo) > CH (y*, yO)
But if consumption is higher in both periods at (yI, yO) under the husband's allocation, he will
prefer saving privately at (y, yO) and y1 as well. So it must be that AM (yl, yo) > 0. Consider
the case where at (y, y) cm < cf and cm > C' (the only other possibility is cm > cfH and1 c2 AM 1 done).1
= AM (yl) > 0 in which case we are done). Then -- AM (y1, yO) > 0. This derivative
will remain positive unless there exists y* such that cm (y*) < cf (y*). In this case Eulers imply:
cf (y*)~" = SMRMcm (y*)-" > C' (y)~" = QRjc' (y*)-"
which implies AM (yb y) < 0. Let $2 = inf {y* : cm (y*) < c' (y*)}. Recall that if the couple
switches from sJ = 0 to s{ > 0 at Q2, AM (y) will discontinuously increase. Otherwise, AM (y)
will be continuous at Q2. In the continuous case, note that 3MRM > QRj and cm (Q2) = c' (y2)
cM (y2) < UH (92). In either case this implies that I e > 0 such that AM (Y1, $2 - e) < 0, which is
impossible. Then y as above, which implies that AM (y 0 ) > 0 > AM (yl) > 0 in cases (a) and
(b). n
We are now prepared to establish Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 1, no PSNE will involve s{ > 0 and at least one s, > 0.
Then the second part of the proposition follows immediately from Lemma 2.
We now establish the first part. Suppose E a PSNE in which si > 0 and s, > 0. By Lemma 1
6 MRM = 6FRM and ci" = Rioic2" for i E {M, F}. By Assumption A2, this equilibrium will never
be chosen by any couple as long as ] some other Pareto dominant PSNE. We divide the problem
into 4 cases: (a) Q = 5M = 6F, (b) QRj = 3iRi and SM < 6 F, (c) QRj > 6JRi, and (d) QRj < 3iRi
and show that in each case a Pareto dominant PSNE exists.
In case (a) RM = Rj = RF. It is clear that s' = s = 0 and sf = sJ (0) > 0 will be a Pareto
dominant PSNE (since b < b' strictly fewer transaction costs are paid when saving in just the joint
account so consumption will be higher in both periods).
In cases (b) and (c), RF < RM and RF < Rj. Note that in order for the original sjF to be a
Nash best response, it must be that the couple would choose sJ = 0 if the wife deviated to sF = 0.
(Since QRJ > SFRF this would have to be due to transaction costs. If the couple chose s{ > 0 in
response to the deviation, second period consumption would increase and the wife would be strictly
better off). Now consider the alternative allocation sf = 0 and s set according to equation 1.13.
Since equation 1.13 holds under the original and the proposed alternative, and since RM > RF,
it must be that a1 > ci and 22 > c2. If 9M is a best response for the husband, then sF = 0,
sM = , s = 0 will be a Pareto dominant PSNE (it is clear that sj = 0 will be a best response1i 1s 1 1  (it0.Clal mi rferdtfor the couple given s% since the original PSNE implies sJ (sI, 0) = 0). Clearly 1{ is preferred to
any other positive s 1 , so if 9M >-m sm = 0 we are done with cases (b) and (c). Suppose instead
that sm = 0 -u s9. Then it must be that sj (0) > 0 - denote the resulting allocation (E1, a2).
Since QRj > 6iRi, Eulers show that a2 < 62 => a1 < a1, so (a1,a 2) -M (01,02) => E2 > 62. Then
6F > SF => (a 1, a 2 ) >-F (a1, 02), which implies sA = sF = 0 and s{ = sj (0) is a Pareto dominant
PSNE.
For case (d) take the alternative allocation AF = g{ = 0, Am > 0 according to equation 1.13.
Then Assumption A3 and RM > RF imply that consumption in both periods must be higher
under this alternative allocation (otherwise the husband's Euler relation would not be maintained).
Lemma 3 implies that Am is a best response for the husband. By Lemma 2, the alternative allocation
results in al = SFRFC2  > QRj62. This implies that sF = 0 is a best response for the wife, and
that A{ = 0 is optimal for the couple. Then the alternative allocation is a Pareto dominant PSNE,
and involves only one account in use. m
Proof of Proposition 2. When 6M = F= , the ex-ante Pareto efficient consumption sharing
rules will be time invariant and given by cm = pct and cF = (1 - p) Ct. Substituting this into the
efficient bargaining problem (EB) yields the following maximand:
Ti_
(Ppi~ + (1 ) (1 p) - t-1  c
t=1
Note that any savings allocation {sm, sF, s'} T=2 that maximizes this term also maximizes U"
and Uf in both t = 1 and t = 2. Then by definition of an optimum, there is no deviation from
this savings plan that makes either individual strictly better off, so the solution to (EB) will be
sustainable as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the private savings game. By definition of an
optimum, it also follows that any other pure strategy equilibrium that does not solve (EB) will
result in strictly less utility for both agents. Then by Assumption A2, the allocation chosen by the
household in the private savings game must correspond to an ex-ante Pareto efficient allocation. m
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose 9' results in the same consumption allocation as st = 0.
For the proof, we only consider A' = A'\§' and h' = Di\§', as a private savings choice that is
equivalent to s' = 0 will never lead to a strict preference for private savings, so we need not consider
these choices. Note that the presence of transaction costs implies that if such an si exists, ']A that
results in strictly more (or less) consumption in agent i's preferred period, so A' 0 =>. Ai : 0 and
D1 # 0 -> D' # 0. Denote the t period consumption allocation that arises given s' and s- = 0 as
ct (si). Then define Q1 (s', 6i) ui (ci (si)) +SiU2 (c2 (s')). Then Uj (0, 6j) is the utility individual
i would receive in the absence of private savings. Then Vsi E A'
8Ai (si o 6) a [Ci (Si, Ji) - 54i (0, 60])
-U2 -( (c2 (si)) - U2 (c2 (0)) (1.14)
This term is always positive for elements of AF and negative for elements of A, unless sI results
in more consumption in both periods, in which case Am (s , oi) > 0 V y > 1. Then either
( (s, Q) - U (0, Q) > 0 or Ci (s', Q) - U (0, Q) < 0. In the former case, this implies that s' is
preferred to s' - 0 V 6 F > Q (i = F) or SM < Q (i = M). Then for the wife, our thresholds are
p* = 0 and 7) (p) = 1 Vp. For the husband, the threshold is -y* = 1.
In the latter case E Si (s') that solves C (s, 3) - t (0, Si) = 0: ) U(Ci(O))-U( (si))
U2 (C2 (el)-U2(C2(O))
Since Oi (s4, Q) - U (0, Q) < 0, by the definition of A it must be that the numerator and denomina-
tor are of the same sign (otherwise the private savings choice would be strictly preferred for all 6i).
Then our derivatives and initial conditions imply that for husbands 0 < SM (s) < Q and for wives
3F (sil) > Q. Then define: * = sup {SM (sM) : sj E A } and * = inf {SM (sf) : sF c
For husbands, we then set Q = . For wives we must address two parameters. The lower bound
p * solves R_-= *. Then for each p > p*, -Y* (p) = .
We can repeat this exercise with the set bl/Ai. Note that if Us (sI, Q) - U (0, Q) < 0, s' will
never be profitable for any individual where oi = Q. In this case, define y = 1 or -*,* (p) = 1
Vp. When i (sl, Q) - U% (0, Q) > 0, the mechanics are essentially the same as the argument above,
except the signs are reversed. Since s' is preferred at 6i = Q, we can find 4** (p) V p E (0, 1). When
s E A n D%1, private savings increases consumption in both periods and will be preferred to the
household alternative. In this case, let -y* = oc or -* (p) 0 Vp E (0, 1). These thresholds meet
the initial requirements of the proposition, which therefore completes the proof. E
Proof of Proposition 4. For parts (a) and (b), there are two possibilities, either the Nash best
response at 6i (y), s* > 0, results in the same consumption allocation as s = 0, or it does not.
When it does, the result follows trivially: individual i could always save sF* + e (for the wife) or
s - e (for the husband). Since there is some transaction cost associated with the joint account
(Assumption A3), we can always find E small enough such that the resulting allocation is strictly
preferred to s' = 0 Voi (-y) with -y > -y. To complete the proofs of (a) and (b) we just establish the
result for the latter possibility (s* results in a different allocation).
First consider (a). We will show that any sf* > 0 that is a Nash best response of the wife,
is an element of Af by contradiction. Suppose instead that sF E DF\A'. Then ci (sf*) >
ci (sJ (0)) = sJ (0) > 0. Since 6F > Q, an agent with discount factor Q would also prefer sF* to
F = 0. Since bF > VJ we have RF F (RJ) > RJ. This implies the following Euler relationship:
ci (sF*) o < ci (sJ (0)) = Rj Qc2 (s J (0)) < RFSF (Y) c2 s
which is not possible if sf* is a best response: Lemma 1 implies that sJ (sf*) = 0, so the above
inequality implies that the wife could make herself even better off by increasing sF. This is a
contradiction, so we conclude that any optimal sf* must be such that c2 (s'*) > C2 (sf (0)). Then
Proposition 3 implies the result.
Now consider (b). Suppose sm* E DM\A. Since RM < RM (RJ), it must be that an agent
with discount factor Q strictly prefers the allocation under the joint alternative. This implies that
cl (sJ (0))1 Ci (s M*) F_ C2 (S*) c2 (Sf (0)) 1-
1 - 1 - > 1 - 1 -1-0 1 - a 1 - aC (I*T_ ____
but since SM !; Q, it is clear that s* would not be a Nash best response. Since all profitable
sM* E Am, Proposition 3 implies the result.
Finally consider (c). It suffices to illustrate a case where use of the individual account is non-
monotonic in -y. Suppose that RM > RM (Rj) but there is no sm that can deliver weakly more
consumption in both periods relative to the joint alternative (i.e. Alm n Dim = 0) - note that
when bM = b this scenario is never possible. This implies that if the husband sets sj such that
first period consumption were equal to that under the joint alternative, second period consumption
under s, would be less than that under the joint alternative:
RM (sJ (0) - bM + bJ) - bM < RisJ (0) -bJ (1.15)
When oM = Q, the husband will strictly prefer saving privately to s' = 0 (this follows from
RM > NM (RJ)), and it must be that c2 (sf~~I*) > c2 (s (0)) under the Nash best response,
Otherwise we would have
(ci (sm** < c s 0)) = QR j (C2 (sJ (0))) _' < GRm (C2 (SM*))
which contradicts optimality of sm*. So when 6m = Q, sm* E D.
Since Am n Dm = 0 and saving privately is strictly profitable at -y = 1, Proposition 3 implies
that ~] finite -y below which the husband prefers to save privately. If Am = 0 we will see downward
monotonicity. However, if Am is not empty, Proposition 3 (part 2) implies that private savings is
again preferred by the husband for all y > ;'.
It is straightforward to construct an example where ' >y. Note that when y = 1, sM* > s{ (0)
and sf* must satisfy the husband's Euler relation. As y increases, oM will decrease, so the sm* that
satisfies the husband's Euler will decrease continuously. Suppose parameters are such that at , the
sm* satisfying the husband's Euler is such that sM* = sf (0), and that he would prefer the savings
allocation {sf =0, sj = 0, s = s *} to consuming endowments. Then equation 1.15 implies that
the husband would be even better off under the household allocation, so at i his best response is
sm = 0. Then it must be that -y< ' < -y.
Proof of Proposition 5. Note 7yi (Ri) > 1 > A' (Ri) n D' (Ri) = 0. By construction, individ-
ual i is indifferent between saving privately and the household alternative at 'yi (Ri) (this follows
immediately from continuity of utility in 3). Then Lemma 1 implies that the best possible private
savings choice at -yi (Ri), s' (-yl (Ri)), must be such that sJ (s' (-y (Ri))) = 0. Now increase Ri
to R' and leave sI unchanged. Then we still have s{ (s') = 0, since increasing Ri decreases sec-
ond period marginal utility. Furthermore, individual i's utility of s' (-yr (Ri)) must strictly increase
(since second period consumption increases and first period consumption remains the same), while
the utility of the joint alternative remains the same. This implies y; (R') < 7y' (Ri).
Now consider -y* (RM). The proof of Proposition 4 illustrates that finite 'Y* (RM) implies
RM > NM (Rj) > Rj and Am (RM) n Dr" (RM) = 0. Then we can apply the same logic as above
to show that y** (R' ) > -y* (RM). *
Proof of Proposition 6. First consider -*, (Ri). Note -y* (Rj) > 1 => AF (Rj) n Df (Rj) = 0.
By construction, the wife is indifferent between saving privately and the household alternative at
7* (Rj). By Lemma 1, sJ (sF (-y* (Ri))) = 0 at Rj. Then s{ (sF (_Y; (Ri))) = 0 VR' < Rj.
It follows that V -y> (Ri), the wife's utility under the private savings regime must be weakly
increasing as Rj decreases. Moreover, the wife's utility under the household alternative will always
fall when Rj falls. When - > 0, 6F ;> Q and the fact that household utility strictly increases
is sufficient to imply this. When D81< 0, joint savings must change so that consumption in each
period decreases as Rj decreases (otherwise the joint Euler would not hold), which is sufficient for the
implication. This implies that a wife who is indifferent between saving privately and the household
allocation at Rj will strictly prefer to save privately at R'. This implies that -y* (Rj) > Jy (R').
Now consider the husband. It suffices to illustrate that y* (Rj) and -y** (Rj) can increase or
decrease with Rj by example. By the same argument used for the wife, the husband's utility of
saving privately must be weakly increasing as Rj declines. Assume the couple strictly prefers to save
in the joint account when sf = 0. Then decreasing Rj has the following impact on the husband's
utility of the joint savings allocation:
- [_ (c1 (sf (0)))0 + SMRJ (c2 (si (0)))"] -- sjo5 (c2 (si (0))) (1.16)
When 8 < 0 this is always negative. However, when a > 0 this will be positive for sufficientlyaRj - Rj
small oM. By Proposition 5, -yl is decreasing with RM given Rj. Then we can choose parameters
so that equation 1.16 is either positive or negative at the oM implied by y* (Rj). We can also
choose parameters so that the s, > 0 that is optimal at -y* (Rj) and Rj satisfies the husband's
Euler equation. Then the movement of -y* (Rj) will be given by the sign of equation 1.16. We can
perform an analogous exercise with y** (Rj). m
1.B Appendix: Extra Statements Sample
As described in Section 1.3, 50 percent of couples (who attended our seventh experimental session
or above) were sampled for an "extra statements" offer. In order to keep selection into individual
account opening constant between treatment and control, our experimental protocol dictated that
the extra statement offer only be made to participants after they decided which accounts to open.
However, extra statement provision is significantly, negatively correlated with the probability of
opening an individual account in our sample. While our enumerators never reported informing
couples about the extra statements before account choice, nor did they report any cases were
couples changed their minds about opening individual accounts after getting an extra statements
offer, they were able to observe whether or not a couple was randomly selected for extra statements
in a subset of our sessions. The correlation is only significant in this subset of sessions, so we
conjecture that some enumerators guided selected couples to joint accounts, as filling out the extra
statement cards involved time consuming paperwork. To address this concern, we ran the following
regression among all individual accounts in the suspect sessions enumerator by enumerator:
openic = Oo + Oiesc + -ye + Eic
Where i indexes the individual, esc indicates extra statement selection and Ye are co-enumerator
fixed effects (our enumerators worked in teams of two).
Out of 14 enumerators, the coefficient on esc was negative and significant for just four enu-
merators. We dropped observations for these four enumerators in the sessions where enumerators
could observe extra statement selection prior to the couple's account opening decision. All told, we
dropped 366 of 1,000 individual account observations. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 verify that ac-
count opening is uncorrelated with extra statement selection once we drop the suspect enumerators.
1.C Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1-1: Demographic Characteristics of Study Sample
Husbands Wives Difference N
Age
Education
Literate
Number Children
Subsistence Farmer or No Job
Income Last Week
Owns Mobile Phone
Participates in ROSCA
Has Bank Account
Savings in Bank Account (Among Savers)
Saves at Home
Savings at Home (Among Savers)
Consumption - I Decide
Consumption - Spouse Decides
Consumption - Decide Together
Consumption - Decide Alone
Savings - I Decide
Savings - Spouse Decides
Savings - Decide Together
Savings - Decide Alone
Weekly Discount Factor
Distance from Family Bank (Miles)
41.8
[13.3]
8.06
[3.57]
0.864
[0.343]
4.84
[2.93]
0.406
[0.491]
1348
[2749]
0.487
[0.500]
0.491
[0.500]
0.303
[0.460]
10217
[18695]
0.851
[0.357]
1209
[2551]
0.470
[0.500]
0.0758
[0.265]
0.389
[0.488]
0.0152
[0.122]
0.355
[0.479]
0.439
[0.497]
0.106
[0.308]
0.0773
[0.267]
0.801
[0.227]
3.78
[2.21]
1194
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets, standard errors in parentheses. Variable recoded to missing
if response was don't know/refused. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90
percent levels respectively.
35.2
[11.8]
5.91
[4.02]
0.668
[0.471]
4.48
[2.54]
0.467
[0.499]
798
[1618]
0.426
[0.495]
0.657
[0.475]
0.119
[0.324]
4495
[5680]
0.898
[0.303]
858
[2923]
0.170
[0.376]
0.378
[0.485]
0.376
[0.485]
0.0337
[0.181]
0.492
[0.500]
0.282
[0.450]
0.103
[0.304]
0.0997
[0.300]
0.793
[0.215]
3.78
[2.21]
6.53***
(0.726)
2.14***
(0.220)
0.196***
(0.0238)
0.358**
(0.159)
-0.0615**
(0.0287)
549***
(132)
0.0615**
(0.0289)
-0.166***
(0.0282)
0.184***
(0.0230)
5722***
(1702)
-0.0472***
(0.0192)
351**
(171)
0.299***
(0.0257)
-0.302***
(0.0227)
0.0128
(0.0282)
-0.0186**
(0.00896)
-0.137***
(0.0284)
0.157***
(0.0275)
0.00284
(0.0178)
-0.0224
(0.0165)
0.00776
(0.0128)
1189
1194
1194
1189
1162
1189
1194
1194
208
1193
1023
1187
1187
1187
1187
1187
1187
1187
1187
1194
1194
Table 1-2: Correlations Between Estimated Discount Factors and Socioeconomic Characteristics
Nonlinear Least Squares
Female
Age
Education
Literate
Number Children
Subsistence Farmer or No Job
Income Last Week+
Owns Phone
Consumption - I Decide
Consumption - Decide Together
Consumption - Decide Alone
Consumption - Other
ROSCA Member
Has Bank Account
Saves at Home
Has SACCO Account
Has MPESA Account
Saves Other Ways
Savings - My Spouse Decides
Savings - Decide Together
Savings - Decide Alone
Savings - Other
Self Reported Savings+
Savings in Family Bank Accounts+
All
-0.0133
(0.0156)
-0.000853
(0.000704)
0.00155
(0.00235)
-0.0268
(0.0212)
-0.00531
(0.00326)
0.00718
(0.0144)
0.0854
(0.259)
-0.000766
(0.0142)
0.0236
(0.0186)
0.00132
(0.0194)
-0.0140
(0.0438)
-0.00926
(0.0376)
0.00342
(0.0145)
-0.0160
(0.0195)
0.0384*
(0.0205)
0.0483
(0.0317)
-0.0489***
(0.0190)
0.0166
(0.0153)
0.0107
(0.0147)
-0.0288
(0.0249)
-0.0549**
(0.0264)
-0.0594
(0.0457)
0.0136
(0.0144)
0.716
(0.470)
1194
Husbands Wives
-0.000798
(0.00100)
0.00175
(0.00337)
-0.0287
(0.0350)
-0.0105**
(0.00463)
0.0142
(0.0229)
-0.00133
(0.251)
0.0177
(0.0206)
0.0378
(0.0392)
0.0317
(0.0420)
-0.00205
(0.0921)
-0.00565
(0.0614)
-0.000996
(0.0201)
0.00525
(0.0249)
0.0429
(0.0289)
0.0381
(0.0355)
-0.0677***
(0.0254)
0.0300
(0.0234)
0.0207
(0.0221)
-0.0146
(0.0377)
-0.0447
(0.0427)
-0.0804
(0.0747)
0.00440
(0.0347)
0.138
(0.622)
597
-0.000975
(0.000962)
0.00264
(0.00354)
-0.0196
(0.0294)
0.000503
(0.00429)
0.0144
(0.0191)
0.412
(0.585)
-0.00447
(0.0188)
0.0290
(0.0247)
-0.0112
(0.0232)
-0.0458
(0.0549)
-0.00121
(0.0536)
0.00833
(0.0197)
-0.0661*
(0.0348)
0.0356
(0.0320)
0.232***
(0.0848)
-0.0293
(0.0330)
-0.00463
(0.0214)
-0.00173
(0.0220)
-0.0425
(0.0326)
-0.0646*
(0.0343)
-0.0332
(0.0641)
0.0562
(0.0796)
1.60**
(0.757)
597
Ad Hoc
All
-0.0205
(0.0207)
-0.00113
(0.000933)
0.00351
(0.00300)
-0.0348
(0.0280)
-0.00617
(0.00432)
0.00798
(0.0187)
0.210
(0.326)
0.00115
(0.0184)
0.0334
(0.0248)
0.00321
(0.0259)
-0.0138
(0.0564)
-0.00939
(0.0498)
0.00296
(0.0188)
-0.0354
(0.0258)
0.0393
(0.0270)
0.0696*
(0.0404)
-0.0459*
(0.0237)
0.0300
(0.0199)
0.00815
(0.0192)
-0.0341
(0.0324)
-0.0740**
(0.0336)
-0.0403
(0.0584)
0.0211
(0.0188)
1.25**
(0.603)
1194
Notes: +Coefficients and standard errors have been scaled by 100,000 for readability. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the couple level for pooled regressions) reported in parentheses. All
regressions include session fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90
percent levels respectively.
Table 1-3: Randomization Verification - Interest Rates and Extra Statements
Individual Accounts Joint Extra Cash
Husband Wife Accounts Statements Prize
Panel A. Adherence to Theoretical Probabilities
10% Interest Rate/Extra Stmts/Cash 0.233
6% Interest Rate
2% Interest Rate
0% Interest Rate
Panel B. Correlation with Demographic
Age
Education
Literate
Number Children
Occupation
Income Last Week (Decile)
Has Mobile Phone
Participates in ROSCA
Has Bank Account
Saves at Home
Has SACCO Account
Has MPESA Account
Saves Other Ways
Self Reported Savings (Decile)
Consumption Decision Making
Savings Decision Making
Estimated Discount Factor (Decile)
Well Matched Couple
Distance from Bank (Decile)
0.240
{0.345} {0.571}
0.243 0.263
{0.706} {0.478}
0.256 0.266
{0.741} {0.369}
0.268 0.231
{0.321} {0.299}
Characteristics
170
{0.745}
42.1
{0.468}
1.50
{0.682}
51.3
{0.577}
19.6
{0.721}
24.5
{0.605}
2.54
{0.468}
3.44
{0.329}
2.75
{0.432}
0.667
{0.881}
1.61
{0.657}
4.45
{0.217}
6.37*
{0.0950}
24.6
{0.596}
17.9
{0.269}
13.5
{0.562}
21.1
{0.272}
1.72
{0.633}
13.0
{0.966}
156
{0.416}
35.1
{0.766}
1.21
{0.752}
37.4
{0.543}
36.3
{0.109}
33.9*
{0.0865}
1.69
{0.640}
1.61
{0.657}
2.67
{0.445}
5.51
{0.138}
3.82
{0.282}
2.63
{0.452}
0.381
{0.944}
27.5
{0.439}
23.4*
{0.0752}
15.9
{0.388}
15.5
{0.799}
1.55
{0.671}
31.5
{0.139}
0.320
{0.515}
0.353
{0.298}
0.327
{0.761}
61.5
{1.000}
15.2
{0.977}
4.20
{0.122}
33.9
{0.567}
21.0
{0.281}
26.1*
{0.0986}
0.455
{0.797}
2.40
{0.301}
1.31
{0.520}
2.23
{0.328}
0.186
{0.911}
9.75***
{0.00763}
4.18
{0.124}
20.1
{0.330}
6.52
{0.770}
5.12
{0.883}
23.1*
{0.0590}
0.0798
{0.961}
10.1
{0.862}
0.456* 0.175**
{0.0544} {0.0327}
24.7
{1.000}
7.60
{0.909}
0.00986
{0.921}
18.4
{0.303}
20.8**
{0.0136}
3.21
{0.956}
1.42
{0.233}
0.0954
{0.757}
0.697
{0.404}
0.0156
{0.900}
0.588
{0.443}
0.0101
{0.920}
4.42**
{0.0355}
12.2
{0.203}
5.03
{0.284}
3.22
{0.666}
8.55
{0.286}
1.42
{0.233}
6.25
{0.619}
37.3
{0.995}
8.91
{0.837}
0.276
{0.599}
13.0
{0.792}
4.65
{0.864}
11.7
{0.228}
0.229
{0.632}
0.0259
{0.872}
0.456
{0.500}
3.52*
{0.0606}
0.0492
{0.824}
0.438
{0.508}
0.979
{0.323}
17.7**
{0.0388}
1.87
{0.867}
2.11
{0.834}
15.5**
{0.0296}
0.290
{0.590}
16.4**
{0.0370}
Notes: P-values from binomial tests of theoretical probabilities (Panel A) or chi-squared tests for the
equality of treatment distributions across demographic characteristics (Panel B) in braces. Theoretical
probabilities are 1/4 for the first two columns, 1/3 for the third column, 1/2 for the fourth column, and 1/5
for the final column. The last three columns of Panel B test the equality of treatment distributions over
both husband and wife's characteristics. These tests are adjusted for clustering at the couple level. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
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Table 1-4: Impact of Interest Rates on Account Takeup and Use
2% Interest
6% Interest
10% Interest
Joint
Joint x6% Interest
Joint x 10% Interest
DV Mean (Individual Accounts, No Interest)
N
Opened
0.0524
(0.0354)
0.144***
(0.0377)
0.191***
(0.0399)
0.263***
(0.0524)
-0.0208
(0.0637)
0.0282
(0.0612)
0.289
1791
Saved
0.0182
(0.0197)
0.0635***
(0.0218)
0.0851***
(0.0233)
0.138***
(0.0342)
0.0432
(0.0491)
0.0802
(0.0516)
0.0537
1791
Average
Balance
-21.0
(34.0)
96.5
(61.5)
114**
(50.2)
166***
(65.3)
-124
(103)
-10.9
(111)
50.0
1791
Total
Deposits
-24.9
(293)
538
(451)
794*
(439)
3058
(2470)
-3218
(2498)
-2041
(2484)
303
1791
Total
Withdrawals
-82.0
(244)
437
(373)
644
(415)
2871
(2461)
-3066
(2474)
-2061
(2447)
212
1791
Number
Transactions
0.0421
(0.135)
0.167
(0.136)
0.319*
(0.166)
0.551**
(0.244)
-0.297
(0.302)
0.310
(0.432)
0.245
1791
d*** ** n
Fees
-0.360
(3.94)
5.31
(4.79)
8.91*
(5.19)
15.1*
(8.04)
-13.3
(10.1)
-0.899
(12.7)
5.18
1791
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses. All regressions include session fixed effec
indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
d 
*
, ,.
Table 1-5: Preference Heterogeneity and Savings Levels, By Account Type
Individual Accounts Joint Accounts
Average Fraction Average Fraction
Saved Balance Balance Saved Balance Balance
Panel A. Basic Controls
Well Matched -0.0675*** -57.2 -0.0818*** 0.100** 208 0.173***
(0.0206) (37.0) (0.0310) (0.0452) (133) (0.0652)
Joint Deviation -0.0523 -69.1 -0.0722 0.0708 409** 0.146
(0.0330) (50.9) (0.0492) (0.0652) (197) (0.103)
Panel B. + Time Preference Controls
Well Matched -0.0858*** -90.0* -0.116*** 0.112** 97.3 0.242***
(0.0223) (52.2) (0.0325) (0.0500) (96.8) (0.0696)
Joint Deviation -0.0468 -65.3 -0.0778 0.0736 414** 0.154
(0.0323) (51.0) (0.0491) (0.0661) (193) (0.104)
Panel C. + Demographic Controls
Well Matched -0.0885*** -80.9 -0.122*** 0.117** 92.2 0.247***
(0.0229) (54.6) (0.0328) (0.0506) (97.6) (0.0730)
Joint Deviation -0.0611* -58.8 -0.0617 0.0811 392** 0.123
(0.0320) (53.0) (0.0500) (0.0685) (195) (0.109)
Panel D. +Economic Controls
Well Matched -0.0870*** -84.2 -0.119*** 0.109** 95.6 0.241***
(0.0228) (56.2) (0.0324) (0.0518) (103) (0.0740)
Joint Deviation -0.0610* -70.2 -0.0693 0.0845 392** 0.137
(0.0318) (52.3) (0.0546) (0.0693) (197) (0.122)
DV Mean (Omitted) 0.114 126 0.200 0.271 174 0.601
N 1194 1194 512 597 597 256
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the couple level for individual accounts) in parentheses.
Time preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower censoring and top/bottomcoding
of the discount factors of each spouse and the average household discount factor. The demographic
control set adds controls for spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of children, and literacy.
The economic control set adds controls for heterogeneity in income, an indicator for subsistence
farmers or the unemployed, and phone ownership. All regressions include session fixed effects and fixed
effects for each account's interest rate. * * and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent
levels respectively.
Table 1-6: Responses to the Excess Interest Rate by Match Quality
Panel A. Well Matched
Excess Lowxlndiv.
Couples Only
Excess High x ndiv.
Excess Low x Joint
Excess High x Joint
DV Mean
N
Panel B. Impacts by Match Quality
Excess Low xIndiv.
Excess High x Indiv.
Excess Low x Joint
Excess High x Joint
Excess Low x ndiv. x Bad Match
Excess High x ndiv. x Bad Match
Excess Low x Joint x Bad Match
Excess High x Joint x Bad Match
DV Mean
N
Control Set
0.00285
(0.00518)
0.0210**
(0.00939)
0.0346**
(0.0152)
-0.00564
(0.0162)
0.152
597
0.00192
(0.00498)
0.0202**
(0.00946)
0.0347***
(0.0148)
-0.00625
(0.0164)
-0.00648
(0.00755)
-0.0279***
(0.0116)
-0.0323*
(0.0178)
-0.00356
(0.0191)
.161
1791
Basic
0.00349
(0.00517)
0.0225***
(0.00957)
0.0348**
(0.0154)
-0.00601
(0.0159)
0.152
597
0.00110
(0.00508)
0.0223***
(0.00935)
0.0346***
(0.0148)
-0.00667
(0.0164)
-0.00457
(0.00765)
-0.0304***
(0.0115)
-0.0313*
(0.0178)
-0.00249
(0.0191)
.161
1791
+Time Pref
0.00316
(0.00623)
0.0222***
(0.00897)
0.0365***
(0.0156)
-0.00674
(0.0155)
0.152
597
0.00293
(0.00534)
0.0212**
(0.00943)
0.0363***
(0.0147)
-0.00666
(0.0161)
-0.00672
(0.00790)
-0.0299***
(0.0116)
-0.0322*
(0.0177)
-0.00219
(0.0189)
.161
1791
+Demo.
0.00708
(0.00682)
0.0182**
(0.00846)
0.0384***
(0.0163)
-0.00634
(0.0159)
0.152
597
0.00345
(0.00552)
0.0199**
(0.00909)
0.0367***
(0.0148)
-0.00864
(0.0161)
-0.00798
(0.00808)
-0.0268***
(0.0114)
-0.0331*
(0.0178)
0.000438
(0.0189)
.161
1791
+Economic
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses. All regressions include
session fixed effects and fixed effects that saturate interest ratexjoint account (x badly matched for
panel B). Time preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower censoring and
top/bottomcoding of the discount factors of each spouse and the average household discount factor.
The demographic control set adds controls for spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of
children, and literacy. The economic control set adds controls for heterogeneity in income, an indicator
for subsistence farmers or the unemployed, and phone ownership. * *, and * indicate significance
at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Table 1-7: Proxied Banking Costs and Savings Behavior
Couple Level Account Level
Saved Any Saved Joint Frac. Joint Saved
Panel A. No Controls
Cost Index/High Cost
Excess
Excessx Cost Index/High C
Panel B. + Time Preference
Cost Index/High Cost
Excess
-0.377***
(0.127)
ost
Controls
-0.397***
(0.130)
0.571***
(0.180)
0.758***
(0.164)
0.588*** 0.784***
(0.187) (0.169)
ExcessxCost Index/High Cost
Panel C. + Demographic
Cost Index/High Cost
Excess
Controls
-0.363***
(0.145)
0.539***
(0.226)
0.766***
(0.205)
ExcessxCost Index/High Cost
Panel D. + Economic Controls
Cost Index/High Cost -0.426***
(0.178)
Excess
0.222
(0.257)
0.523**
(0.248)
Excess x Cost Index/High Cost
DV Mean 0.429
597
0.676
256
0.652
256
-0.125***
(0.0351)
0.0169***
(0.00579)
-0.0141***
(0.00542)
-0.131***
(0.0359)
0.0174***
(0.00583)
-0.0138***
(0.00547)
-0.113***
(0.0358)
0.0162***
(0.00589)
-0.0135***
(0.00559)
-0.0966**
(0.0459)
0.0163***
(0.00602)
-0.0136***
(0.00567)
0.152
597
-0.158*
(0.0852)
0.0178**
(0.00785)
-0.0157
(0.0100)
-0.143
(0.0901)
0.0176**
(0.00777)
-0.0141
(0.0103)
-0.159*
(0.0928)
0.0174***
(0.00728)
-0.0158
(0.0100)
-0.152*
(0.0913)
0.0177***
(0.00746)
-0.0163
(0.0101)
Sample All Savers Savers Matched Matched
Interest Rate Restrictions? N/A N/A N/A Yes No
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the couple level when relevant) in parentheses. Time
preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower censoring and top/bottom coding of the
discount factor for each member of the couple and the average household discount factor. The demographic
control set adds controls for spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of children, and literacy. The
economic control set adds controls for heterogeneity in income and phone ownership. The final two columns
include dummy variables that fully saturate interest ratexjoint, as well as a high cost xjoint dummy. The
fourth column also includes interactions between the high cost dummy and the interest ratexjoint
interaction set. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Table 1-8: Interest Rate Losses Borne Among Savers, by Match Quality
Assumed Ei 0 5 10 15 20
Poorly Matched Couples
Maximum Interest Earnings 8.30 6.90 6.25 6.09 6.08
Actual Interest Earnings 6.00 4.61 3.23 1.84 0.452
Loss 2.30 2.29 3.03 4.25 5.62
Well Matched Couples
Maximum Interest Earnings 8.29 7.01 6.62 6.47 6.45
Actual Interest Earnings 6.89 6.14 5.39 4.64 3.89
Loss 1.40 0.874 1.23 1.83 2.55
Loss Gap 0.900*** 1.42*** 1.80*** 2.42*** 3.07***
(0.344) (0.364) (0.494) (0.660) (0.843)
As Share of Well Matched Loss 0.643 1.62 1.47 1.33 1.20
N 256 256 256 256 256
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** , and * indicate significance at the 99, 95,
and 90 percent levels respectively. Principal components index constructed from distance from the
bank, spouse specific indicators for subsistence farmers/the unemployed, and spouse specific
indicators for baseline bank account ownership and SACCO membership.
Table 1-9: Impact of Extra Statements on Savings and Average Balances of Individual Accounts
Protocol Check First Stage Reduced Forms Two Stage Least Squares
Opened Consented to ES Saved Average Balance Saved Average Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. Basic Controls
Extra Statement -0.00985 -0.0641 0.598*** 0.474*** -0.00683 -0.356*** 27.3 -417 -0.0114 -0.832*** 45.6 -958
(0.0523) (0.109) (0.0694) (0.118) (0.0629) (0.125) (123) (296) (0.106) (0.356) (204) (737)
x Well Matched 0.0118 0.00375 0.264** 422** 0.607*** 897**
(0.107) (0.133) (0.118) (214) (0.247) (417)
x Well Informed 0.0967 0.257** 0.347** 512 0.755** 995
(0.122) (0.127) (0.156) (517) (0.346) (919)
Panel B. + Time Preference Controls
Extra Statement -0.0112 -0.0617 0.575*** 0.472*** 0.00513 -0.291*** 91.3 -316 0.00894 -0.771** 159 -881
(0.0542) (0.110) (0.0753) (0.130) (0.0573) (0.121) (141) (345) (0.0996) (0.356) (244) (873)
x Well Matched 0.0267 -0.0238 0.133 207 0.452* 660
(0.110) (0.147) (0.124) (240) (0.259) (524)
x Well Informed 0.0752 0.237 0.350** 620 0.743** 1138
(0.125) (0.146) (0.157) (542) (0.338) (969)
Panel C. + Demographic Controls
Extra Statement -0.00810 -0.0114 0.601*** 0.517*** 0.0425 -0.265* 179 -429 0.0707 -0.625* 298 -1161
(0.0541) (0.118) (0.0644) (0.139) (0.0549) (0.149) (146) (318) (0.0911) (0.334) (244) (806)
x Well Matched 0.0218 0.0864 0.180 690*** 0.453* 1483**
(0.113) (0.141) (0.135) (279) (0.262) (688)
x Well Informed 0.000729 0.185 0.307* 952* 0,548* 1602*
(0.137) (0.148) (0.182) (517) (0.299) (894)
Panel D. + Economic Controls
Extra Statement -0.00784 -0.0205 0.610*** 0.515*** 0.0101 -0.433*** 192 -353 0.0166 -0.971*** 315 -1135
(0.0563) (0.117) (0.0632) (0.141) (0.0610) (0.158) (215) (352) (0.0997) (0.370) (350) (906)
x Well Matched 0.0231 0.0285 0.173 513* 0.517* 1117*
(0.115) (0.155) (0.151) (279) (0.292) (647)
x Well Informed 0.00172 0.230 0.420** 867 0.799*** 1617
(0.139) (0.175) (0.184) (534) (0.329) (1009)
DV Mean (ES=0) 0.395 0 0.266 241 0.266 241
N 634 244 244 244 244 244
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses. All regressions except for columns (1) and (2) limited to open individual
accounts. Time preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower censoring and top/bottomcoding of the discount factors of each spouse and
the average household discount factor. The demographic control set adds controls for spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of children, and
literacy. The economic control set adds controls for heterogeneity in income, an indicator for subsistence farmers or the unemployed, and phone ownership.
All regressions include session fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Table 1-10: Preference Heterogeneity, Information Sharing, and Savings Levels, By Account Type
Individual Accounts Joint Accounts
Average Fraction Average Fraction
Saved Balance Balance Saved Balance Balance
ntrols
-0.0689***
(0.0205)
-0.0478
(0.0326)
-0.0454**
(0.0231)
Preference Controls
-0.0857***
(0.0222)
-0.0458
(0.0321)
-0.0345*
(0.0207)
Panel C. + Demographic Controls
Well Matched -0.0886***
(0.0228)
Joint Deviation -0.0597*
(0.0319)
Well Informed -0.0270
(0.0209)
Panel D. + Economic Controls
-58.9
(37.1)
-63.2
(50.6)
-66.4
(44.6)
-89.8*
(52.4)
-63.6
(51.1)
-56.1
(41.9)
-81.1
(54.7)
-56.7
(53.7)
-40.6
(50.3)
Well Matched -0.0872*** -84.2
(0.0228) (55.7)
Joint Deviation -0.0600* -70.2
(0.0318) (53.4)
Well Informed -0.0161 0.191
(0.0219) (57.1)
DV Mean (Omitted-Match) 0.114 126
N 1194 1194
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the couple
Panel A. Basic Co
Well Matched
Joint Deviation
Well Informed
Panel B. + Time
Well Matched
Joint Deviation
Well Informed
0.103**
(0.0451)
0.0616
(0.0654)
0.0918**
(0.0407)
0.112**
(0.0498)
0.0718
(0.0662)
0.0613
(0.0386)
0.118***
(0.0502)
0.0778
(0.0688)
0.0640
(0.0410)
0.110**
(0.0516)
0.0815
(0.0695)
0.0544
(0.0423)
0.271
597
level for individual accounts) in
"Omitted-Match" refers to couples who are poorly matched and have no joint deviation. Time
preference controls include separate dummies for upper/lower censoring and top/bottomcoding of the
discount factors of each spouse and the average household discount factor. The demographic control
set adds controls for spousal heterogeneity in age, education, number of children, and literacy. The
economic control set adds controls for heterogeneity in income, an indicator for subsistence farmers or
the unemployed, and phone ownership. All regressions include session fixed effects and fixed effects for
each account's interest rate. * *, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels
respectively.
-0.0860***
(0.0299)
-0.0506
(0.0490)
-0.107***
(0.0318)
-0.114***
(0.0323)
-0.0812*
(0.0492)
-0.0666**
(0.0299)
-0.120***
(0.0327)
-0.0669
(0.0499)
-0.0499
(0.0320)
-0.118***
(0.0326)
-0.0701
(0.0545)
-0.0235
(0.0368)
0.200
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204 0.
(132) (0
415**
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-15.7 0.
(100) (0
97.2 0.
(97.0) (0
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97.1 0.
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parentheses.
179***
.0634)
0.102
0.103)
205***
.0678)
237***
.0695)
0.161
0.104)
.125*
.0650)
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.0730)
0.133
0.109)
0.0924
0.0715)
239***
0.0747)
0.137
0.122)
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Figure 1-1: Map of Study Locations
Notes: The shaded area on the map of Kenya indicates Busia district, with Busia town marked by
a star. The local map shows detail surrounding Busia town, including major roads (dashed lines),
boundaries (solid lines) and study locations. Group meeting locations are demarcated by an x.
Figure 1-2: Interest Rate Design
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on the joint account. The excess interest on the husband's and wife's account follow
Figure 1-3: Theoretical Responses to the Excess Interest Rate by Match Quality and Account
A. Individual Accounts
000.00
0
0Excess Interest Rate
B. Joint Accounts
0
+-
U
0-
0
4 -J
U
0-
-Ej(Rj) 0 Ej(Rj)
Excess Interest Rate
Perfectly Matched - -- - Poorly Matched
-E(R 1)
00-
0-.-
0.0
-a. 10
E (R1)
I Perfectly Matched - -Poorly MatchedI
Figure 1-4: Distribution of Estimated Discount Factors by Gender
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Figure 1-5: Intrahousehold Heterogeneity in Estimated Discount Factors
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Figure 1-6: Relationship Between Savings Balances and Heterogeneity in Estimated Discount Factors
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Figure 1-7: Savings Response to Excess Interest Rate by Match Quality and Account Type
A. Well Matched Couples
Individual Accounts
B. Poorly Matched Couples
Individual Accounts
C
C,,
-1 0I I I I I I
-10 -5 0 5 10 -10 -5 0 5 10
Joint Accounts Joint Accounts
o..
/o
-10 -5 0 5 10 -10 -5 0 5 1
0-
Note: Predicted values calculated from regressions with standard errors clustered at the couple
level. Whiskers indicate 95 percent confidence intervals for each predicted value.
Figure 1-8: Distribution of Household Information Index
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Table 1-Al: Demographic Characteristics of Study Sample by
Well Matched Badly Matched
Age
Education
Literate
Number Children
Subsistence Farmer or No Job
Income Last Week
Owns Mobile Phone
Participates in ROSCA
Has Bank Account
Savings in Bank Account
Saves at Home
Savings at Home
Consumption - I Decide
Consumption - Spouse Decides
Consumption - Decide Together
Consumption - Decide Alone
Savings - I Decide
Savings - Spouse Decides
Savings - Decide Together
Savings - Decide Alone
Weekly Discount Factor
Distance from Family Bank (Miles)
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets,
38.1
[13.2]
6.77
[4.01]
0.731
[0.444]
4.60
[2.86]
0.429
[0.496]
895
[1361]
0.496
[0.501]
0.565
[0.496]
0.188
[0.392]
8626
[12046]
0.917
[0.276]
887
[2130]
0.322
[0.468]
0.234
[0.424]
0.378
[0.486]
0.0203
[0.141]
0.482
[0.500]
0.338
[0.474]
0.0808
[0.273]
0.0783
[0.269]
0.876
[0.197]
3.93
[2.25]
standard
38.7
[12.8]
7.09
[3.91]
0.784
[0.412]
4.70
[2.69]
0.440
[0.497]
1164
[2612]
0.437
[0.496]
0.578
[0.494]
0.222
[0.416]
8580
[17870]
0.853
[0.354]
1103
[3034]
0.319
[0.466]
0.223
[0.417]
0.385
[0.487]
0.0265
[0.161]
0.393
[0.489]
0.372
[0.484]
0.116
[0.321]
0.0936
[0.291]
0.758
[0.222]
3.71
[2.19]
errors in parentheses.
missing if response was don't know/refused. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95,
and 90 percent levels respectively.
Match Quality
Difference N
-0.595 1194
(0.801)
-0.319 1189
(0.245)
-0.0528** 1194
(0.0266)
-0.0980 1194
(0.172)
-0.0113 1189
(0.0305)
-269** 1162
(117)
0.0592* 1189
(0.0307)
-0.0126 1194
(0.0304)
-0.0339 1194
(0.0245)
46.4 208
(2121)
0.0639*** 1193
(0.0187)
-216 1023
(163)
0.00329 1187
(0.0288)
0.0103 1187
(0.0260)
-0.00644 1187
(0.0299)
-0.00618 1187
(0.00912)
0.0892*** 1187
(0.0306)
-0.0333 1187
(0.0294)
-0.0355** 1187
(0.0178)
-0.0153 1187
(0.0170)
0.119*** 1194
(0.0126)
0.224 1194
(0.137)
Variable recoded to
Figure 1-Al: Interest Rate Reminder Cards and Translation
Weka kadi hii kama kumbusho la kutumima akaunti yako
mpya ya binafsi/pamoja kwenye Family Bank ili kujenga
akiba yako kwa wakti ujao.
Kumbuka, IPA inalipia udhamini wa miezi sita kwa riba ya
kiasi cha
6%
Kwa akaunti yako! Riba yaweza ongeza akiba yako bila bidii
upande wako.
Leo ukiweka akiba ya: Kwa miezi sita riba yako itakuwa:
Shilingi 1,000/= * Shilingi 60/=
Shilingi 10,000/= - Shilingi 600/=
Shilingi 40,000/= - . Shilingi 2,400/=
Keep this card as a
reminder to use your
new Family Bank
individual/joint
account to build your
savings for the future.
Remember, IPA is
funding a 6 month
promotional interest
rate of
6%
on your account!
Interest can grow your
savings without any
effort on your part.
If today you save:
In 6 months your
interest will be:
Keep this card as a
reminder to use your
new Family Bank
individual/joint
account to build your
savings for the future.
Note: Figure illustrates reminder cards given for 6 percent and 0 percent interest.
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Chapter 2
Cost and Convenience: The Impact of
ATM Card Provision on Formal Savings
Account Use in Kenya
2.1 Introduction
The vast majority of the world's poor do not have access to formal financial services. Recent
estimates suggest that nearly three quarters of individuals in developing countries are unbanked
(Kendall et al. 2010), and in Sub-Saharan Africa, this estimate reaches 80 percent (Chaia et al.
2009). This lack of access does not reflect an inability or unwillingness to save. Indeed, the ability to
save is essential for the poor - stores of resources are needed to smooth unexpected shocks, to boost
investment in income generating activities, and to purchase valuable durable goods. Accordingly,
Collins et al. (2009) document that low-income households in developing countries save resources
in a wide variety of informal and semi-formal savings devices, even though these devices are often
quite costly. Policymakers have taken note of the costs and risks associated with informal savings,
as well as evidence from bank expansions in developing countries suggesting that increasing access
to the formal financial sector increases savings, investment, and income. 1 As a result, there is a
growing movement to connect the unbanked to formal financial services. Yet at the micro-level,
relatively little is known about the poor's use of formal savings accounts. The first part of this
paper contributes to filling this knowledge gap by presenting the results of a field experiment de-
signed to answer the following questions: Would the poor save with formal institutions if given the
opportunity? Would making formal sector accounts cheaper (by reducing fees) and more convenient
(by reducing non-fee transaction costs) substantially increase use of these accounts?
The answer to the above is not obvious. Traditional economic theory suggests that making formal
'See, for example, Aportela (1999), Bruhn and Love (2009), Burgess and Pande (2005), and Kaboski and
Townsend (2005).
accounts cheap and readily available would result in increased adoption by low income households.
However, a growing body of literature documents that individuals, particularly in developing coun-
tries, face important internal and external constraints to building savings balances. Furthermore,
these constraints are often such that fees or restrictions on access to liquidity may actually help
increase stores of savings. First, individuals may have to contend with time inconsistent preferences
- if the temptation to spend out of readily accessible savings is too great, individuals may prefer
to store resources in an account that is costly (in terms of time or money) to access (Banerjee
and Mullainathan 2010; Laibson 1997). Second, individuals in developing countries face frequent
demands on their resources from the community and extended family members. In such a context,
individuals may prefer to store savings in technologies that are costly to access in order to protect
their resources from these demands (Baland et al. 2007; Jakiela and Ozier 2011). Finally, demands
on savings may come from within the household. When the household is not Pareto efficient, indi-
viduals may value savings technologies that make resources difficult to access or observe (Anderson
and Baland 2002; Schaner 2011). For example, a wife may have difficulty denying her husband a
few shillings for a drink if he knows she has a store of savings under the mattress. However, if the
funds are stored at the bank and withdrawals incur a fee, she may be able to avoid having to make
such a transfer.
Moreover, these concerns are economically relevant. Many informal savings devices are charac-
terized by commitment and/or security features, and a growing body of empirical evidence suggests
that individuals in developing countries behave in ways consistent with these concerns (for a review,
see Karlan and Morduch (2010)). In light of these results, the second part of this paper asks the
following question: Is there evidence that the above-described internal and external constraints limit
the benefits of reduced fees and transaction costs? This question is of particular importance given
a recent shift in policymaker interest away from microcredit towards microsavings. For example, in
November 2010 the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation announced a $500 million pledge to expand
access to formal savings accounts to the wold's poor, with an emphasis on transactions cost reducing
technologies such as mobile money (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2010).
The field experiment that we designed to answer these questions was conducted in rural Kenya
from June 2009-February 2010. Seven hundred forty-eight married couples were given the opportu-
nity to open up to three accounts with a formal bank: a joint account, an individual account for the
husband, and an individual account for the wife. Each account was randomly assigned a temporary
6-month interest rate, which ranged from zero percent to 10 percent. Altogether, these couples
opened 1,121 accounts. As is typical in Kenya, the bank accounts featured nontrivial withdrawal
fees of $0.78, and accounts were only accessible during bank hours. However, the bank also offered
ATM cards for the accounts: these cards reduced withdrawal fees by over 50 percent (to $0.38) and
also enabled card holders to make withdrawals outside of bank hours. These cards were costly to
obtain (ordinarily, account holders would have to pay $3.75 to acquire an ATM card). We randomly
selected a subset of opened accounts to receive an ATM card for free - given their high cost, the
intervention increased ATM card takeup by nearly 89 percentage points.
Overall, we find relatively low use of formal accounts. Even though all couples included in the
study reported that they were interested in opening a savings account with the bank, just 27 percent
of the couples had saved in at least one of their new accounts after six months. ATM card provision
had a significant impact on account use - overall, aggregate account use increased by 0.15 standard
deviations relative to the control, savings rates increased by 28 percent (7 percentage points), and
average daily account balances increased by 9 percent. However, this net positive impact masks a
striking heterogeneous treatment effect by account type. In particular, ATM card provision to joint
and men's accounts substantially increased usage (aggregate account use, savings rates, and average
daily balances increased by 0.24 standard deviations, 39 percent, and 16 percent respectively). This
overall impact is equivalent to making 8 additional percentage points of interest available to couples.
In contrast, providing ATM cards to women's accounts actually had a negative impact on overall
account use.
We find evidence that this heterogeneous treatment effect is driven by the intrahousehold re-
source allocation concerns described above. An ATM card makes an account cheaper to access and
less secure (if a husband knows his wife's passcode and can obtain the ATM card, he can access her
account without her consent). We proxy the relative bargaining power of husbands and wives by
using demographic characteristics collected during our baseline survey and find that women with
below-median bargaining power had a large and significantly negative response to the ATM card
treatment. In contrast, women with above-median power exhibited a small positive response that
is not statistically significant from zero. Furthermore, men with below-median bargaining power
did not respond to the ATM treatment, while men with above-median bargaining power exhibited
a very large, significantly positive response to the ATM card treatment. These results suggest that
both transaction costs and security are important determinants of formal account adoption and
use. Furthermore, transaction cost saving technologies that also make account balances easier to
view and access may differentially favor individuals who have better bargaining positions within the
household.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 outlines a simple model of
individual savings behavior that highlights the role of transaction costs and security in the decision
to make use of formal bank accounts. Section 2.3 describes the experimental design and the data,
Section 3.5 presents the results, and Section 3.7 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
This section sets up a model of savings behavior to motivate the empirical analysis. The primary goal
of the model is to highlight two mechanisms by which ATM cards might impact savings behavior:
First, the cards reduce transaction costs associated with formal accounts by reducing withdrawal fees
and enabling account owners to make withdrawals outside of usual bank hours. Second, ATM cards
may make formal accounts less secure, for reasons discussed in the introduction. These concerns
may be particularly salient in developing countries, where a growing body of evidence suggests that
individuals strategically use financial services to sequester resources from other members of the
household and the community (Anderson and Baland 2002; Ashraf 2009; Ashraf et al. 2010 Baland
et al. 2007; Brune et al. 2010; Jakiela and Ozier 2011; Platteau 2000; Schaner 2011).
Individuals in the model exponentially discount utility, where the per-period utility function
is given by u (ct). We assume that u (-) is well behaved in that it is concave, twice continuously
differentiable, and u'(c) -+00 as c -+ 0. There are T periods in the world, so at time t, individual
utility is expressed as Ut = E t(r-t)u (c,). For simplicity, we assume that there is no uncertainty,
and that in each period t individuals receive an endowment, yt. In order to capture intrahousehold
bargaining, we can think of yt as the share of resources allocated to a given individual after transfers
to and from others and the bargaining process. This imposes an important restriction - as long as
the vector of endowments is independent of consumption and savings decisions, then this implies
that transfers from others do not respond to individual savings choices. We will, however, allow
that transfers to others out of savings will depend on how individuals save.
Individuals cannot borrow, but they can save. Specifically, there are two different savings
technologies available at any time. First, agents may store resources at home (denoted by ht).
Saving at home has the advantage of having no transaction costs, but it also makes cash more easily
appropriated by other members of the household and the community - we capture this by denoting
the return (net of transfers) on home savings as Rh, where Rh < 1. Alternatively, individuals may
save at the bank (denoted by bt). The key advantage of saving with the bank is that fewer resources
are appropriated by outside agents, so the rate of return on bank savings exceeds the rate of return
on home savings: Rb > R,. However, bank accounts also have transaction costs - in particular, an
individual must pay a fee w > 0 every time he or she makes a withdrawal.
Then the the individual's optimal consumption and savings allocation is given by the solution
to the following constrained maximization problem:
T
arg max 6tu (ct)
{ct~bt,ht}t=0 t=0
subject to
ct + ht + st < yt + Rhht-1 + Rbbt-1 + 1 (bt < Rbbt_1) w Vt
bt > 0, ht > 0 Vt
where 1 (.) is the indicator function. As a result of the lumpy withdrawal fees, this problem is not
convex - some individuals will save at home rather than with the bank to avoid withdrawal fees.
Individuals will be particularly averse to saving formally when desired savings levels are small (this
is due to the fact that w is fixed in absolute terms) and when Rh and Rb are not very different.
The tradeoff between a higher rate of return and lumpy fees versus a lower rate of return and
no fee is the same tradeoff highlighted by the canonical work of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956).
Consider a population of agents with different income streams. When the withdrawal fee is reduced,
the number of deposits and withdrawals into formal bank accounts will increase. Individuals who
were already using bank accounts will make more deposits and withdrawals, and other individuals
who were not using bank accounts will start to use them. However, the impact on balances in bank
accounts is ambiguous, as there are different effects on the intensive and extensive margins. This
is easily seen by studying the T = 2 case. Consider an agent who was already saving at the bank.
Since Rb > Rh she will not save at home, and period 1 and 2 consumption will be governed by
u' (yi - b1) = Rbou' (Y2 + Rbb1 - w)
differentiating implicitly, we see that ab= Ru"(c2)+U (ci) > 0 (so decreasing w will decrease the
amount deposited). The intuition is straightforward - to an inframarginal saver, reducing w is akin
to increasing income in future periods. The agent spreads this increase over both periods when
allocating consumption, so bi must decrease for first period consumption to increase. However, the
reduction in the balance must necessarily be small, since consumption in the second period must also
go up, which implies that Abi < kAw. Therefore, particularly in a multiperiod setting, it seems
likely that this effect will be outweighed by an extensive margin effect - pre-existing savers will
deposit and withdraw from their accounts more frequently (increasing the average daily balance)
and individuals who did not save at all given the higher withdrawal fee will begin to save. As
such, we expect a decrease in withdrawal fees to increase formal account deposits, withdrawals, and
balances. However, the impact of the withdrawal fee on total fees paid is ambiguous. Although the
fee goes down, more transactions will occur (among both pre-existing savers and new savers who
are brought into the formal sector by the fee reduction) - as such, the net effect will depend on the
elasticity of the number of withdrawals with respect to the withdrawal fee. If the elasticity is less
than -1, then total fee revenue will increase.
However, as discussed earlier, ATM cards may also make bank accounts less secure. We capture
this by assuming that an ATM card reduces Rb (with an ATM card saved resources are more easily
appropriated by others, so the return on savings net of transfers goes down). Holding w constant,
reducing Rb will reduce the number of deposits and withdrawals. As before, the net impact on the
average balance is ambiguous - if the income effect is very large, it could theoretically outweigh
the substitution effect and the extensive margin effect (though reducing security to the point that
Rb = Rh will unambiguously reduce formal account use to zero). In practice, it seems likely that
average balances would decline, all else equal.
Overall, the net effect of ATM card provision is an empirical question - if the impact of the
fee reduction dominates, account use will increase, but if the security effect dominates, account
use will decrease. This analysis also suggests the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects:
the impact of ATM cards is more likely to be negative when security effects are large. Our field
experiment enables us to empirically estimate the impact of ATM card provision on bank account
use. Furthermore, we will exploit features of the experimental design and baseline data to study
the empirical relevance of the security effect and related heterogeneous treatment effects. The next
section describes the experimental context and design, as well as our data.
2.3 Experimental Design and Data
2.3.1 Experimental Context
The experiment was conducted in Western Province, Kenya, in areas surrounding the town of
Busia. Busia is a commercial trading center straddling the Kenya-Uganda border. The town is
well served by the formal banking sector, hosting over six banks at the time of field activities. It
is only recently, however, that formal banks have begun to offer products suitable for low income
individuals. Traditionally, Kenyan bank accounts required opening balances upwards of Ksh 1,000
(approximately equal to $12.50 at an exchange rate of Ksh 80 per $1, or $19.23 using a PPP
exchange rate of Ksh 52 per $1) and charged monthly maintenance fees around Ksh 50 ($0.63).2
However, recently banks have begun to target lower income individuals, and several banks currently
offer lower fee alternatives to traditional bank accounts.
The financial partner for this study is Family Bank of Kenya. At the time of field activities the
bank had over 600,000 customers, 50 branches throughout the country, Ksh 13 billion ($167 million)
in assets, and actively targeted low and middle income individuals as part of its corporate strategy.
All study participants were offered Family Bank's Mwananchi accounts. This account can be opened
with any amount of money, though a minimum operating balance of Ksh 100 (approximately $1.25)
cannot be withdrawn. The account pays no interest, but deposits are free of charge and there are no
recurring maintenance fees. The only fees associated with the account are withdrawal fees, which
are Ksh 62 ($0.78) over the counter and Ksh 30 ($0.38) with an ATM card.3 Account holders may
purchase an ATM card for Ksh 300 ($3.75), though this is not mandatory.
2.3.2 Experimental Design
2.3.2.1 Targeted Population
We examine the impact of providing free ATM cards to a randomly selected subset of 1,113 newly
opened Family Bank accounts. These accounts included both joint and individual accounts opened
by 748 married couples living in the vicinity of Busia town who did not have a pre-existing account
2 For comparison, the median household in our sample reported Ksh 1,200 in combined income in the week before
the survey.
3 These accounts therefore offered both a negative nominal and real rate of return on savings. Year-on-year
inflation averaged around 9 percent for the first 6 months of the study period (July-December 2009) and dropped to
around 5.5 percent for the remaining 3 months covered by the study (January-March 2010) (Central Bank of Kenya
2009; Central Bank of Kenya 2010).
with Family Bank but stated that they were potentially interested in opening one. At the outset of
the study, we identified communities surrounding 19 local primary schools, which served as group
meeting grounds to implement baseline surveys, complete account opening paperwork, and conduct
randomization. These schools were located between 0.2 and 7.7 miles from Family Bank's Busia
branch, which is situated in the town's commercial center. Targeted communities were located
either on the outskirts of Busia town or in nearby rural areas. Figure 1 illustrates the location of
the schools relative to Family Bank and our field office on a map.
Trained field officers recruited households in communities surrounding a study school the day
before each meeting. With the help of a local guide, they made door-to-door visits to homes in the
area and issued meeting invitations to eligible households. To be eligible for invitation, a household
had to be headed by a married couple, with both spouses present and able to attend the meeting.
Couples were targeted jointly in order to study strategic savings behavior in the household (see
Schaner (2011) for details) and to study gender differences in savings behavior and savings account
use absent a selection effect. (I.e, it is difficult to answer the question "would targeting men or
women for savings accounts lead to greater total savings in formal accounts?" if selection into
account ownership is different for men and women. Our sampling strategy eliminates this selection
problem, so that we can look at gender differences within a single population of households.) In
addition, only households where both spouses had a valid Kenyan national ID card were admitted
to the meetings, as Family Bank requires this document of all account holders. 4
In order to compensate respondents for their time and to provide an additional incentive to
attend the meetings, each individual who participated in the study received Ksh 100 in cash at the
end of the meeting. Approximately 29 percent of issued invitations were redeemed over the course
of the study. While far from universal, takeup rates are high enough that our sample represents a
nontrivial fraction of targeted married couples in our catchment area.
2.3.2.2 Interest Rates
All couples attending the group meetings were given the opportunity to open up to three Family
Bank accounts: an individual account in the name of the husband, an individual account in the
name of the wife, and a joint account. To maximize takeup, we funded each opened account with the
Ksh 100 ($1.25) minimum operating balance (this amount could not be withdrawn by participants
- it simply made opening an account costless). Each potential account was randomly assigned a
temporary 6-month interest rate of either 0, 2, 6, or 10 percent. 5 Joint accounts could earn 2, 6, or
10 percent interest with equal probability while individual accounts could earn 0, 2, 6, or 10 percent
4 This requirement is common to all banks in Kenya. The majority of individuals in Kenya have a national ID
card as it is legally required of all adult citizens and necessary in order to vote, buy or sell land, and seek formal
employment.
5 These percentages are 6-month yields. Annualized yields are approximately double the quoted rates. However,
interest was paid on the six-month average daily balance and balances earned no interest thereafter. Respondents
were aware of the temporary nature of these interest rates from the outset of the study.
interest with equal probability. This design, illustrated in Figure 2, created random variation in the
maximum interest rate available to couples participating in the study. In particular, 7 percent of
couples had a maximum interest rate of 2 percent, 31 percent of couples had a maximum interest
rate of 6 percent, and 62 percent of couples had a maximum interest rate of 10 percent. We will
exploit this variation to calculate the interest value of the free ATM card intervention in the results
section.
2.3.2.3 ATM Cards
Each newly opened, ATM-eligible account was randomly allocated to either the ATM treatment
group (in which case the account received an ATM card for free) or the control group. 6 The free
ATM selection probability was 0.15 for the first six experimental sessions (193 open accounts, or 17
percent of all open accounts) and 0.25 for the remaining 27 experimental sessions (920 accounts).
Making ATM cards free could impact observed account use through both a direct effect (account
use with the card differs relative to the counterfactual) and a composition effect (the pool of open
accounts changes). In order to study the direct effect absent the composition effect, we designed
the experimental protocol so that respondents did not know if a given account would be selected
for an ATM card when they decided which accounts to open.
Since the majority of respondents did not have prior experience with bank accounts (or ATM
cards), enumerators carefully explained how the bank accounts and ATM cards worked, as well as
the withdrawal fees associated with the accounts and cards. When an opened account was randomly
chosen to receive a free ATM card, respondents were informed that the Ksh 300 ATM card fee would
be paid on their behalf, and that they could retrieve their card at the bank branch. Due to technical
constraints on the part of Family Bank, only one free ATM card was issued for both individual and
joint accounts. In the case of joint accounts, it was up to the couple to decide how to allocate the
card between spouses.
2.3.3 Data
We use two data sources for this project - survey data from one-on-one baseline questionnaires ad-
ministered during the group sessions (spouses were separated for the interviews) and administrative
6 Respondents were given the choice between two types of joint accounts. The first, dubbed "either to sign"
required the consent of either spouse to make withdrawals. These accounts were eligible for ATM cards. The
second, dubbed "both to sign" required that both spouses appear in person, together at the bank in order to make
withdrawals - as such, these accounts were not eligible for ATM cards. Overall, "either to sign" accounts were much
more popular with respondents - 93 percent of couples opening a joint account opted for this type of joint account.
We exclude all couples who only opened a "both to sign" joint account from the analysis, and we exclude 8 "both to
sign" joint accounts from our account-level analysis of the impact of ATM cards. Results are unchanged if we simply
drop these 8 couples altogether. A subset of individual accounts were also randomly selected to be eligible for an
information sharing intervention. The details of this intervention are described in Schaner (2011). We do not discuss
this intervention further here, as it has no impact on our results.
data on account use from the bank. The baseline survey collected basic demographic information,
as well as information on rates of time preference and time inconsistency, decision making power in
the household, income, and current use of a variety of savings devices (for details on the time pref-
erence questions, see Appendix section A.1. As detailed in the Appendix, the baseline survey asked
individuals to choose between different amounts of money at different times in order to directly
elicit time preferences. To incentivize the questions, each respondent was given a 1 in 5 chance of
winning one of his choices. The majority of respondents chose to have their cash prizes deposited
into their newly opened bank accounts). The administrative data provided by the bank includes
the first six months' transaction history of all accounts opened under the auspices of the project.
Each entry in the transaction history includes the deposit or withdrawal amount, any fees, and the
type and time of the transaction.
2.3.4 Sample Characteristics and Randomization Verification
The sample consists of 1,113 ATM card-eligible joint and individual bank accounts opened by
748 married couples who had valid national ID cards and no pre-existing accounts with Family
Bank. Table 1 presents summary statistics for these couples. Respondents are of relatively low
socioeconomic status - husbands average 8 years of schooling, and their wives average just under
6 years. While most men are literate (85 percent), one third of women cannot read and write.
On average, men reported earning Ksh 1,662 (about $21) in the past week, while women reported
earning Ksh 815 ($10). However, median reported weekly incomes are substantially lower, at Ksh
700 and Ksh 300 for husbands and wives respectively. Forty-six percent of men and 41 percent
of women reported that they own their own phone. Overall 47 percent of couples reporting that
either spouse owns a phone - this rate is low relative to the whole of Kenya, where 75 percent of
households report owning at least one phone (Jack and Suri 2011).
Almost all respondents reported using at least one savings device at baseline, with use of informal
devices much more common than use of formal or semi-formal devices. Most common was saving
cash at home, reported by 85 and 90 percent of husbands and wives respectively. Reported savings
levels at home were substantial and approximately equal to average weekly earnings. ROSCAs were
also very popular, with 49 percent of men and 66 percent of women reporting belonging to at least
one group.7 Savings accounts with formal banks were less common, particularly for women - while
32 percent of men reported owning a savings account (and those men reported substantial savings
in their accounts), just 12 percent of women reported owning a savings account. These numbers are
very similar to reported use of mobile phone money storage technologies, though bank accounts have
much larger balances. Least common was ownership of a SACCO account - just 7 percent of men
7 ROSCA stands for "rotating savings and credit association". ROSCAs consist of a group of individuals who
meet at predetermined intervals (e.g. weekly, monthly) to put a fixed amount of money into a common pot. At each
meeting, a different member of the group receives the pot. ROSCAs are by nature illiquid and often quite risky, as
group members can defect before the ROSCA cycle is completed.
and 1 percent of women reported belonging to a SACCO at baseline. 8 The large savings balances
in bank accounts and SACCO accounts in part reflect higher incomes of these account owners.
However, the secure and formal nature of these devices may also make them more appealing for
storing large sums of money: the average home saver stored 1.5 weeks of his income at home, while
bank account owners stored 7.8 weeks of their income at the bank and SACCO accounts were used
to store 38 weeks of income.
Although women in developing countries are generally thought to have less bargaining power
than their husbands, questions regarding savings decision making power reveal that both genders
frequently reported that women made savings decisions (49 percent of women and 43 percent of
men). This may also reflect social norms: women in developing countries are often tasked with
investing in the needs of the family and household (Bruce 1989). Still, a substantial share of
respondents reported that men were responsible for deciding how much to save (28 percent of
women and 37 percent of men). In contrast, few individuals reported joint or independent decision
making regarding savings.
Table 2 checks that randomization of free ATM cards, of cash payments made to incentivize
discount rate elicitation, and of the maximum interest rate available to the couples was successful.
Since randomization was conducted in the field, with respondents drawing folded envelopes from tins,
we check that (1) proportions treated do not differ from their theoretical selection probabilities and
(2) treatment status is uncorrelated with observable demographic characteristics. Panel A of each
table displays the results of the first exercise. P-values from a binomial test that realized proportions
are equal to theoretical proportions are reported in braces. Overall, realized probabilities for ATM
cards and cash prizes are slightly lower than, though not significantly different from, theoretical
probabilities. Theoretical and actual probabilities are also very close for the maximum interest
rate.
Panel B presents the results of separate regressions of demographic characteristics on treatment
indicators. The first two columns are limited to characteristics of either the husband or the wife,
whereas the last three columns use both husband and wife demographic characteristics. Since ATM
card and cash prize receipt are binary treatments, we report coefficients and standard errors on
treatment indicators in the first four columns. Since the maximum interest rate could take on
values of 2, 6, or 10 percent, we regress demographic characteristics on dummy variables for 6 and
10 percent interest, and then present results of an F-test that these dummy variables are jointly
equal to zero.
Overall, the randomization appears to have functioned well, with significant differences appear-
ing at a rate approximately equal to that which would appear due to chance. We do note that cash
prize provision for women is significantly (and negatively) correlated with ATM card provision for
8This is not surprising given the low incidence of formal sector employment in our sample. SACCO stands for
"Savings and Credit Co-Operative". In Kenya they function much like credit unions and are organized around higher
paying formal occupations such as teaching and commercial farming.
women's accounts. Since cash prizes could be deposited into bank accounts, and since the majority
of individuals chose to do so, prize provision significantly increased measures of bank account use.
For this reason, we control for cash prize receipt throughout our analysis (results are also robust to
controlling for a laundry list of demographic characteristics).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Summary of Account Use
Table 3 presents account use summary statistics. To give a sense of rates of account use absent the
cash deposits from time preference elicitation, we present summary statistics for the entire sample
(Panel A) and for the subset of couples where neither spouse was randomly selected to receive a
cash prize (Panel B). Columns 1-3 present means and standard deviations of a variety of account
use measures by account type. In these columns we drop individual accounts randomly selected
to receive no interest to ensure that the interest rate compositions of the three account types are
comparable. For each account type, we present the share of potential accounts that were actually
opened, and then limit the sample to open accounts that were not randomly selected for the ATM
treatment and present averages for measures of account use including savings rates, the average
daily balance, the number of deposits and withdrawals, and the amount of transaction fees paid.
Columns 4-6 present differences (and associated standard errors) in account use measures between
account types. Finally, in order to give a picture of overall use of Family Bank accounts by couples
in the study, the last column presents a summary of aggregate account use at the couple level. This
column includes all couples and accounts, and displays the average number of accounts opened by
a couple, the share of couples who saved in any account at all, the average daily balance stored in
all accounts, and so on.
Overall, joint accounts were much more popular than individual accounts - the first row of each
panel illustrates that two thirds of couples opened a joint account, whereas 45-47 percent of couples
opened individual accounts, with no significant difference in the rate of account opening for men's
and women's accounts. Even though we targeted a sample of individuals who stated that they were
interested in opening a bank account, rates of actual account use were relatively low. Column 7
illustrates that just 45 percent of couples saved in any one of the three accounts, and this number
drops to 27 percent when we exclude couples who won at least one cash prize.
These usage rates are notably lower than those documented by Prina (2011) (among a sample
of Nepalese women in an urban slums) and Dupas and Robinson (2011), among a sample of Kenyan
small-scale entrepreneurs. 9 Inspection of columns 4-6 of Table 3 also reveals that even conditional on
9 The contrast with Prina (2011) likely reflects very different contexts and savings products (the accounts in her
study bore 10 percent nominal interest, had no use fees, and had lower time and travel costs to go to the bank
branch). In contrast, Dupas and Robinson (2011) conducted their study in a similar part of Kenya, and the bank
accounts offered to both study populations had similar fees. In this case the differences in usage rates are likely
opening, joint accounts were substantially more likely to be used for saving than individual accounts.
Joint accounts also appear to be used by more small-scale savers - despite the higher savings rates,
joint accounts do not have higher average daily balances when compared to individual accounts.
Men and women are just as likely to save in their individual accounts, and also have very similar
average daily balances. Although differences are not significant, men do appear to transact more
than women - they make more withdrawals (though the number of deposits are very similar), and
consequently pay more fees. This finding also contrasts sharply with Dupas and Robinson (2011),
who find that the women in their sample made much more use of accounts as compared to men.
This is likely due to a selection effect - women and men in their sample engage in different income
generating activities and may well have belonged to very different types of households (indeed, the
women in their sample have higher incomes than the men on average). In contrast, we compare the
behavior of men and women in the same set of households.
Figure 3 explores the dynamics of account use, exploiting the fact that we have time series data
on account activity. For each account in the control group (i.e. not selected for an ATM card) that
was assigned an interest rate of 2 percent or better, we calculate whether an account was used for
saving, the closing balance, the average daily balance, the number of deposits, and the number of
withdrawals at the end of each week from the first week to the 26th week following account opening,
which marks the end of our study period. We exclude couples who were randomly selected for cash
prizes, as the cash prize deposits could lead us to falsely conclude that couples make sustained use
of their accounts. The time series reveals that account activity does not trail off after the first
few weeks of account opening - the number of deposits and withdrawals continue to grow as time
progresses. Furthermore, a nontrivial share of savers take a great deal of time to make their first
deposit into an account - though 19.6 percent of joint accounts received a deposit within the first
5 weeks of account opening, another 5 percent of accounts received a deposit over the ensuing 19
weeks.
Though many savers use their accounts infrequently and store small sums, a small number of the
couples in our sample used their new accounts very intensively. Table 4 limits the sample to those
couples who saved in at least one account and presents quantiles of aggregate savings measures.
While the median couple who saved (in the absence of cash prizes) accrued an average daily balance
of just Ksh 844 ($10.55) in all its Family Bank accounts, the 75th percentile couple saved Ksh 1,584
($19.80), and the 99th percentile couple saved Ksh 14,439 ($180.49). This skewness is also present
in transaction volume - the median saving couple made four deposits (including the opening deposit
made on their behalf at the beginning of the study) and one withdrawal, while the 99th percentiles
are 24 deposits and 21 withdrawals.
It is possible that this dispersion in account use is driven by a small number of couples who have
because Dupas and Robinson exclusively targeted small-scale entrepreneurs, who may have had a greater need for
formal bank accounts. We also offered each individual Ksh 100 in compensation for participating in our baseline
sessions. This may have selected some couples who only had limited interest in bank accounts but low opportunity
costs of time.
very high incomes. In fact, this is not the case. Table Al regresses aggregate couple-level account
use (among couples who did not win cash prizes) on demographic and economic characteristics.
Conditional on a variety of demographic characteristics, men's income does not significantly predict
account use, and women's reported income is actually negatively correlated with account use (though
other markers associated with women's socioeconomic status, such as education, phone ownership,
and bank account ownership are all positively and significantly correlated with aggregate savings
activity). The R 2 on the regressions in table Al range from 0.13-0.15. It therefore appears that key
determinants of intensive account use in our sample are largely unobservable.
2.4.2 Impact of ATM Card Provision
It is not entirely unexpected that the use of opened accounts is so low in the control group -
transaction costs associated with the accounts are large, particularly given that most savers do not
save very much (for example, a single withdrawal fee represents 7.34 percent of the average daily
balance of the median saving couple in panel B of Table 4). We now ask whether substantially
reducing these costs through ATM card provision can meaningfully increase account activity. Table
5 presents estimates of the impact of ATM card provision on a variety of account use measures. All
regressions are of the following form:
Yac = #0 + 3ifreeatmac + x',c + Cac (2.1)
where Yac is the outcome of interest, as measured 26 weeks after account opening, freeatmac is a
dummy variable indicating that account a owned by couple c was selected to receive a free ATM
card, and Xac is a vector of controls. These controls include a dummy variable for the first six
experimental sessions (since ATM selection probability was lower for these sessions), account type
dummy variables (when relevant), separate dummy variables for husband and wife's cash prize
receipt, and the interaction of these dummies with the account type dummies. In all regressions
we limit our attention to open accounts, since ATM cards were randomly allocated conditional on
account opening. We examine the impact of ATM card receipt by account type (Panels A-C) and
pooled for all accounts (Panels D and E).
The first column of Table 5 reports the first stage - the impact of the free card treatment on
whether or not an account had an active ATM card. ATM card fees are quite significant given the
low incomes of our study population: in the control group, respondents purchased ATM cards for
just 11 percent of their accounts (Panel D). Since the free card treatment ensured that an account
received an ATM card, the first stages are very substantial. As such, we focus on the reduced form
impact of free ATM card provision for the remainder of the analysis.
The subsequent columns of Table 5 examine the impact of ATM card provision on several
measures of account use that, in the model absent security concerns presented in Section 2.2,
should increase when withdrawal fees fall - these include a dummy variable indicating that an
account was used for saving, the average daily balance in the account, the number of deposits, and
the number of withdrawals.' 0 Given the large number of outcomes, we also present the mean effect
for these outcomes in the second column, where we follow the methodology of Kling, Liebman, and
Katz (2007) to construct a measure of standardized account activity. We standardize each variable
relative to the subset of the control group that did not receive a cash prize (pooling all accounts).
This way the magnitude of the treatment effects are in the same standard deviation units for all
accounts types (as such, the dependent variable mean is only equal to 0 for the omitted group in
panels that pool all accounts - results are very similar when we standardize outcomes relative to
the control group mean for each account type separately). We also separately present estimates
of the impact of ATM card provisions on fees paid. As highlighted by the theory, reducing the
withdrawal fee will mechanically reduce total fees paid, but total withdrawals will increase (absent
security concerns) - so the net effect is ambiguous.
Inspection of Panels A-C of Table 5 reveals positive impacts of ATM card provision for joint
and men's accounts. These impacts are large relative to dependent variable means - in particular,
column 2 illustrates that ATM card provision resulted in a 0.305 standard deviation increase in
joint account use and a 0.266 standard deviation increase in husbands' account use. ATM cards
had a substantially larger impact on withdrawals as compared to deposits (relative to dependent
variable means) - the ATM treatment increased the number of deposits into joint accounts by 11
percent, but increased the number of withdrawals by 196 percent. The analogous point estimates
for husbands' accounts imply increases of 18 percent and 223 percent for deposits and withdrawals
respectively."1 Given the very large elasticities of withdrawals with respect to the fee (-3.8 for joint
accounts and -4.3 for husbands' accounts), total fees paid on both types of accounts more than
doubles, though all of these estimates are somewhat imprecise. In contrast, point estimates for
wives' accounts are much smaller and almost always negative, though we cannot reject that any of
them are equal to zero (or positive).
Despite the negative point estimates for wives' accounts, Panel D illustrates that when pooling
all accounts, the ATM card treatment significantly increased account use by 0.191 standard devia-
tions. The negative estimates for women are quite striking, especially given that the patterns and
magnitudes are so different from those observed for joint and men's accounts. Panel E pools all
accounts and tests whether impacts for women are significantly different than those for other ac-
counts by including an interaction between the free ATM indicator and the wife's account indicator.
'
0 Since all open accounts had a positive average daily balance and a small number of accounts had very large
average daily balances, as documented in Table 4, we use the log of the average daily balance in this and all subsequent
analysis. Results are similar, though less precisely estimated, if we use the level instead.
"One complication associated with comparing these treatment effects relative to dependent variable means is that
the mean for deposits includes one deposit made on behalf of respondents for each open account. This will push the
mean of deposits in the control group up while leaving the treatment-control difference unchanged, thereby pushing
the percentage increase down. However, if we omit these opening deposits, we still estimate that ATM card provision
increased deposits into joint accounts by 17 percent and deposits into husband's accounts by 31 percent - in both
cases these impacts are substantially smaller than the percentage impacts for withdrawals.
When pooling accounts this way, we estimate large, significant impacts for joint/husbands accounts
(a mean impact of 0.29 standard deviations) and impacts that do not significantly differ from zero
for women. We also strongly reject that the treatment effect for women's accounts is equal to the
treatment effect for other accounts.
The estimated impacts on the use of joint and men's accounts are large - however, an account-
level analysis cannot determine whether the effect reflects an aggregate increase in couples' use
of bank accounts, or if the impact is driven by substitution between multiple accounts owned by
the same couple. To test between these two alternatives, Table 6 examines the effect of the ATM
treatment on couple-level aggregates of account use. This analysis also allows us to compare the
impact of ATM card provision to the impact of interest rates by estimating how the maximum
interest rate available to the couple affected aggregate account use. Panel A of Table 6 presents
results from the following regression:
ye = So + I1ifreeJc + #2freeHc + #33f reeWe + x'5 + c (2.2)
where yc is the outcome of interest, freeJc, freeHe, and freeWc indicate selection for the ATM
treatment for the joint, husband's and wife's account respectively, and xc is a vector of controls.
Since the likelihood that a couple received an ATM card depended on whether or not an account
was opened, xc includes dummy variables that fully saturate every combination of account opening
choices as well as a dummy variable for the first 6 experimental sessions and two separate dummy
variables indicating husband and wife cash prize selection. 12
Panel B presents results of a specification where the account-specific treatment indicators are
replaced with a dummy variable that is equal to one if the couple was selected for any free ATM
card. To test whether the treatment effect on wives' accounts differs from the treatment effect of
other accounts, Panel C presents a specification where two treatment dummy variables are included
- one indicating that a couple received a free ATM card on the joint or husband's account, and one
indicating that a free ATM card was given to the wife's account. We standardize aggregate account
activity relative to couples who were not selected for any free ATM cards and did not receive any
cash prizes.
Panels A-C confirm that the substantial account level impacts in Table 5 reflect increases in
aggregate account use at the couple level. The first column of Panel C illustrates that receipt of
a joint or husband's ATM card results in an increase in aggregate account use of 0.239 standard
deviations. As before, the impact on withdrawals is much larger, relative to control group dependent
variable means, when compared to the impact on deposits. 13 The F-tests reported in Panel C
1
2 The combination of account opening choices separately accounts for the 8 joint accounts that were opened but
not eligible to receive a free ATM card because they were "both to sign". In total, 10 different account opening
combinations were realized, though most couples either opened just an "either to sign" joint account (53 percent of
the sample) or two individual accounts (31 percent of the sample).
1
3 As before, this result holds even when we omit opening deposits made on behalf of respondents, which reduces
clearly reject that the impact of wives' ATM cards and joint/husbands' ATM cards are the same.
However, an important caveat is in order - although we can state whether or not the ATM treatment
increased saving in Family Bank accounts, we cannot tell if this savings represents crowd-out from
other savings devices, or if this represents mostly new savings. This is a limitation of our data
collection strategy, which did not include an endline survey.
Panel D studies the impact of the maximum interest rate available to the couple on aggregate
account use. Note that in this case, it is not appropriate to control for combinations of open accounts
(since account-specific interest rates had a robust impact on the decision to open a given account),
so we estimate the impact of interest rates in a separate regression of the following form:
Yac = #0 + 31max6c + #2maxlOc + x'6 + ec (2.3)
where max6c and max10c indicate that the maximum interest rate available to couple c was 6
percent and 10 percent respectively and xc includes a dummy variable for the first 6 experimental
sessions and separate dummy variables for cash prize selection of men and women. For the mean
effect, we use the same standardization (treating couples not selected for any free ATM card or cash
prize as the reference group) in order to ensure that magnitudes are comparable across panels in
the table.
Panel D illustrates that aggregate account use responded robustly to the maximum interest
rate - in particular, couples who received a maximum rate of 10 percent had aggregate account
activity 0.232 standard deviations above that of those couples who received a maximum rate of 2
percent. This impact is nearly identical to the impact of providing a free ATM card to the joint
or husband's account. However, from the standpoint of a policymaker, increasing account use by
providing ATM cards is notably more cost effective. In particular, consider the policy of purchasing
a free ATM card for all joint and husbands' accounts. In the absence of the free ATM treatment,
couples purchased ATM cards for just 7.7 percent of joint accounts and 7.6 percent of husband's
accounts. Given the opening rates in our sample, free provision would therefore result in lost ATM
card fee revenue of Ksh 25.8 per couple, while increasing transaction fee revenue by Ksh 26.0 (here
we use the couple-level estimate in Table 6). The subsidy therefore increases revenue by Ksh 0.2.
Furthermore, examination of the ATM treatment effect week by week (not presented in this paper)
reveals that the treatment effect on fees for husband's and joint accounts grows over time. 14 It
therefore seems likely that the subsidy would result in more revenue gains as the time horizon
expands. 15 In contrast, the average interest payout to couples with a maximum interest rate of
2 percent (and no cash prizes) was Ksh 3.73, while the average interest payout to couples with a
maximum interest rate of 10 percent was Ksh 48.5. At the same time, couples with a maximum
interest rate of 10 percent paid an average of Ksh 25.2 more in fees, so the net cost of the interest
the mean of deposits in the control group (with no cash prizes) to 0.85.
4 These results are available upon request from the author.
i5 Shifting transactions to the ATM would also reduce the need for tellers at the bank, reducing labor costs.
rate subsidy would be Ksh 19.6 per account. 16
The average treatment effects presented in Tables 5 and 6 are large. Given the very skewed
distribution of account use illustrated by Table 4, it is natural to ask whether this only reflects a
very large impact at upper quantiles of the distribution of account use, or if the treatment effect is
more diffuse. Figure 4 graphs the CDFs of couple-level aggregate account use for six groups. Panel
A limits the sample to couples who opened a joint account and plots the CDF of standardized
aggregate account use for couples who did and did not receive the free ATM treatment on the joint
account. Panels B and C repeat the exercise for men's and women's individual accounts, in each
case limiting the sample to couples who opened the relevant account. For both joint and husband's
accounts, the CDF for couples who received a free ATM card is almost everywhere below the control
group CDF, suggesting that the ATM card had a substantial impact at a variety of quantiles (of
course, given the large point masses of couples who did not save at all, the treatment effect must
necessarily be concentrated at upper quantiles). In contrast, inspection of Panel C reveals that the
CDF for couples in which women's accounts received the free ATM treatment is almost everywhere
above the CDF of the control group.
To test for significance of these CDF differences while simultaneously controlling for cash prize
receipt, Figure 5 plots point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals from quantile regressions
following the specification given by equation 2.2. Panel A graphs quantile treatment effects for a
free ATM card to the joint account, while Panels B and C present analogous results for husbands'
and wives' accounts. The figure only shows estimates for quantiles 70-99 - since so many couples
did not save at all, the estimated treatment effect is identically zero at almost all quantiles below
70 in each panel.
Over quantiles 70-92, the treatment effects for joint accounts average 0.19, while the treatment
effects for husbands' accounts average 0.27. At quantiles 93-99, the estimated treatment effects
become very large - particularly for joint accounts. Under the assumption of rank invariance, this
suggests that the couples who would have made the most intensive use of bank accounts in the
absence of the treatment also benefit disproportionately from ATM cards.
As expected, a distinctly different pattern emerges when studying the quantile treatment effects
for wives' accounts in Panel C. Nearly all estimated treatment effects are negative, with an average
of -0.395 over quantiles 70-99, and many estimates are statistically different from zero at the 90
or 95 percent level. This suggests that giving free ATM cards to women did not just result in no
change in savings behavior, it may have actually negatively impacted account use for some women.
This heterogeneous treatment effect is striking: while women's accounts respond to the ATM
treatment quite differently than joint/men's accounts, both men and women have remarkably similar
rates of saving and average balances in the control group (recall Table 3). The gender difference is
unlikely to be driven by selection on couple level unobservables, since couples generally opened both
1
6 The external validity of this comparison is questionable, however, since ATM card provision was done conditional
on account opening, while interest rates were randomized unconditional on account opening.
individual accounts together: 86 percent of couples who opened an account for the husband also
opened an account for the wife and 89 percent of couples who opened an account for the wife also
opened an account for the husband. The question then becomes, what is it about women that makes
their response to the ATM treatment so different? Some explanations, such as financial literacy or
prior exposure to the formal sector, could explain a zero impact on account use but cannot explain
a negative impact. Although women are more likely than men to be time inconsistent (Table 1),
we do not have any strong evidence that this is a key factor governing differential responses to
the ATM treatment (see Appendix section A.2 for supporting analysis). This leaves differences in
bargaining power between husbands and wives as a leading explanation. One may ask "if the ATM
card harmed the security of a wife's account, why wouldn't she just throw it away?". Our ATM card
randomization was conducted when the couples were sitting together, so card receipt was public
information. This may have made it difficult for a wife to simply dispose of the card if it was of
interest to her spouse. The next section investigates the bargaining power hypothesis.
2.4.3 Bargaining Power and ATM Card Treatment Effects
A growing body of literature documents that individuals make financial decisions strategically in
order to manipulate intrahousehold resource allocation in their favor. In a lab experiment in the
Philippines, Ashraf (2009) documents that spouses who report that they do not have control over
savings decisions allocate experimental winnings so as to increase their own personal consumption.
In India, Mani (2010) finds that individuals in married couples are willing to sacrifice experimental
earnings in order to ensure that these earnings are deposited in their own individual bank accounts
rather than a spouse's account. In Kenya, Anderson and Baland (2002) show that ROSCAs are
most popular among women with intermediate levels of bargaining power - the authors hypothesize
that at these levels of bargaining power, women can use ROSCAs to tilt household consumption
towards goods that they favor. Finally, using the same sample of couples considered in this paper,
Schaner (2011) presents evidence that couples who are badly matched in terms of rates of time
preference strategically use bank accounts to manipulate household savings levels.
In all the studies listed above, choices with strategic value enable the decision maker to securely
sequester or hide resources from his or her spouse. In our context, individual bank accounts are
useful for this reason because they can only be accessed by the account owner. However, ATM cards
may dilute the strategic value of individual accounts - suppose a husband learned his wife's ATM
passcode - then he would be able to make withdrawals from (and learn the balance of) her account
through the ATM. Absent the ATM card, he would have to force the wife to make withdrawals
herself, in person, at the bank. If spouses make use of individual accounts strategically and value
these accounts for security, then making an ATM card available could make the individual account
less attractive. Furthermore, when the withdrawal cost is reduced, it may be more difficult for an
account holder to refuse to make a withdrawal for her spouse (or for another member of her family
or the community). ATM cards may be particularly unattractive to spouses with low bargaining
power, since they already have difficulty resisting demands made by their partners. 17 Since women
generally have less bargaining power than men in Kenya, this could explain why a negative impact
is only visible for women. To test this hypothesis, we study how responses to individual ATM cards
differ between households in which the wife has higher versus lower levels of bargaining power.
We use intrahousehold differences in demographic characteristics to measure women's relative
power. In particular, we assume that having higher income, having more years of education, being
more literate, and being older than a spouse correlate with greater relative bargaining power. First,
we standardize each of these four variables at the individual level by subtracting the sample mean
and dividing by the sample standard deviation. We then proxy the wife's relative bargaining power
by the average difference between her values for these variables and her husband's values for these
variables:
powerc 1c" (- x)
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Figure 6 plots the histogram of powere among the 698 couples where both spouses had nonmiss-
ing values for the four demographic characteristics included in the index. As expected, husbands
have more proxied bargaining power than wives - just 17 percent of women have greater proxied
power than their husbands and the median difference between wives and husbands is -0.42 standard
deviation units.
To check that this index has informative content about household savings behavior, Figure 7
presents results of local linear regressions of baseline self-reported account use on the bargaining
power index. Indeed, savings device use for husbands (panel A) and wives (panel B) is generally
correlated with the index and results symmetric across genders. When men have relatively more
bargaining power, they are less likely to save at home and more likely to save at the bank/SACCO
and on the phone. In contrast, women are more likely to save in the bank/SACCO and on the
phone and less likely to save at home when they have more bargaining power. These correlations are
consistent with the idea that spouses with more bargaining power are more economically empowered.
On the other hand, this is not the only way to interpret the data - if individuals with less bargaining
power differentially value security, it is surprising that they are also more likely to save at home. 18
Since so few women have greater absolute proxied bargaining power when compared to their
husbands, we define a woman to be "relatively advantaged" in terms of bargaining power if powere is
above the sample median. The following account-level specification studies heterogeneous impacts
1 71t is not obvious that this relationship should be linear. As highlighted by Anderson and Baland (2002), women
with very low bargaining power may simply forfeit control of accounts to their husbands regardless of the ATM card.
However, these is no evidence of such a nonlinear relationship in our data, so we focus on the distinction between
high and low bargaining power.
18We also note that we do not find the patterns with respect to bargaining power and ROSCA use that are
highlighted by Anderson and Baland (2002), even though relative income is an important input into our indicator.
of ATM cards by bargaining power:
yac = o + 01 f reeatmac + 12 freeatmac x wif eadve + 03wif eadve + xTco + 6 ac (2.4)
where all variables are as defined in equation 2.1 and wifeadvc is either an indicator that the wife's
relative bargaining power in couple c is above the sample median, or the wife's decision making
index.19
Table 8 presents the results of this specification for men's and women's accounts separately
(Panels A and B). Panel C presents results from a couple-level specification where equation 2.2 is
augmented to include interactions of each ATM card treatment with the bargaining power variable
(coefficients for the joint account are omitted from the table for clarity). We also limit the sample in
this. specification to those couples who opened at least one individual account, since we are interested
in studying the impact of ATM cards on individual accounts. Since the bargaining power index is
correlated with baseline bank account use, we present a specification in which we only control for
"basic controls" (those control sets used in Table 5 and 6), as well as two specifications in which we
progressively control for baseline savings device use and its interaction with the ATM treatments.
The second specification adds controls for formal account ownership (here, we define both bank
accounts and SACCO accounts as formal accounts, since they have similar features and are often
used to store large amounts of savings at baseline) and interactions with the ATM treatments.
We then add controls for mobile money, ROSCA, and home savings (and their interactions with
the ATM treatment indicators) in the third specification. Note that the interpretation of the free
ATM main effect therefore changes from specification to specification. In the first column, it is
the ATM treatment effect for households in which the husband has the most bargaining power. In
the second specification, it is households in which the husband has the most bargaining power and
neither spouse owned a formal account at baseline. In the third specification, the main effect is
for households in which neither spouse had a formal account, a mobile money account, any home
savings, or any ROSCA memberships. No couples actually meet this criterion (recall the very
high rates of home saving at baseline), so we do not focus on the main effect in the latter two
specifications.
Panel A reveals that men's positive response to free ATM cards is driven entirely by households
where men have more proxied bargaining power, even though these two groups of households did
not make significantly different use of men's accounts in the absence of the ATM card treatment.
The coefficient on the ATMxbargaining power interaction is relatively robust to adding additional
baseline savings controls, though it is no longer significant when we include the full baseline control
set.
1 9Results are similar using an absolute threshold of powerc > 0 or the continuous index value, though they are less
precise. Proxied bargaining power is missing for 50 of 748 couples due to missing input variables. For these couples,
we set wifeadvc = 0, dummy them out separately, and include an interaction of the missing dummy with the free
ATM card dummy.
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In contrast, Panel B illustrates the opposite pattern for wives' accounts. In particular, women in
households where they have relatively little bargaining power displayed a sizable negative response
to ATM cards, while women who have more bargaining power responded positively to the ATM
treatment (however, the sum of the main effect and the interaction term is not significantly different
from zero for any of the specifications). Again, the interaction term is robust to adding baseline
account controls. Another notable pattern present in Panel B is that in the absence of ATM cards,
women with relatively more proxied bargaining power actually make less use of their individual
accounts. This may be because women with relatively little bargaining power make excessive use
of their secure individual accounts in order to manipulate household consumption and/or savings
allocations, or because these women were more likely to have a bank account at baseline. Panel
C demonstrates that these patterns persist when examining aggregate couple-level account use,
though significance of the results is somewhat attenuated. Overall, our results are very consistent
with the hypothesis that security concerns are an important mediator of individuals' responses to
ATM cards.
2.5 Conclusion
We present results from a field experiment conducted in Western Kenya with a low-income, mostly
rural sample of married couples. A subset of newly opened formal bank accounts belonging to these
couples were randomly selected to receive a free ATM card. ATM cards reduced withdrawal fees
by over 50 percent and also made the accounts easier to access and less secure. Overall formal
account use in our sample is relatively low - 27 percent of couples used at least one newly opened
account for saving and the median saving couple had a 6-month average daily balance of $10.55. The
free ATM treatment significantly increased overall account use. However, inspection of impacts by
account type reveals a striking heterogeneous treatment effect by gender. When joint or husband's
accounts were selected for the free ATM treatment, aggregate account use by couples increased
by 0.24 standard deviations. This impact is substantial, and equivalent to offering the couple 8
more percentage points of interest on their accounts. When the wife's account was selected for the
free ATM treatment, aggregate account use decreased by 0.13 standard deviations. Furthermore,
quantile treatment effects for free ATM provision on wives' accounts are often large, negative, and
significantly different from zero.
We hypothesize that this heterogeneous treatment effect is largely driven by a security effect:
when individuals in the household have weak bargaining power, the ATM treatment may do more
harm than good because the card makes it more difficult for individuals to guard their savings from
appropriation by other members of the household. When women have less bargaining power than
men on average, this could generate the patterns that we observe in the data. To test this, we
proxy relative bargaining power between men and women by intracouple differences in demographic
characteristics. We find that the positive response to men's ATM cards is concentrated among
couples where men have above median bargaining power, while the negative response to women's
ATM cards is concentrated among couples where women have below median bargaining power.
These results suggest that security of savings is very important to individuals with poor bargaining
positions within the household. However, our results are not robust to proxying bargaining power
within the household with spousal self reports of decision making power over savings. This could
be because self reports of decision making power reflect not just bargaining power, but satisfaction
with household savings allocations (which could be driven by successful strategic savings behavior
on the part of individuals or because both members of the couple have similar preferences). Given
the different results associated with these two measures, additional research is needed to clarify the
relationship between relative bargaining power and a preference for secure savings devices.
Our results add to a small but growing literature that studies the use of formal bank accounts
by low-income individuals in developing countries (Dupas and Robinson 2011; Prina 2011; Ashraf
et al. 2006; Ashraf et al. 2010; Brune et al. 2010). They also add to a literature demonstrating
that issues of control mediate the use of different savings technologies in large and important ways
(Anderson and Baland 2002; Ashraf 2009; Ashraf et al. 2010; Chin et al. 2010; Schaner 2011).
Finally, our results have implications for the design of formal savings products targeted to poor
households. First, reducing transaction costs substantially increases the use of formal sector bank
accounts. At the same time, making formal accounts more easily accessible may actually decrease
use of formal accounts by individuals with poor bargaining positions within the household. In our
sample, and in developing countries more generally, this often means women. This is particularly
important to keep in mind given the recent policy interest in mobile money. In many ways, this
technology is easily appropriated by other members of the household - a husband may be able
to learn a wife's savings balance by simply catching a glimpse of her phone. Our study cannot
determine whether women's account use was depressed due to the withdrawal fee reduction, or due
to the fact that the ATM card made the account easier to access and possible to access remotely,
or both. Better understanding how these factors mediate formal account use is an important area
for future research and will provide useful insights for designing formal accounts that best meet the
needs of the poor.
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2.A Appendix: Additional Time Preference Analysis
2.A.1 Survey Questions on Rates of Time Preference
As part of the baseline, each respondent was asked a series of questions designed to elicit discount
factors. We chose to elicit time preferences using choices between different amounts of money at
different times, as opposed to different amounts of goods at different times. We made this choice
for two reasons. First, Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) find that while time preference parameters
estimated using choices between money, rice, and ice cream were all correlated, only the parameters
estimated using money choices significantly predicted takeup and use of a commitment savings
product. Second, cash lotteries made intuitive sense to respondents given that the group meetings
revolved around bank accounts and savings.
We framed all questions as a choice between a smaller amount of money at a nearer time t (xt)
and a larger amount of money at a farther time t + r (xt+r) 20 In order to make choices salient,
respondents were given a 1 in 5 chance of winning one of their choices. Enumerators also used
calendars to visually show respondents the number of days they would have to wait for both the
smaller and larger amount of money.
In total, participants responded to 10 tables of monetary choices, with each table consisting of 5
separate choices between a smaller Ksh x' E {290, 220, 150, 80, 10} and larger x1+1 = Ksh 300. This
was a sizable amount of cash for the study participants. (For comparison, median reported daily
earnings in our sample were Ksh 100 for men and Ksh 43 for women). The 10 (t, t + -r) pairs were:
(1, 1) , (}, 2) , (}, 3) , (1,4) , (4, 8) , (j,12), (2,3), (2,4), (4,8), and (4,12) weeks. We chose to set
the lowest near term t to "tomorrow" (4) instead of "today" (0) to avoid confounding our discount
factor estimates with differences in transaction costs of obtaining the funds in the near versus far
term, or degrees of trust as to whether the money would be delivered (Harrison, Lau, Rutstrom,
and Sullivan 2004).
We can measure preference reversals (of both the hyperbolic, impatient-now, patient-later type,
as well as the anti-hyperbolic patient-now impatient-later type) by comparing responses to the last
four tables of questions to their analogues that involves choices between cash tomorrow and cash at
a later date. (An important drawback of using "tomorrow" instead of "today" as the nearest choice
is that we will not be able to detect hyperbolic discounting that discounts all future consumption
relative to immediate consumption - this will lead us to underestimate the degree of hyperbolic
discounting in our sample). If a respondent won one of her choices, she had the option of having the
funds deposited directly in her bank account, or picking the cash up at our field office, also located
in Busia town. 21
2 0 This method is common to most empirical studies that attempt to measure rates of time preference in developing
countries. Examples include Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006), Bauer and Chytilovi ce (2009), Dupas and Robinson
(2011), Shapiro (2010), and Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010).
2
'Despite the fact that the field office and Family Bank were proximately located, and that accessing cash deposited
in an account would entail paying a withdrawal fee, the majority of cash winners (77 percent) chose to have their
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For the purposes of this study, we define an individual to have "hyperbolic" preferences if he or
she exhibited impatient-now, patient-later preference reversals on at least 2 out of 4 of the relevant
pairs of tables. Similarly, we define an individual to have "anti-hyperbolic" preferences if he or she
exhibited patient-now, impatient later preference reversals on at least 2 out of 4 of the relevant
pairs of tables (as a result of this definition, 32 individuals are coded as both hyperbolic and anti-
hyperbolic). We computed discount factors using a simple ad hoc bounding strategy similar to that
found in Meier and Sprenger (2010). Specifically, suppose that for individual i, xt - 3 0 0 t+r, but
that 3 0 0 t~r >- x 4q (where x, > x+ 1 ). We then assume that the individual is indifferent between
Ksh 300 at time t + -r and the midpoint of the two amounts at time t, q,q+1 = 2 i
midpoint, we can then calculate the implied discount factor 6 q,q+1 1 ) . We do this for each300}
table, obtaining 10 discount factor estimates, and take the simple average of them.
2.A.2 Time Inconsistency and ATM Card Treatment Effects
One reason why women may respond negatively to the ATM card treatment is time inconsistency.
As illustrated by Table 1, women were more likely than men to make choices between amounts of
money in a manner consistent with hyperbolic discounting. If ATM cards increase the temptation
to withdraw funds, sophisticated individuals may respond negatively to the ATM card treatment.
(In contrast, the impact for naive individuals is ambiguous - they may initially use the account
intensively, only to withdraw more than they like). Table A2 investigates heterogeneous treatment
effects with respect to time inconsistency by running the specification described by equation 2.2,
augmented to include interactions between each account specific free ATM treatment indicator and
separate dummy variables indicating that husband and wife gave answers to baseline time preference
questions in a way consistent with hyperbolic discounting. Overall, there is little evidence that time
inconsistency matters for heterogeneous treatment effects - though point estimates are sometimes
large and negative for individual accounts, they are positive for joint accounts and imprecisely
estimated on all accounts. 22
payments deposited in a bank account. The bank account may have been attractive because the respondents did not
have to remember to pick up the funds at any specific time, because the bank was more conveniently located (in the
commercial center of town), because the withdrawal fee was seen as a commitment device not to spend the money
frivolously, or because the individuals intended to use their new accounts for saving anyway.
22 This may be due in part to our choice to use a front end delay method in estimating discount factors, particularly
if the relevant tradeoff for most hyperbolic discounters is "today" versus the future.
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2.B Appendix: Tables and Figures
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Table 2-1: Demographic Characteristics of Study Sample
Age
Education
Literate
Polygamous
Number Children
Subsistence Farmer or No Job
Income Last Week
Owns Mobile Phone
Participates in ROSCA
Has Bank Account
Savings in Bank Account (Among Savers)
Has SACCO Account
Savings in SACCO Account (Among Savers)
Saves at Home
Savings at Home (Among Savers)
Saves on Mobile Phone
Mobile Phone Savings (Among Savers)
Savings - I Decide
Savings - Spouse Decides
Savings - Decide Together
Savings - Decide Alone
Impatient Now-Patient Later
Patient Now-Impatient Later
Distance from Family Bank (Miles)
106
Husbands
44.0
[14.1]
7.88
[3.70]
0.845
[0.362]
0.192
[0.395]
5.82
[4.13]
0.415
[0.493]
1662
[5474]
0.464
[0.499]
0.487
[0.500]
0.318
[0.466]
10853
[17994]
0.0668
[0.250]
54706
[53736]
0.845
[0.362]
1344
[2993]
0.304
[0.460]
581
[1670]
0.367
[0.482]
0.430
[0.495]
0.101
[0.301]
0.0791
[0.270]
0.149
[0.356]
0.167
[0.373]
3.73
[2.19]
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets, robust standard errors in parentheses. * **, and *
indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Wives
36.9
[12.1]
5.82
[3.99]
0.660
[0.474]
0.209
[0.407]
4.58
[2.47]
0.462
[0.499]
815
[1781]
0.413
[0.493]
0.664
[0.473]
0.120
[0.326]
5967
[14629]
0.0121
[0.109]
44444
[64293]
0.896
[0.306]
887
[2761]
0.142
[0.350]
557
[1286]
0.487
[0.500]
0.275
[0.447]
0.0957
[0.294]
0.120
[0.325]
0.191
[0.394]
0.198
[0.399]
3.73
[2.19]
Difference
7.10***
(0.678)
2.06***
(0.199)
0.184***
(0.0218)
-0.0162
(0.0208)
1.24***
(0.176)
-0.0477*
(0.0257)
847***
(213)
0.0512**
(0.0257)
-0.178***
(0.0252)
0.198***
(0.0208)
4886**
(2134)
0.0547***
(0.00998)
10261
(22039)
-0.0509***
(0.0174)
457***
(162)
0.162***
(0.0231)
23.9
(187)
-0.119***
(0.0255)
0.155***
(0.0245)
0.00485
(0.0154)
-0.0409***
(0.0155)
-0.0423**
(0.0196)
-0.0314
(0.0201)
N
1496
1489
1496
1486
1493
1491
1452
1490
1496
1496
271
1492
56
1494
1266
1251
266
1488
1488
1488
1488
1475
1475
1496
Table 2-2: Randomization Verification
Free ATM Card Maximum
Husband Wife Joint Cash Prize Interest Rate
Panel A. Adherence to Theoretical Probabilities
Free ATM/Cash Prize/2 Percent 0.190 0.217 0.214 0.183 0.0749
{0.115} {0.636} {0.309} {0.106} {0.428}
6 Percent 0.307
{0.355}
10 Percent 0.618
{0.678}
Panel B. Correlation with Demographic Characteristics
Age -1.02 -0.676 0.993 0.676 0.576
(1.99) (1.57) (1.41) (0.902) {0.562}
Education 0.164 -0.111 0.294 -0.0507 1.59
(0.548) (0.546) (0.371) (0.256) {0.205}
Literate 0.0558 -0.135** 0.0335 -0.000500 0.912
(0.0502) (0.0650) (0.0371) (0.0289) {0.402}
Polygamous 0.0249 -0.0148 -0.0276 0.0232 0.407
(0.0661) (0.0590) (0.0396) (0.0276) {0.666}
Number Children 0.126 -0.0587 -0.0325 -0.0618 0.326
(0.703) (0.332) (0.322) (0.211) {0.722}
Subsistence Farmer/Unemployed -0.133* -0.111* 0.00809 -0.0683** 1.89
(0.0680) (0.0642) (0.0432) (0.0324) {0.152}
Income Last Week 177 -187 27.8 -367** 0.00225
(557) (180) (427) (168) {0.998}
Owns Mobile Phone 0.0866 0.110 -0.0334 0.0289 3.22**
(0.0764) (0.0678) (0.0460) (0.0327) {0.0403}
Participates in ROSCA -0.112 -0.0248 -0.0244 0.0143 1.06
(0.0755) (0.0653) (0.0418) (0.0330) {0.346}
Has Bank Account -0.0126 -0.0287 -0.0160 0.00437 1.89
(0.0737) (0.0498) (0.0333) (0.0278) {0.151}
Has SACCO Account 0.0298 0.0134 -0.0166 -0.00370 0.813
(0.0440) (0.0225) (0.0142) (0.0127) {0.444}
Saves at Home -0.0427 0.0460 0.0185 0.0370* 0.666
(0.0613) (0.0397) (0.0238) (0.0203) {0.514}
Saves on Mobile Phone 0.0174 -0.113** -0.00823 -0.0303 4.15**
(0.0813) (0.0491) (0.0343) (0.0290) {0.0162}
Savings - I Decide 0.0952 0.000876 -0.0366 0.0157 0.783
(0.0756) (0.0700) (0.0381) (0.0325) {0.457}
Savings - Spouse Decides -0.0505 0.000620 0.0306 -0.0204 0.124
(0.0746) (0.0597) (0.0364) (0.0318) {0.883}
Savings - Decide Together -0.0375 -0.0381 -0.00246 -0.0209 1.30
(0.0371) (0.0310) (0.0263) (0.0195) {0.273}
Savings - Decide Alone -0.00370 0.0139 0.0222 0.0184 0.531
(0.0447) (0.0538) (0.0239) (0.0209) {0.588}
Impatient Now-Patient Later -0.0312 0.0908 -0.0311 -0.0197 0.990
(0.0498) (0.0590) (0.0311) (0.0239) {0.372}
Patient Now-Impatient Later -0.0565 -0.0425 0.00875 0.0324 0.121
(0.0508) (0.0514) (0.0323) (0.0264) {0.886}
Distance from Family Bank (Miles) -0.622** -0.00445 -0.0553 0.00389 1.51
(0.290) (0.296) (0.250) (0.137) {0.221}
Interest Rate 0.771 -0.464 0.284 0.221
(0.600) (0.549) (0.354) (0.228)
Cash Prize - Husband 0.0276 -0.0496 0.0299 1.35
(0.0594) (0.0494) (0.0440) {0.259}
Cash Prize - Wife -0.0194 -0.101** 0.0419 3.35**
(0.0604) (0.0497) (0.0440) {0.0357}
Notes: P-values in braces, robust standard errors (clustered at the couple level in columns 3-5) in
parentheses. The first four columns present regression coefficients and standard errors on
treatment dummies. The last columns presents the test statistic and p-value of an F-test that
demographics are equal across all treatments. For the cash prize, the interest rate is the individual
interest rate when open, and the joint interest rate otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
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Table 2-3: Account Use Summary Statistics
Joint Husband Wife Husband-Joint Wife-Joint Husband-Wife All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. All Couples
Opened
Saved
Average Balance
Number Deposits
Number Withdrawals
Fees
N (Open Accounts)
B. Couples Without Cas
Opened
Saved
Average Balance
Number Deposits
Number Withdrawals
Fees
N (Open Accounts)
Notes: Robust standard
0.659
[0.474]
0.404
[0.491]
338
[1364]
1.96
[2.34]
0.352
[1.43]
25.7
[110]
389
Prizes
0.665
[0.473]
0.243
[0.430]
269
[1158]
1.80
[2.57]
0.356
[1.57]
26.1
[120]
267
0.463
[0.499]
0.260
[0.440]
341
[1352]
1.75
[2.06]
0.530
[2.30]
32.8
[134]
200
(N=495)
0.472
[0.500]
0.163
[0.371]
223
[1271]
1.48
[1.51]
0.348
[1.37]
23.4
[90.8]
135
errors in parentheses,
0.446
[0.497]
0.308
[0.463]
236
[724]
1.65
[1.57]
0.308
[1.12]
19.0
[73.6]
198
0.455
[0.499]
0.144
[0.353]
208
[758]
1.49
[1.67]
0.232
[0.824]
14.9
[51.9]
125
standard
-0.197***
(0.0353)
-0.144***
(0.0390)
2.91
(118)
-0.214
(0.187)
0.178
(0.178)
7.08
(11.0)
589
-0.193***
(0.0434)
-0.0805**
(0.0402)
-46.0
(130)
-0.320
(0.203)
-0.00766
(0.152)
-2.65
(10.7)
402
deviations in
-0.213***
(0.0351)
-0.0955***
(0.0409)
-102
(86.1)
-0.312*
(0.162)
-0.0441
(0.107)
-6.71
(7.61)
587
-0.210***
(0.0432)
-0.0994***
(0.0408)
-61.8
(97.9)
-0.313
(0.217)
-0.124
(0.121)
-11.1
(8.68)
392
0.0167
(0.0194)
-0.0481
(0.0415)
105
(109)
0.0985
(0.171)
0.222
(0.163)
13.8
(9.82)
398
0.0172
(0.0253)
0.0190
(0.0413)
15.8
(128)
-0.00652
(0.178)
0.116
(0.134)
8.49
(8.80)
260
1.50
[0.596]
0.448
[0.498
569
[2871]
1.24
[2.70]
0.698
[2.61]
43.0
[155]
748
1.51
[0.603]
0.271
[0.445]
409
[1532]
1.01
[2.75]
0.655
[2.60]
41.2
[153]
495
brackets. Columns 1-6 limited to accounts
with 2 percent interest or better and no free ATM card. All outcomes (except for account opening) are presented
conditional on account opening. Final column reports couples' aggregate activity across all three accounts.
Table 2-4: Quantiles of Account Use - Couples Who Saved
Average
Balance Deposits Withdrawals Fees
A. All Couples
Minimum
1st Percentile
25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile
90th Percentile
95th Percentile
99th Percentile
Maximum
Mean
N
B. Couples Without
Minimum
1st Percentile
25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile
90th Percentile
95th Percentile
99th Percentile
Maximum
Mean
N
105 1.00
110 1.00
320 2.00
463 3.00
1098 5.00
2968 8.00
4871 11.0
14439 21.0
66410 30.0
1421 4.24
335 335
Cash Prizes
108 2.00
113 2.00
327 3.00
844 4.00
1582 6.00
4053 11.0
8143 14.0
14439 24.0
15119 30.0
1663 5.23
134 134
109
0
0
0
0
1.00
5.00
8.00
20.0
31.0
1.56
335
0
0
0
1.00
2.00
8.00
10.0
21.0
30.0
2.42
134
0
0
0
0
92.0
310
534
1188
1732
96.1
335
0
0
0
60.0
162
496
664
1345
1404
152
134
Table 2-5: Impact of Free ATM Cards on Account Use
Has ATM Mean Average Number Number
Card Effect Saved Balance Deposits Withdrawals Fees
Panel A. Joint Accounts
Free ATM 0.860*** 0.305** 0.0737 0.301** 0.311 0.715* 32.2
(0.0191) (0.153) (0.0513) (0.143) (0.323) (0.407) (21.4)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) 0.0769 0.0920 0.246 5.03 2.82 0.365 26.8
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 485
Panel B. Husbands' Accounts
Free ATM 0.884*** 0.266* 0.0853 0.126 0.440 0.651 31.6
(0.0219) (0.157) (0.0546) (0.126) (0.311) (0.422) (23.1)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) 0.0760 -0.0779 0.152 4.85 2.43 0.292 19.4
N 319 319 319 319 319 319 319
Panel C. Wives' Accounts
Free ATM 0.934*** -0.0672 -0.0393 -0.0589 -0.219 0.00297 -0.884
(0.0173) (0.0960) (0.0508) (0.120) (0.149) (0.138) (8.39)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) 0.0446 -0.0674 0.153 4.92 2.49 0.204 13.1
N 309 309 309 309 309 309 309
Panel D. All Accounts
Free ATM 0.887*** 0.191** 0.0453 0.153* 0.202 0.501** 22.9**
(0.0115) (0.0849) (0.0312) (0.0808) (0.171) (0.216) (11.6)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) 0.0680 0.000 0.194 4.95 2.62 0.301 21.0
N 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113
Panel E. All Accounts - Is Impact for Wives Different?
Free ATM 0.871*** 0.288*** 0.0768** 0.230** 0.358 0.691** 32.0**
(0.0144) (0.112) (0.0378) (0.0998) (0.232) (0.299) (16.0)
Free ATM x Wife 0.0594*** -0.344*** -0.112* -0.274* -0.555** -0.680** -32.5*
(0.0214) (0.147) (0.0614) (0.150) (0.275) (0.338) (18.4)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) 0.0680 0.000 0.194 4.95 2.62 0.301 21.0
N 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the couple level when relevant) in parentheses. All regressions include dummy
variables for the first 6 experimental sessions, cash prize receipt for each spouse, and account type and cash prizex account
type interactions when relevant. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Table 2-6: Impact of Free ATM Card Provision on Total Savings by Couples
Saved (Any Average Number Number
Mean Effect Account) Balance Deposits Withdrawals Fees
A. Impact of ATM Card by Type
Joint ATM Card 0.194 0.0740 0.233* 0.0810 0.546 20.9
(0.131) (0.0494) (0.135) (0.338) (0.417) (22.3)
Husband's ATM Card 0.262* 0.137*** 0.0141 0.951* 0.527 26.8
(0.158) (0.0574) (0.111) (0.529) (0.521) (27.9)
Wife's ATM Card -0.127 -0.0479 -0.151 -0.0552 -0.363 -22.6
(0.122) (0.0557) (0.117) (0.418) (0.294) (16.8)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) 0.000 0.255 5.33 2.27 0.440 30.6
B. Pooled Impact of ATM Cards
Any ATM Card 0.152* 0.0716** 0.0944 0.261 0.386 16.1
(0.0863) (0.0359) (0.0873) (0.241) (0.253) (14.4)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) 0.000 0.255 5.33 2.27 0.440 30.6
C. Impact by Card Type - Is Impact for Wives Different?
Joint or Husband's ATM Card 0.239*** 0.101*** 0.161* 0.464* 0.597** 26.0
(0.0987) (0.0387) (0.0964) (0.282) (0.304) (17.0)
Wife's ATM Card -0.126 -0.0449 -0.166 -0.00888 -0.371 -22.6
(0.124) (0.0556) (0.118) (0.435) (0.289) (16.6)
F Test - Joint/Husband=Wife 5.13** 4.46** 4.27** 1.01 4.30** 3.43*
{0.0238} {0.0351} {0.0391} {0.316} {0.0384} {0.0643}
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) 0.000 0.255 5.33 2.27 0.440 30.6
D. Impact of Interest Rates
Max Interest is 6 Percent 0.160 0.0479 0.274*** 0.276 0.221 13.5
(0.109) (0.0604) (0.110) (0.302) (0.248) (13.6)
Max Interest is 10 Percent 0.232** 0.0589 0.316*** 0.578** 0.378* 25.2**
(0.100) (0.0567) (0.0991) (0.288) (0.202) (12.2)
DV Mean (2 Percent Interest, No Cash Prize) -0.132 0.190 5.06 2.12 0.357 18.5
N 748 748 748 748 748 748
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values in braces. Additional controls (all panels) include cash prize dummies for
both the husband and and a dummy for the first 6 experimental sessions. The first three panels also include a set of dummy
variables that saturate possible combinations of open accounts. * **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent
levels respectively.
Table 2-7: Impact of ATM Cards Interacted with Bargaining Power in the Household
Panel A. Husbands' Accounts
Free ATM 0.569** 0.120 -0.749
(0.266) (0.220) (0.794)
Free ATMxWife Advantaged -0.618* -0.584** -0.508
(0.322) (0.286) (0.326)
Wife Advantaged 0.0922 0.0881 0.0763
(0.118) (0.118) (0.127)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) -0.0779 -0.0779 -0.0779
N 319 319 319
Panel B. Wives' Accounts
Free ATM -0.279*** -0.245*** -0.633*
(0.113) (0.105) (0.337)
Free ATMxWife Advantaged 0.350* 0.364** 0.420***
(0.181) (0.172) (0.175)
Wife Advantaged -0.229** -0.223** -0.228**
(0.101) (0.0991) (0.102)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) -0.0674 -0.0674 -0.0674
N 309 309 309
Panel C. Couple Level Impact
Husband's ATM 0.407* 0.0492 -0.645
(0.243) (0.204) (0.786)
Husband's ATMxWife Advantaged -0.295 -0.338 -0.530
(0.334) (0.289) (0.333)
Wife's ATM -0.343** -0.308** -0.686
(0.159) (0.148) (0.538)
Wife's ATM x Wife Advantaged 0.412 0.461** 0.495**
(0.258) (0.231) (0.234)
Wife Advantaged -0.0816 -0.0678 -0.0623
(0.133) (0.129) (0.144)
DV Mean (No ATM, No Cash Prize) 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 354 354 354
Baseline Account Ownership Controls? No Formal All
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline control sets for panels A and B
match those in Table 5. Baseline control sets for panel C include those for couple-level
ATM regressions in Table 6. "Formal" controls add a dummy variable for formal account
ownership and its interaction with the relevant ATM treatments. "All" controls add
additional dummy variables for mobile phone savings use, ROSCA membership, and a
home savings dummy, as well as the relevant interactions with the ATM treatments. *
**, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Figure 2-1: Map of Study Locations
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Notes: The shaded area on the map of Kenya indicates Busia district, with Busia town marked by
a star. The local map shows detail surrounding Busia town, including major roads (dashed lines),
boundaries (solid lines) and study locations. Group meeting locations are demarcated by an x.
Figure 2-2: Interest Rate Design
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Notes: The maximum interest rate available to the couple is illustrated in interior cells.
Figure 2-3: Account Use Over Time - Couples Without Cash Prizes
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Notes: Figures limited to opened accounts with 2 percent interest or better that were
no selected for a free ATM card.
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Figure 2-4: CDFs of Standardized Aggregate Account Use by Opened Account Type and ATM Treatment
A. Joint Accounts B. Husbands' Accounts
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Figure 2-5: Quantile Treatment Effects of ATM Cards and Interest on Aggregate Standardized Account Use
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Figure 2-6: Distribution of Husband's Relative Bargaining Power
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Figure 2-7: Baseline Savings Device Use and Proxied Bargaining Power
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0)
- -%-- L.
-~-- K
a0
Il-
0-
-1 0
Proxied Bargaining Power
-2 -1 0
Proxied Bargaining Power
I Bank/SACCO - - - ROSCA - - - - - MPESA ---- Home
(D~
0 -
-2
r- .
Table 2-Al: What Predicts Savings Account Use? (Couples Without Cash Prizes)
SavedStandardized Use
Coefficient Std. Error
Age (H) 0.00239 (0.00476)
Age (W) -0.000418 (0.00579)
Education (H) -0.0127 (0.0125)
Education (W) 0.0317*** (0.0126)
Children (H) 0.0278 (0.0185)
Children (W) 0.0127 (0.0248)
Subsistence Farmer/Unemployed (H) -0.107 (0.0869)
Subsistence Farmer/Unemployed (W) -0.0909 (0.0813)
Income/1,000 (H) 0.00498 (0.00650)
Income/1,000 (W) -0.0498*** (0.0153)
Owns Mobile Phone (H) -0.0503 (0.0752)
Owns Mobile Phone (W) 0.130* (0.0768)
Saves in ROSCA (H) 0.0233 (0.0745)
Saves in ROSCA (W) 0.0293 (0.0761)
Owns Bank Account (H) -0.0290 (0.102)
Owns Bank Account (W) 0.373** (0.168)
Owns SACCO Account (H) 0.534** (0.237)
Owns SACCO Account (W) 0.297 (0.448)
Saves at Home (H) 0.0121 (0.106)
Saves at Home (W) 0.0601 (0.142)
Saves on Mobile Phone (H) 0.143 (0.104)
Saves on Mobile Phone (W) 0.0986 (0.139)
Hyperbolic Discounter (H) -0.0289 (0.0947)
Hyperbolic Discounter (W) -0.0993 (0.0934)
Anti-Hyperbolic Discounter (H) 0.152 (0.119)
Anti-Hyperbolic Discounter (W) -0.0936 (0.0811)
Discount Factor (H) 0.000132 (0.158)
Discount Factor (W) 0.00391 (0.152)
Polygamous -0.0775 (0.124)
Distance from Bank -0.0269 (0.0196)
DV Mean / R2 0.000 .154
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time preference controls are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Coefficient
0.00287
0.0000649
-0.00606
0.0121*
0.0152
-0.000941
-0.0297
-0.0177
0.00649
-0.0270***
-0.0304
0.0951**
0.0212
0.0409
0.0162
0.186***
0.123
0.0942
-0.0584
0.0610
0.0865
0.0334
0.0324
0.0173
0.0810
-0.0225
0.0199
-0.0826
-0.0521
-0.0115
0.271
Std. Error
(0.00279)
(0.00323)
(0.00663)
(0.00654)
(0.00971)
(0.0125)
(0.0487)
(0.0462)
(0.00429)
(0.00750)
(0.0425)
(0.0434)
(0.0408)
(0.0434)
(0.0481)
(0.0755)
(0.0928)
(0.231)
(0.0581)
(0.0689)
(0.0555)
(0.0701)
(0.0598)
(0.0540)
(0.0592)
(0.0471)
(0.0838)
(0.0889)
(0.0611)
(0.00938)
.127
Average Daily Balance
Coefficient Std. Error
-0.000559 (0.00570)
-0.0000938 (0.00727)
-0.00870 (0.0152)
0.0295* (0.0152)
0.0281 (0.0226)
0.0239 (0.0325)
-0.0894 (0.109)
-0.0865 (0.100)
0.00230 (0.00784)
-0.0488*** (0.0202)
-0.0939 (0.0931)
0.168* (0.0947)
0.0251 (0.0917)
0.0526 (0.0935)
0.00411 (0.120)
0.372* (0.196)
0.550** (0.259)
0.624 (0.717)
-0.0511 (0.142)
0.107 (0.153)
0.175 (0.134)
0.265 (0.184)
0.0136 (0.131)
-0.151 (0.118)
0.130 (0.139)
-0.129 (0.107)
0.132 (0.185)
0.175 (0.185)
-0.0652 (0.141)
-0.0305 (0.0230)
5.41 .146
Table 2-A2: Treatment Effects by Time Inconsistency
Joint ATM
Joint ATM x Hyperbolic (H)
Joint ATM x Hyperbolic (W)
Husband's ATM
Husband's ATM x Hyperbolic (H)
Husband's ATM x Hyperbolic (W)
Wife's ATM
Wife's ATM x Hyperbolic (H)
Wife's ATM x Hyperbolic (W)
Hyperbolic (H)
Hyperbolic (W)
DV Mean
N
Mean
Effect
0.177
(0.159)
-0.0430
(0.236)
0.106
(0.243)
0.312
(0.200)
-0.253
(0.292)
-0.113
(0.250)
-0.0983
(0.169)
-0.231
(0.262)
0.0755
(0.234)
-0.00724
(0.103)
-0.103
(0.0895)
9.91e-09
748
Saved
0.0351
(0.0553)
0.181
(0.144)
0.0794
(0.133)
0. 126*
(0.0677)
-0.0875
(0.181)
0.140
(0.148)
-0.0627
(0.0635)
-0.0156
(0.177)
0.0942
(0.134)
-0.0291
(0.0553)
-0.0298
(0.0492)
0.255
748
in parentheses.
Average
Balance
0.199
(0.158)
0.0429
(0.321)
0.183
(0.335)
0.00924
(0.135)
0.178
(0.276)
-0.0446
(0.213)
-0.0238
(0.162)
-0.505**
(0.248)
-0.269
(0.241)
0.0644
(0.125)
-0.0786
(0.102)
5.33
748
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the couple level when relevant)
and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Number
Deposits
0.0290
(0.410)
-0.275
(0.571)
0.445
(0.640)
1.28*
(0.668)
-0.939
(0.720)
-1.33**
(0.662)
-0.00402
(0.612)
-0.725
(0.767)
0.358
(0.772)
0.0418
(0.287)
-0.302
(0.239)
2.27
748
Number
Withdrawals
0.671
(0.518)
-0.837*
(0.464)
-0.210
(0.533)
0.676
(0.664)
-0.977
(0.656)
-0.273
(0.824)
-0.364
(0.379)
-0.121
(0.451)
0.340
(0.574)
-0.0735
(0.193)
-0.222
(0.180)
0.440
748
Fees
28.0
(27.7)
-44.2
(26.9)
-15.4
(27.5)
33.1
(35.7)
-30.9
(45.2)
-17.0
(40.9)
-20.1
(22.4)
-21.0
(30.2)
14.5
(30.7)
-3.27
(14.8)
-15.0
(11.5)
30.6
748
~*** **,
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Chapter 3
Price Subsidies, Diagnostic Tests, and
Targeting of Malaria Treatment:
Evidence from a Randomized Controlled
Trial*
3.1 Introduction
Limiting the spread of infectious disease has positive social benefits - as such, infectious disease
programs often feature subsidies for prevention and treatment technologies. Financing such subsidies
is obviously subject to a budget constraint, however, and it is therefore critical to ensure that subsidy
dollars are spent where they have the highest return. For products that have heterogeneous returns,
the introduction of a subsidy creates a tradeoff between access and targeting. That is, subsidies
for the product are likely to increase demand among both appropriate users, for whom the returns
are indeed high, and among inappropriate users, for whom the benefits are marginal. This is the
"menu-setting problem" described by Olmstead and Zeckhauser (1999).
This tradeoff between affordability and over-consumption is magnified for products for which
overuse has negative social spillovers. For example, the (ineffective but quite common) use of antibi-
otics to treat viral infections contributes to antibiotic resistance. Likewise, antimalarial treatment in
the absence of malaria can contribute to antimalarial resistance. When people are uncertain about
the cause of their ailment and the costs of under-treating can be deadly (e.g., untreated malaria
is a major cause of childhood mortality in Africa), presumptive treatment is likely to be privately
optimal if the treatment is subsidized and thus affordable (provided side-effects are minimal). This
makes the menu-setting problem even more pressing: the trade-off is not just between affordability
and cost-ineffective consumption at a single point in time, but a trade-off between affordability
*This chapter is co-authored with Jessica Cohen and Pascaline Dupas.
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today and effectiveness in the future.
This paper studies the menu-setting problem for the latest class of antimalarials, artemisinin
combination therapies (ACTs). Artemisinin-based therapies now constitute the only effective class
of antimalarials in Africa, where drug resistance has rendered all earlier generations of antimalari-
als (quinine, chloroquine, amodiaquine, sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine) mostly ineffective. The use of
artemisinin derivatives by themselves as monotherapies is highly discouraged by the World Health
Organization, however, due to concerns that malaria parasites have already started developing resis-
tance to artemisinin. Instead, the WHO encourages the use of ACTs, which combine an artemisinin
derivative with a partner drug (such as mefloquine or lumefantrine), and thereby help protect the
artemisinin derivatives from resistance.1 The unsubsidized price of ACTs is prohibitive for the great
majority of rural African households and as a result, in 2008, 6 years after ACTs were placed on the
WHO's essential drugs list, fewer than 15 percent of African children with malaria were treated with
ACTs (World Health Organization 2009). In response, a call was made for a global ACT subsidy
to achieve two main goals: (1) immediately save lives, by increasing access to ACTs, and (2) buy
time, by crowding-out monotherapies and thereby delaying resistance (Arrow et al. 2004). The
Affordable Medicines Facility for malaria (AMFm) initiative, financed by major international aid
agencies, was subsequently established to roll out a 95 percent subsidy to first line buyers of ACTs
throughout Africa. At the time of writing, the subsidy was being piloted in 8 countries.
The AMFm subsidy was explicitly designed to impact the price of ACTS in the private sector, as
many people seeking malaria treatment do so in loosely regulated, informal private-sector drug shops
where they receive no formal diagnosis. In this context, it is quite likely that a 95 percent decrease
in ACT prices will be associated with increases in not only appropriate but also inappropriate ACT
use. A high rate of overtreatment with ACTs is problematic for several reasons. First, it is a
waste of a vast amount of subsidy money. The co-payments alone for the AMFm are estimated to
cost $216 million in the pilot phase (Global Fund 2010). Second, if the retail-sector ACT subsidy
draws malaria-negative people from health clinics to the drug shop (reducing the chances they
receive diagnostic confirmation), it could delay or preclude proper treatment for the true cause of
illness (Reyburn et al. 2004). Finally, a high rate of overtreatment for malaria may contribute
to the selection of drug resistant parasites (Perkins and Bell 2008; White 2004). This means that,
although ACT subsidies would have a first order (positive) effect on resistance because of artemisinin
monotherapy crowd-out, there could be a second order negative effect of accelerating resistance from
overtreatment with ACTs.
We use data from a randomized controlled trial conducted with over 2,900 households in rural
Kenya to study the tradeoffs between ACT affordability and overuse in the context of the AMFm
subsidy. Our research design also tests an alternative to the AMFm subsidy regime that explicitly
'Combination therapies slow resistance because in order for a resistant parasite to arise, it must develop mutations
that make it resistant to all drugs in the combinations. When the combined drugs have differing modes of action, the
probability of this event occurring is substantially lower than the probability of resistance developing to any single
drug alone (World Health Organization 2010a).
124
acknowledges the problem of overuse by providing access to a subsidized rapid diagnostic test for
malaria (RDT) in tandem with subsidized ACTs.2
We show that subsidies for ACTs and RDTs can successfully broaden access to these technologies,
and that including RDT subsidies under any ACT subsidy policy could be an effective way to
improve the targeting of subsidized ACTs to people with confirmed malaria. We also show that this
RDT subsidy could be financed by reducing the ACT subsidy somewhat, an approach that could
be more cost-effective than the proposed AMFm subsidy alone. This is primarily due to two stark
results from our experiment:
1. Over-diagnosis of malaria is extremely common in our study context, particularly among
teenagers and adults. As a result, when ACTs are heavily subsidized, only 33 percent of ACT
takers over age 13 actually have malaria. This implies that improving diagnostic access has
the potential to considerably reduce over-treatment.
2. The demand for ACTs is highly price-elastic above a certain range (which includes the unsub-
sidized price of ACTs), but very inelastic at low prices, especially for children. Specifically,
we see a modest 13 percent decline in ACT purchases at the drug shop when the subsidy level
declines from 92 to 80 percent, corresponding to a 150 percent price increase. For children,
who are much more likely to actually have malaria and for whom malaria is most dangerous,
there is no significant price sensitivity in this range. This implies that some reduction in the
ACT subsidy (compared to the current AMFm plan) is unlikely to meaningfully reduce access.
In order for the RDT subsidy to be cost-effective (relative to an ACT subsidy alone), it is critical
for people to be both willing to take the test and compliant with the test result. We find that
willingness to test is very high: when offered a voucher for subsidized RDTs, more than 80 percent
of households who visited the drug shop chose to get the patient tested with an RDT prior to
making their ACT purchase decision. This is despite the fact that only 15 percent of households
had ever heard of RDTs prior to our experiment. Compliance with the test results is not as high,
however. In our context, about 49 percent of patients over the age of 5 who tested negative went
on to purchase the ACT. This is not surprising given that the status quo testing technology (a
microscopic test offered at health centers) has a relatively high rate of false negatives when used by
health workers in the field (31 percent according to a 2002 study in Kenya (Zurovac et al. 2006)),
and health practitioners themselves tend to ignore test results and prescribe antimalarials to those
who test negative. For example, a 2002 study in Kenya found that nearly 80 percent of patients who
tested negative for malaria were prescribed antimalarials regardless (Zurovac et al. 2006). This had
decreased somewhat by 2010, but remained as high as 50 percent among those above the age of 5,
2 RDTs for malaria work similarly to rapid tests for HIV and do not require specialized equipment, such as a
microscope, or electricity. A small sample of blood is collected through a finger prick and placed on a testing cassette.
The blood sample is exposed to a buffer solution, and the presence of malaria antibodies can be determined within
approximately 15 minutes.
despite the introduction of strict guidelines for health workers to test and adhere to test results for
patients above 5 (Juma and Zurovac 2011). While RDTs have a much lower rate of false negatives
than microscopy (generally under 5 percent in lab settings (World Health Organization 2010b) and
around 8 percent when used by health workers (de Oliveira et al. 2009)), it might take some time
for households to learn this.
Overall, in the absence of any information or marketing campaign on RDTs, our estimates
suggest that moving from the AMFm subsidy level to an 80 percent ACT subsidy with RDTs could
increase the share of ACT takers who are malaria positive at the drug shop by around 22 percentage
points. The majority (18 percentage points) of this impact comes from selection induced by the
higher ACT price. However, the total impact could be substantially increased if full adherence to
RDT results were achieved. Overall, our results suggest that, in this context, taking some of the
planned ACT subsidy money away from ACTs and putting it towards subsidizing and promoting
RDTs could improve targeting and be particularly cost-effective among older children and adults if
adherence to test results can be improved.
It is important to point out that this subsidy regime is a second-best strategy. The first-best
would be to make the ACT subsidy conditional on having a positive malaria test result. This
first-best is unlikely to be enforceable at a reasonable cost, however. Overuse of prescription-only
drugs are common even in highly regulated health care markets such as the US and Europe, due to
physician agency problems (McGuire 2000). Similar agencies issues are likely to be widespread in
developing countries where monitoring of both private and public health care sectors is extremely
limited (World Bank 2004).
While our results suggest that the combined ACT+RDT subsidy regime would be preferred to
an ACT subsidy alone (especially in the long run), our results make it very clear that an ACT
subsidy will considerably increase access among the needy. We proxy SES by whether a household's
female head is illiterate (about 38 percent of our sample) and find a substantial access gap in the
absence of a subsidy: literate-headed households are over three times more likely to treat an illness
episode with an ACT. However, under the ACT subsidy regime literate-headed households are just
17 percent more likely to treat an illness with an ACT. The subsidy would also primarily benefit
children, who are much more susceptible to malaria than adults. In fact, for children, the benefit
of the RDT subsidy would not be in averting over-treatment, but rather in ensuring that in those
cases where a child suspected of having malaria does not actually have malaria, the true illness is
diagnosed and treated faster.
Beyond its immediate relevance to the proposed AMFm subsidy initiative, which will affect
millions of households in rural Africa in both the short-run (affordability) and long-run (drug re-
sistance), our paper contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, our paper adds to a
fast-growing experimental literature on user fees for health services and health products whose ap-
propriate use generates positive externalities. So far this literature has focused on optimal pricing
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for preventative health products, such as water purification kits or bednets, 3 for which overuse is
not a problem, and for which the objective of the social planner is to expand access while limiting
underuse among subsidy beneficiaries. In contrast, this paper considers the price-setting problem
that arises when overuse generates negative externalities (in our case, through drug resistance).
Second, we contribute to the literature on overdiagnosis and overtreatment, two major con-
tributors to health care costs and a source of concern throughout the world (Welch, Schwartz,
and Woloshin 2011). Finally, we contribute to the nascent literature on treatment-seeking behav-
ior in resource-constrained environments, along with the earlier contributions of Leonard, Mliga,
and Mariam (2002) in Tanzania, Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo (2004) in Rajasthan (India), and of
Leonard (2007, 2009) in Tanzania and Cameroun, respectively.
Our results generate a number of important questions for future research. The first obvious
question is that of learning about the effectiveness of ACTs and the reliability of RDTs. Limiting
overtreatment with ACTs is likely to improve inference about ACTs' effectiveness among the general
population (Adhvaryu 2009). The timeline of our experiment was too short to study this question,
however. In a companion paper (Cohen, Dupas, and Schaner 2011) we find that exposure to RDTs
via neighbors increases demand for RDTs, although learning about the reliability of RDTs might
take some time.
The second question is how to ensure optimal provider incentives. As discussed in Cohen and
Dickens (2011), drug shops, which make a profit from selling ACTs whether their clients are truly
malaria positive or not, might not have any incentive to sell a cheap diagnostic test that will result
in fewer ACT purchases. The problem of RDT provision is an incentive problem similar to that
of "informed experts" who sell both their diagnostic of a problem and the solution to the problem,
such as surgeons or auto repair shops (Wolinsky 1993). One possibility for increasing RDT provision
would be to decouple the supply of medication and diagnostic services. For example, RDTs could
be made available at general stores, rather than drug shops, and be made simple enough to use
for households to self-administer the test. Alternatively, drug shops might have an interest in
building trust and ensuring that their clients' beliefs about the drug's effectiveness remain high.
This dynamic incentive could be enough to ensure availability of RDTs at drug shops.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes some background facts on
the malaria burden and treatment options in rural Africa, as well as the proposed AMFm subsidy.
Section 3.3 develops a model of treatment-seeking behavior in this environment, and identifies the
key trade-offs inherent in heavily subsidizing ACTs. Section 3.4 describes our experimental design
and data. We discuss the results in Section 3.5 and performs a cost-effectiveness analysis in Section
3.6, before we conclude in Section 3.7.
3 See Cohen and Dupas (2010), Dupas (2010), Hoffmann (2009), and Tarozzi et al. (2011) on bednets; and Ashraf,
Berry, and Shapiro (2010) and Kremer et al. (2011) on water purification.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 Background on Malaria
Malaria is a disease caused not by "bad air", as was once believed, but by a blood parasite called
Plasmodium, which is transmitted from human to human by female anopheles mosquitoes. Malaria
is estimated to cause 200 million illnesses and to kill close to one million people every year - the
great majority of them in Africa, and the great majority of them under the age of five (World Health
Organization 2009).
Despite major strides in malaria eradication in the early and mid-20th century, notably in the
Americas (Bleakley 2010; Lucas 2010), efforts to eradicate malaria worldwide were abandoned in
the 1970s. Recently, efforts to control malaria transmission have rejuvenated with the introduction
of highly effective prevention tools, such as long-lasting insecticide treated bednets. Such nets have
been distributed on a massive scale in the past five years, contributing to reductions in malaria
incidence and deaths in some countries (Otten et al. 2009). The morbidity burden of malaria
remains considerable, however, and there is no malaria vaccine on the near horizon. Given this,
policy-makers and donors have recently been turning their attention to malaria treatment, an aspect
of malaria control where less progress has been made.
Because immunity to malaria develops with repeated exposure, children under 5 are most vul-
nerable to acquiring and dying from malaria. How readily these children can access effective anti-
malarials when they get infected is thus a very important determinant of overall malaria morbidity
and mortality. According to the 2009 World Malaria Report, fewer than 15 percent of young chil-
dren with presumed malaria in endemic countries were treated with effective antimalarial drugs.
This crisis in access has been fueled by the spread of drug resistant malaria parasites. Early malaria
control efforts relied heavily on chloroquine as a cheap, effective treatment. Plasmodium falciparum,
the most common and deadly of the five strains of malaria, started becoming resistant to chloro-
quine in the 1960s and rendered the drug ineffective by the early 1990s, contributing to a substantial
rebound in malaria mortality (Trape 2001). Subsequent innovations in antimalarial medicines have
been successively less able to withstand parasite resistance (D'Alessandro and Buttiens 2001).
Currently, the only effective antimalarial against the P. falciparum parasite is artemisinin, a
compound derived from Chinese wormwood trees that is significantly more expensive to produce
than older, synthetic forms of malaria medicine. Artemisinin acts quickly to bring down the parasite
load (often people feel significantly better within 24 hours) and has only mild side effects. The retail
price of artemisinin-based antimalarials is roughly $6-8 in Sub-Saharan Africa. 4 In most populations
dealing with endemic malaria this cost of treatment is unaffordable.
4 ACT Watch, Population Services International, Outlet Surveys (http://www.actwatch.info). The median price
of Artemether Lumefantrine (the drug used in this study) in drug shops is $5.26 in Uganda, $6.03 in Benin, $4.58
in DRC, $5.36 in Nigeria and $5.36 in Zambia. In most cases, other ACTs are $1 more expensive, and all ACTs are
more expensive in pharmacies than in drug shops.
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As discussed in the introduction, the two major challenges in malaria control today are: (1) How
can effective malaria medicines be made accessible and affordable? And (2) How can resistance to
the only remaining effective treatment be forestalled?
3.2.2 The Affordable Medicines Facility for Malaria (AMFm)
In response to the two challenges above, the Gates Foundation, UNICEF, the Global Fund and
others have recently created a "global subsidy" policy called the Affordable Medicines Facility for
Malaria (AMFm). Through a co-payment to ACT manufacturers, the program would reduce the
price of ACTs by roughly 95 percent to first line buyers, such as governments, NGOs and wholesalers
(Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 2010). The final price to consumers in the private
sector is unrestricted, but the aim is for retail sector ACTs to be cheap enough for most rural, poor
populations to afford them and to be competitive with older antimalarials like chloroquine. The
AMFm launched in early 2011 as a pilot in 8 countries (including Kenya). Our study was conceived
and implemented in 2008/2009, when the AMFm was under consideration but had not yet started
its pilot.
3.2.3 Health Providers and Health Treatment Seeking in Rural Kenya
To provide context for our theoretical framework and experimental design, this subsection provides
some descriptive evidence on health care choices that are available to households in rural Kenya
and presents some key baseline facts about treatment-seeking behavior in our study population.
As in many developing countries, the range of health treatment providers in Kenya is vast.
Public health facilities vary from small "dispensaries", which provide very basic outpatient care
for the most common types of illness, to hospitals with medical specialists and surgical capacity
(Luoma 2010). As in other countries ((Leonard 2007; Das et al. 2008)), the level of practitioner
training and expertise varies widely across Kenyan health facilities, even within the same tier of care.
However, in rural areas, patients generally only have access to lower level facilities, as the distance
and transport costs to higher level facilities in district centers and urban areas are often prohibitive.
Lower level health facilities are typically staffed with nurses or medical assistants and are known
to have high rates of absenteeism and stock outs of essential medicines (Kangwana et al. 2009;
Chaudhury et al. 2006). Rural health facilities often do blood slide microscopy tests for malaria,
though this depends on the availability of a trained lab technician and stocks of slides and reagents.
Even when microscopy tests for malaria are performed, negative results are often disregarded and
treatment is given anyway (Juma and Zurovac 2011; Zurovac et al. 2006).5 ACTs are free in public
health facilities in Kenya, but are quite often stocked out (Kangwana et al. 2009). Even with free
medication, the direct and indirect costs of seeking treatment for malaria in the public sector can
5The reasons why negative malaria tests are so often ignored by medical practitioners in Africa is the subject of
a growing body of public health research. Some explanations include historical presumptive treatment of malaria,
risk aversion, lack of confidence in the test results, professional norms and patient demands (Chandler et al. 2008).
be high if fees are charged for consultation, diagnosis, etc. (as is often the case in our study area)
and if it takes a long time to reach the facility and been seen by a medical professional.
Households also have the option of treating an illness with over-the-counter medication purchased
at a drug shop.6 The education levels and credentials of drug shop owners vary widely, but they
are often asked by patients for treatment recommendations (Patouillard et al. 2010; Marsh et al.
2004). The two main benefits to treating an illness at a drug shop, rather than a public health
facility, are convenience and choice. Drug shops are ubiquitous in Kenya, even in the most remote
areas, whereas the average household in our sample lived more than 6.5 kilometers from the nearest
health facility. These shops are also often open 7 days a week from early morning until late at night
and offer a wide variety of medications to treat malaria (for example, many of the shops we visited
during our pilot phase were open 12 hours a day, 6-7 days of the week). Private sector supply chains
for pharmaceuticals are also more reliable than in the public sector, so drug shops are less often
stocked out of medication than health facilities. 7 The main drawbacks to treating malaria at a drug
shop rather than a public health facility is the lack of diagnostic capability, the risk of receiving
lower quality or counterfeit drugs, and of course the absence of emergency medicines and equipment
to treat severe malaria infections.
We conclude this section with some basic statistics on malaria treatment seeking behavior re-
ported in our baseline survey. The results, presented in Table 2, are from self-reported behavior in
response to presumed malaria episodes. (We will discuss in detail how the sample was formed and
how the data was collected in Section 4). Overall presumed malaria incidence in Western Kenya is
very high, with nearly 70 percent of households reporting an episode of malaria in the month before
baseline. Yet rates of malaria diagnostic testing were relatively low, with 18 percent of households
taking a microscopy test and 3 percent of households taking an RDT in the previous month. Most
households either go to the health facility (41 percent) or to the drug shop (37 percent) to treat
malaria, though a substantial minority (18 percent) does not seek care. The drug shop is the most
common source of antimalarial medication, however - antimalarials are procured from a drug shop
52 percent of the time.
At baseline, households in our sample had limited access to effective antimalarials - only 21
percent of presumed malaria episodes were reported to be treated with ACTs. This rate of ACT
taking is not much higher in children 13 and younger, even though young children are most at
risk of severe morbidity and mortality from malaria. Roughly 35 percent of households take older,
less effective drugs like amodiaquine and sulfadoxine pyrimethamine. Households spend $1.68 per
6 Another option is to seek care in the formal private sector (at a clinic or doctor's office, for example). The cost
of this type of care is prohibitively high for our study population, however. At endline, just 4 percent of all illness
episodes were treated in the formal private sector.
7 Indeed it is often the case that health facilities will send patients to drug shops to purchase the medicines that
they are stocked out of. We see some evidence of this in our baseline. When a presumed malaria episode was first
treated at the health center, the household only reported obtaining drugs from the health center 82 percent of the
time.
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malaria episode (the median is substantially lower at $0.77). This is a remarkably large sum of
money given that the agricultural daily wage is around $1.5 (Dupas and Robinson 2011). In sum,
our baseline data suggests that households have frequent malaria episodes that are often treated at
the drug shop with inappropriate medications, despite high out of pocket expenditures. Children
are slightly more likely to go to a health center and be treated with ACTs. Literate households are
more likely to go to health facilities and access ACTs than illiterate households.
3.3 Model
This section develops a model of treatment seeking behavior in the environment described above.
The goal of the model is to highlight the trade-off inherent to subsidizing ACTs through the retail
sector. The trade-off is embedded in the following two policy parameters of interest:
" The share of true malaria episodes that do not get treated with ACTs - we denote this as
"UT" for "under-treatment".
" The share of non-malaria episodes that are treated with ACTs - we denote this as "OT" for
"over-treatment".
The objective of the social planner is to decrease UT while limiting the increase in OT, since
overtreatment has the negative social externalities we discussed earlier. In other words, the objective
is to reduce the number of type II errors (false negatives) without increasing the number of type I
errors (false positives) too much. The relative weight placed on these two parameters is captured
by the social planner's objective function (some F (UT, OT)), which the planner maximizes subject
to a budget constraint.
One simple objective function that prizes ACT targeting over ACT access is the fraction of ACT
takers who are malaria positive, which we denote by T for "targeting". Let H represent the fraction
of all illness episodes that are actually malaria. Then we can express T as follows:
(1 - UT) H(1 - UT) H + OT (1 - I)
In a first-best world, decreasing UT while keeping OT at a minimum could be easily achieved by
simply making the ACT subsidy conditional: only those with a positive malaria test result would be
allowed to buy an ACT at the subsidized price. This is the idea behind the free ACT distribution
ongoing at health centers in our study context. It is clear from our baseline data that access to
health centers is limited, however - hence the AMFm plan to roll out a subsidy through the retail
sector. The goal of this section is to discuss how such a proposed retail sector subsidy will affect
UT, OT, and T.
3.3.1 Model Setup
We consider an environment where the household has three possible actions, a:
1. Buy ACTs at the drug shop: a = s
2. Seek diagnosis at a formal health facility and receive ACTs if positive: a = h
3. Purchase other drugs at the drug shop (e.g. antipyretics) or do nothing: a = n
When a household gets an illness shock, the household observes the symptoms of the illness and
subjectively assesses the probability 7r that the illness is actually malaria. The expected value of
taking a particular action a E {s, h, n} depends on this probability, and is denoted by Va (7r). It
can be decomposed into:
Va (-F) = 7r (Upa (1r) - Pa (7r)) + (1 - 7r) (Uky (7) - Pa (7r))Va 
- 7r)
= rVa (r) + (1 -7)VA(ir)
where Uk (ir) is the utility obtained from taking action a when the individual's true malaria status
is M E {P, N} (i.e., malaria positive or malaria negative) and pa is the expected price paid for
treatment when the individual's true malaria status is M. 8 Note that the utilities and prices may
be a function of 7r - if, for example, the severity of symptoms is increasing as 7r increases, then
individuals may expect to pay more to treat the illness, particularly when it is not actually malaria.
An individual will seek ACT treatment at the drug shop if
V" (-r) = ,r (Up (-r) - p, (ir)) + (1 - r) (Uy (7r) - p" (7r)) > max {Vh (7), V" (7r) (3.1)
3.3.2 Impact of an ACT Subsidy at the Drug Shop
Consider a population of illness episodes. The share of episodes that are actually malaria, II,
is determined by the distribution g (.) of actual malaria positivity in the population, where we
denote true malaria positivity as ir. We assume that individuals' subjective malaria assessments are
accurate, in that 7r = f (an individual's self-assessed probability of having malaria is equal to the
true probability). In the absence of any diagnostic testing in the retail sector, a decrease in the price
of ACTs at the drug shop will decrease UT and increase OT. Generally, the relative magnitudes of
the changes in UT and OT are unclear, so the net effect on T (the share of illness episodes treated
with ACTs that are actually malaria) is ambiguous. However, we can refine the prediction if we
make two assumptions:
8 We assume that Va : 7r -+ R is a function, not a correspondence. This is not a trivial restriction - the assumption
would be violated if, for example, two illness episodes had equal malaria probability but different likelihoods of being
other illnesses of differing severity, such as a cold or pneumonia.
Al. All cases at the health center are diagnosed, and only given an ACT if the patient tests malaria
positive.
A2. The value of taking action a = n (doing nothing/taking non-ACT medication at the drug
shop) becomes relatively less attractive as 7r increases: - [V4 (7r) - V" (7r)] > 0 for a E {s.h}
When these two assumptions hold, we have the following result:
9 Result 1: Suppose the subsidy strictly increases the share of illness episodestreated with
ACTs at the drug shop. Then UT will decrease and OT will increase such that T decreases.
A decrease in the price of ACTs in the private sector (holding the health center price constant)
will decrease both p, (7r) and pN (7r) by the amount of the price reduction (assuming the individual
always buys the antimalarial upon arriving at a drug shop). This increases the left hand side of
inequality 3.1 while leaving Vh (7r) and V" (7r) unchanged for all values of 7r. Note that purchases of
ACTs at the drug shop will strictly increase unless V' (7r) is everywhere dominated by either Vh (7)
or V" (7r) after the price reduction.
Suppose ACT purchases at the drug shop increase. First consider crowd-out from the health
center - by assumption Al, this crowd-out will leave UT unchanged and increase OT. This shift
will clearly work to decrease T. Now consider crowd out from doing something else. By assumption
A2, the curves VS (7r) and V' (7r) will only intersect once, and V8 (7r) will cut V" (7r) from below.
This implies that all the marginal illnesses induced to take ACTs by the subsidy will have lower
malaria probabilities than those illness who would have taken ACTs in either case. This implies
that T will decrease. Thus, under these conditions, an ACT subsidy that increases ACT access will
always make targeting of ACTs to those with malaria worse.
However, this prediction is no longer unambiguous if there is heterogeneity in the population.
Specifically, suppose there are two types of households, rich and poor. Rich households are able to
afford ACTs and travel to the health center in the absence of the subsidy, whereas poor households
cannot - they always either hope an illness resolves on its own or they purchase inexpensive medi-
cation at the drug shop. Figure 1 graphs the value curves for the rich (panel A) and the poor (panel
B) in the case where going to the health center is preferred to buying an ACT at the drug shop for
intermediate malaria probabilities. We have normalized the value functions so that V" (7r) = 0 for
all 7r.
For the rich, reducing the price of ACTs at the drug shop will lead to crowd-out from the health
center among those with intermediate malaria probabilities, and, if the ACT subsidy is large enough,
crowd-out from subtherapeutic options among those with a low malaria probability. By Result 1,
targeting among rich households will decrease after the subsidy.
In contrast, since none of the poor take an ACT in the absence of the subsidy, introducing the
subsidy crowds in a mass of high-positivity ACT takers, which will substantially decrease UT while
only slightly increasing OT. This crowd-in could actually improve overall targeting if there are
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enough poor households in the population. (This would also be true if we considered a less extreme
case where, in the absence of the subsidy, the poor only take ACTs when they are very certain
that they have malaria). This underscores that it is particularly important to pay attention to
distributional impacts of the ACT subsidy. In particular, the subsidy would be especially attractive
if it increased takeup among high-positivity populations who didn't have access to ACTs before
(this is certainly the intent of the AMFm). On the other hand, it is possible that the subsidy would
mostly go to populations who would have gotten the ACT regardless of the subsidy policy (at a
health center, for example), or to very low positivity populations - in this case the policy would be
mostly wasteful.
3.3.3 Impact of Adding an RDT Subsidy at the Drug Shop
Suppose that at a cost of PR, an individual can take a diagnostic test for malaria at the drug
shop - he or she must pay this cost with certainty. We assume that the diagnostics are perfectly
accurate and that all individuals believe that this is the case - in this case, no one will ever take an
antimalarial if they test negative. Then there are two primary advantages of taking a test:
1. If the test is negative, the individual avoids the need to pay for an antimalarial - this is
particularly attractive when the price of the diagnostic is less than the price of an antimalarial,
as it will reduce p" (*r).
2. If the test is negative, it can help the individual to select appropriate medication earlier: this
will increase Ug (7r) - p" (*r).
Both of these effects are captured by writing Vk (r) Vk (r), where Vj (7r) is the value of seeking
care at the drug shop conditional on not having malaria and seeing the negative RDT test result.
This gives us our second result:
e Result 2: Adding an RDT subsidy onto the ACT subsidy will (possibly weakly) decrease
UT and (possibly weakly) decrease OT, compared to the ACT subsidy regime only. T will
therefore (possibly weakly) increase.
In other words, RDTs offer a way to increase access in the private sector (decrease UT) while
simultaneously improving targeting (increasing T). To see this, we consider the intensive and the
extensive margin effects of RDTs in turn. Let's begin with the intensive margin effect: this applies
to individuals for whom V" (7r) 2 max {Vh (r) , Vw (7r) }. These individuals will continue to seek
care from the drug shop and will choose to use an RDT if:
V 1(7r)[( -r)-) V (7r) - P P 2 R (7r)+ (1 - (r) V) (7r
(1 - 7r) Vk (7) - Vj ((r).2p
that is, they will use the RDT if the expected gain in utility/savings on excess medicine exceeds
the cost of the RDT. If individuals always comply with RDT results, this will leave UT unchanged
while decreasing OT.
Now consider the extensive margin - there may be a set of individuals for whom V8 (7r) <
max {Vh (7r) , V" (7r)} but for whom V" (7r) > max {Vh (7r) , Vw (7r)}. When this crowd out is from
the health center, both UT and OT will remain unchanged. When this crowd out is from doing
nothing/taking something else, UT will decrease while OT will remain unchanged. It is important
to note, however, that if RDT compliance is imperfect, an RDT subsidy could potentially decrease
T by increasing OT.
Some of our theoretical predictions (particularly with respect to T, which captures targeting) are
ambiguous because the shapes of the value curves, Va (7r), the distribution of malaria positivity in
the population, g (f), and actual patterns of crowd out are unknown. However, we can learn about
these objects if we can observe r and the impacts of ACT and RDT subsidies. Specifically, observing
how crowd out in terms of treatment channel (whether an episode is treated at the drug shop, at the
health center, or by doing nothing), and therapy choice (whether the episode is treated with an ACT,
a substandard antimalarial, or something else) varies with ir will allow us to infer where the value
curves cross before and after the subsidy. We can also study treatment effects by socioeconomic
status to assess the distributional impacts of the subsidy. The next section describes the experiment
that we designed to assess the impact of ACT and RDT subsidies on policy parameters UT, OT,
and T.
3.4 Study Design and Data
3.4.1 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted in the districts of Busia, Mumias and Samia in Western Kenya
between May and December of 2009.9 Malaria is endemic in this region with transmission occurring
year-round, but with two peaks corresponding to heavy rain in May-July and October-November.
This region is rural and poor, with the majority of household heads working as subsistence farmers.
Daily agricultural wages are estimated at approximately $1.50 (Dupas and Robinson 2011).
We selected four drug shops, in four rural market centers. 10 We then sampled all households in
the catchment area (within a 4km radius) of each of these four drug shops. The total number of
sampled households was 2,928. We then visited each household to administer a baseline survey to
the female head of household, at the end of which two vouchers for ACTs and (when applicable)
9 The study protocol was approved by the UCLA IRB, the KEMRI/Kenya National Ethical Review Committee,
the Kenya Pharmacy and Poisons Board, and the IPA Kenya IRB.
'
0 Participating drug shops were chosen on the basis of several criteria including distance from drug shops partici-
pating in other public health interventions, shop owner qualifications, length of time the shop had been in business
and the number of daily customers.
135
two vouchers for RDTs were distributed." Enumerators explained that ACTs are the most effective
type of antimalarial and, if the household received an RDT voucher, what the RDT was for and
how it worked. The vouchers stated the drug shop at which the products could be redeemed and
did not have expiration dates so that households had no reason to redeem them in the absence of
an illness episode. An image of an ACT voucher with English translation is in Appendix Figure
Al. RDT vouchers were similar in appearance.
The experimental design is illustrated in Figure 2. Of the 2,928 households sampled during the
census, 2,789 (95 percent) were reached and consented to the baseline survey. Households were
randomly assigned to one of three groups, corresponding to the three policy regimes of interest.
The "No Subsidy" group received vouchers to purchase unsubsidized ACTs at the market price of
Ksh 500 (just under $6.25). This treatment arm is meant to capture the no-subsidy status quo
in Kenya, where over-the-counter ACTs are expensive and RDTs are not available outside a few
health facilities.' 2 The second group received the ACT subsidy only, meant to reflect outcomes
under the planned form of the AMFm in Kenya (i.e. without RDTs). Within the "ACT subsidy
only" group, households were randomly assigned to a subsidy level of 92, 88 or 80 percent. Since
the AMFm is a top-of-the-supply-chain subsidy, with a floating final retail price, we chose subsidy
levels that correspond to final prices likely to capture the range one would see across drug shops in
Kenya.13 The third group received vouchers for both subsidized ACTs and RDTs, with households
also randomized into one of three RDT subsidy levels. The most expensive RDTs were subsidized
by 85 percent, corresponding to a retail price of roughly $0.20.14
Since ACTs are priced by dose, with the appropriate dose determined by age, the four ACT
subsidy levels (0, 80, 88 and 92 percent) differed in the "price-per-pill" to which a household was
entitled. Figure A2 in the Appendix demonstrates the pricing and dosing regimens in the study.15
The randomization of households was done using a computerized random number assignment algo-
"In rare cases when there was no female head or she was not available, we interviewed the male head of household.
The ACT used in this study was Coartem (Artemether Lumefantrine), produced by Novartis. The RDT was the
ICT Malaria Pf test, produced by ICT Diagnostics. This type of test only detects the Plasmodium falciparum strain
of malaria, which accounts for 98 percent of all malaria infections in Kenya and is by far the most deadly strain of
malaria (Kenya Division of Malaria Control 2011).
1
2 The rationale behind distributing a voucher for unsubsidized ACTs to the control group was to harmonize the
level of "endorsement" of the local drug shop across groups, as well as harmonize the amount of information (about
effectiveness and availability) provided about ACTs across groups.
1
3 This price range also roughly corresponds to the price span from the cheapest to the most expensive non-ACT
antimalarials available in drug shops in our area of study.
1
4 Some households received RDTs for free, some received RDTs subsidized at 85 percent, and some were offered
a refund for the 85 percent subsidized RDT if they tested positive. In practice, we find few substantive differences
across these groups in RDT take-up and composition of ACT buyers, so we pool them together for simplicity. For
additional detail on the separate RDT treatments, see Cohen et al. (2010).
i"Ideal dosing is based on weight but manufacturers and the Kenyan Ministry of Health provide age guidelines
as well, as it is not always feasible to weigh malaria patients. This study used the age guidelines from the Kenya
Ministry of Health.
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rithm and was stratified by drug shop, by the household's distance to the drug shop (in quartiles)
and by the presence of children in the household.
As discussed in the previous section, the success of a subsidy policy depends upon the fraction
of malaria positive people who do not receive an ACT under the policy (UT) and the fraction of
malaria negative people taking ACTs under the policy (OT). To estimate these policy parameters, a
sub-sample of households in all the treatment groups other than the no subsidy group was randomly
selected to get a "surprise RDT".16 If these households came to the drug shop to redeem their ACT
voucher, but did not redeem an RDT voucher (either because they didn't have one or because they
chose not to) they were asked whether they would be willing to take an RDT for free, after they had
paid for the ACT. Over the three-month period during which we conducted this exercise, 93 percent
of those offered the surprise RDT consented to be tested (or consented for their sick dependent to
be tested). All RDTs given at the drug shop were performed by trained study officers posted at
the shop. If the patient (the person for whom the ACT voucher was redeemed) had not come to
the shop, one of the two study officers accompanied the client back home in order to perform the
test on the patient. No one was selected for a surprise RDT in the no subsidy group because we
anticipated very low take-up of the ACT in this group. (Indeed, only 8 households redeemed an
ACT voucher in this group).
At the end of the experiment we visited households again to administer an endline survey. Only
5 percent of households surveyed at baseline were not reached at endline, and attrition was balanced
across treatment arms (Figure 2).
3.4.2 Data
We use two types of data in the analysis that follows. The first is the administrative data based
on redemptions at the drug shop, and the second is survey data from baseline and endline surveys
administered at the beginning and end of the study.
The administrative data captures the details of the drug shop transaction (including medicines
bought, symptoms, patient characteristics, and true malaria status in case an RDT was adminis-
tered). This data was recorded by a trained enumerator posted at the drug shop during opening
hours, every single day throughout the study period. This data includes information on over 1,700
drug shop visits made by study households over a four-month period.
The endline survey was administered about four months after the vouchers had been distributed.
It asked households to recall all illness episodes that involved fever, chills, headache, sweats, nausea,
cough, or diarrhea, that the household experienced in the previous four months. For each of these
episodes, we collected information about symptoms, where treatment was sought, what type of
malaria test (if any) was taken and what medications were purchased.
We use these two sources of data in combination. First, because it includes malaria status (based
1649 percent of households not offered an RDT, 71 percent of households offered an RDT for Ksh 15, and 100
percent of households offered a free RDT were selected for surprise testing.
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on an RDT test result) for over 1,300 presumed malaria episodes, the administrative data enables us
to estimate the relationship between reported symptoms and malaria positivity. The administrative
data is also used to explore the impact of subsidies on the uptake of ACTs and RDTs and on the
targeting of ACTs toward malaria positive people at the drug shop. In particular, we use voucher
redemption data to measure the demand for ACTs and RDTs at the drug shop. Furthermore, we
use the subsample of households selected for a surprise RDT to tell us what fraction of ACT buyers
at the drug shop are truly malaria positive.
In order to gauge the overall impact of the ACT and RDT subsidies on uptake and targeting,
however, we have to know how our sample treated illnesses that did not appear at the drug shop.
The endline data allows us to estimate the impact of the subsidies on ACT and RDT uptake for all
illness episodes, regardless of where they were treated, but the endline data alone is not informative
about the issue of targeting. For that, we would need to know the true malaria status of each illness
treated by our households throughout the study. While we cannot observe actual positivity, we can
proxy for it based on reported symptoms, since we know from the administrative data what the
mapping is between reported symptoms and actual malaria status. (The details of how we estimate
malaria positivity are presented in Section 5.1).
One concern is that households in our ACT subsidy treatments would remember significantly
more illness episodes, (if the vouchers served to jog their memory or make an illness episode more
salient, for example). We do not find any significant evidence of this - Appendix Table Al shows
that there are no systematic differences in illness reporting at endline across treatment groups. After
the endline survey we informed households that their vouchers had expired, and we collected unused
vouchers back from households. 17
3.4.3 Characteristics of Study Sample
In Table 1 we present basic household characteristics and test for balance across treatment groups.
We interviewed the female household head roughly 90 percent of the time. These women are
typically married, with five years of education and four dependents. Literacy rates are roughly
60 percent. On average, households live 1.66 kilometers from the drug shop for which vouchers
were given and 6.5 kilometers from the nearest public health facility. While roughly 40 percent of
households had heard of ACTs at baseline, less than 15 percent had heard of RDTs. Columns (4)-(6)
present p-values on F-tests for differences in baseline characteristics across treatment groups. There
are no significant differences across treatment groups, other than for the number of acres owned and
the age distribution in the household. In particular, our control group has slightly older household
heads, with, as a consequence, a significantly higher fraction of adults and lower fraction of infants.
Since age is highly correlated with malaria incidence, a lack of balance across treatment groups in
the age composition of households could confound estimates of treatment assignment on uptake and
'
7 As compensation, all households were given a tin of cooking fat at endline regardless of whether or not they
returned any vouchers to us.
targeting, even though the magnitudes of the age differences is not large. In all of the results that
follow we therefore control for the age of the household head.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Predicting Malaria Positivity
As highlighted by the model, a household's optimal treatment plan for a given illness should vary
with the household's subjectively assessed probability that the illness is malaria. Furthermore, in
order to estimate the impact of ACT and RDT subsidies on targeting, we need to be able to assess
the malaria status of all illness episodes, not just those treated at the drug shop. Unfortunately, we
can only observe actual malaria status for those illness episodes given an RDT at the drug shop.
To address this, we use data on illness-specific characteristics to impute a malaria probability
to the universe of illness episodes enumerated at endline. We impute probabilities based on the
following probit model, fit to all illnesses that were RDT tested at the drug shop (either due to
voluntary redemption or surprise testing) over the course of the study:
POSeh -- 0 + symp'eh6 + age'hA + (symp x overl4)'h'y + ee
where Poseh is a dummy variable equal to 1 if episode e in household h tested RDT positive for
malaria, sympeh is a vector of symptom dummies including cough, chills, headache, diarrhea, runny
nose, vomiting, body pain, malaise/fatigue, and poor appetite, ageeh is a vector including the
patient's age, age squared, and a dummy variable indicating that the patient is aged 14 or older
(an "adult"). We also interact all the symptom dummies with this indicator, to allow for a different
relationship between malaria positivity and symptoms among younger and older patients.18
The results of this regression are presented in Table 3. Our estimates are consistent with clinical
indicators of malaria (CDC 2011) - chills and body pain are positively correlated with malaria
positivity, while cough is robustly negatively correlated with malaria positivity. Table 3 also reveals
that age correlates very strongly with malaria positivity. Although the interaction terms make the
trend somewhat difficult to infer, children (aged 13 and under) who seek care at the drug shop
are substantially more likely to actually have malaria as compared to adults (the relevant fractions
testing positive are 38 percent for adults and 83 percent for children). While striking, these results
are not entirely unexpected - young children are substantially more vulnerable to malaria, as they
do not benefit from the acquired immunity that develops with repeated exposure to the parasite.
On the other hand, our results are for a selected sample of episodes that households suspected to
be malaria and therefore chose to treat at the drug shop. In this case, it is not obvious that an age
18We do not include the most commonly cited symptom of malaria, fever, in order to avoid endline reporting bias.
In Kiswahili (the interview language for our respondents), the word for "fever" and "malaria' are the same - "homa".
A concern is that if the ACT subsidy increased ACT taking, respondents would be more likely to identify the illness
as malaria, and therefore report homa as a symptom at endline.
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gradient should be apparent. The presence of the age gradient suggests that households are less
adept at identifying malaria in older individuals, possibly because the symptoms are less severe and
overlap with other milder diseases, such as cold and flu.
One concern with our predicted positivity measure is that the probit model is fit to a selected
sample of illness episodes, while we use the results to impute malaria positivity to the universe
of illness episodes (including illnesses very unlikely to be malaria, such as allergies). As such,
the imputed probabilities are likely biased upwards at the bottom of the distribution. However,
when making ordinal, rather than cardinal comparisons with respect to predicted probability our
measure will still be useful as long as the predicted probabilities are directionally correct. Similarly,
when using predicted probability to assess targeting (the impact of RDTs on policy parameter T,
the share of ACT takers who have malaria), we only need that predicted probability is consistent
for actual probability conditional on taking an ACT or RDT. When this is the case, the Appendix
illustrates that use of predicted probability will bias our estimates down, so our reliance on predicted
probability implies that our results will be lower bounds.
3.5.2 Status Quo Treatment-Seeking Behavior
As highlighted by the model, the impact of the two subsidy regimes under study will depend on the
relative value of the three possible malaria treatment-seeking behaviors (buying ACTs at the drug
shop, going to the health center, other) across malaria risk levels. To get a sense of how these three
options compare in the absence of a subsidy, Figure 3 plots the frequency of these three possible
actions by predicted positivity among the control group. The figure graphs results of local linear
regressions of the following form:
yeh = 9 (predposeh) + E ch (3.3)
where Yeh is the outcome of interest for episode e in household h and predposh is predicted positivity.
We present the results for all control group households in Panel A, and separately by SES (proxied by
head literacy) in Panels B and C. To avoid overweighting households with many illness episodes and
to ensure that results are consistent with the analysis that follows, we only include each household's
first illness episode following the baseline survey in all the regressions. Solid gray vertical lines
demarcate overall tertiles of predicted positivity, while the dashed gray vertical line demarcates the
median.19
The figure highlights a sharp contrast in treatment-seeking behavior by SES. For literate house-
holds, the likelihood of taking a non- or sub-therapeutic action is clearly decreasing with malaria
positivity, in favor of health center visits, while purchase of ACTs at the drug store begins increas-
ing only in the top two tertiles of the malaria positivity distribution. We can draw a number of
. 19 We calculated quantiles using all first illness episodes for both treatment groups and the control group. We do
not update these quantiles when conducting subgroup analysis.
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conclusions from these patterns. First, they suggest that our predicted positivity measure captures
important heterogeneity in illness episodes that determine treatment seeking behavior. Second,
literate households appear to make accurate assessments as to their malaria likelihood, and their
treatment decisions appear consistent with the scenario for "the rich" described in the theory section
and illustrated in Figure 1. For literate households, we therefore expect that the ACT subsidy will
have a modest impact on ACT access for the truly sick (a modest decrease in UT - the share of
true malaria episodes that remain untreated with an ACT), and a potentially large increase in OT
(the share of non-malaria episodes that are treated with an ACT), since most of the crowd out will
come from the health center.
The patterns for illiterate households in Panel C are notably different. The share of illness
episodes treated at the health center is very low overall and declines sharply in the upper tertile of
positivity. The share of episodes for which an ACT is bought at the drug shop is exceptionally low
(likely due to the high retail price of ACTs) and increases only weakly with malaria positivity. This is
consistent with the scenario for "the poor" discussed in the theory section and illustrated in panel B
of Figure 1. The fact that low SES households overwhelmingly do not seek care at the health center,
despite the fact that the health center provides (at least in principle) free ACTs, implies that the cost
of visiting the health center must be quite high. Even though treatment at the health center is free,
the health center is on average 6.5 kilometers away as the crow flies (compared to 1.7 km away for the
drug shop). Reaching the health center might therefore require taking costly public transportation,
or walking for 1 to 2 hours, something that might be difficult during an illness episode. Overall,
the baseline treatment-seeking patterns we observe among illiterate households suggest that, under
an ACT subsidy regime, crowd-out of the health center is likely to be minimal for this group, since
they are much less likely to seek care at the health center in any case. Instead, the crowd-out is
more likely to come from those that choose non- or sub-therapeutic options. Furthermore, if the
ACT subsidy draws high positivity illiterate households to the drug shop (that is, crowd-in from
illiterates substantially decreases UT), this could have attractive implications in terms of both ACT
access and targeting.
3.5.3 The Impact of Subsidies on Treatment Seeking Behavior
We now study whether two different treatment regimes - ACT subsidy only and ACT+RDT subsidy
significantly impact households' treatment seeking behavior vis-d-vis the status quo. To focus on
the subsidy versus no subsidy comparison, we pool the three ACT subsidy treatments (92 percent,
88 percent, and 80 percent) into a single group.20 Since households were only given two ACT and
2 0 The mix of subsidized ACT prices in the "no RDT subsidy" and "RDT subsidy" treatment groups are slightly
different. As such, any differential effects due to the different price mixes will load onto the "RDT subsidy" dummy.
However, results for the RDT treatment are nearly identical if we separately dummy out ACT prices and constrain
the RDT treatment effect to be constant across subsidized ACT price levels. We therefore present the pooled results
for ease of interpretation.
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(when relevant) RDT vouchers, we limit the roster of endline illness episodes to the first episode
following the baseline survey to ensure that all households had the option of using a voucher if
they so desired.2 1 We also exclude all ACT-only households who were randomly selected for a
surprise RDT test from the endline data analysis, as the surprise test could impact their choice of
treatment. We do not exclude surprise tested households who received RDT vouchers - 80 percent
of these households chose to use their RDTs when going to the drug shop anyway, and F-tests of the
significance of surprise testing selection for the ACT+RDT group confirm that the surprise testing
had no significant impact on behavior.22
We first examine the impact of subsidies graphically by presenting the results of treatment-group
specific local linear regressions specified by equation 3.3 in Figure 4. Panel A illustrates results
separately for each of the three treatment-seeking behaviors discussed earlier (buying ACTs at the
drug shop, visiting the health center, or doing something else). We present evidence of the impacts
for the full sample in panel A. Since literate and illiterate households exhibit very different behavior
under the status quo, we present evidence of the impact of the two subsidy regimes separately by
literacy status in panels B and C.
Panel A shows that both subsidy regimes led to an increase in the likelihood that households
buy an ACT at the drug shop across the entire range of predicted positivity. The uniform increase
masks different crowd out patterns by predicted positivity, however. In particular, crowd out of the
health center is largely concentrated in the upper tertiles of predicted positivity, while crowd out of
no or sub-therapeutic care occurs across all ranges of predicted positivity. (Our subsequent analysis
will show that this pattern captures two different types of crowdout - doing nothing at low malaria
probabilities, versus purchasing a substandard malaria treatment at higher malaria probabilities).
Panels B and C show that the effects of the subsidy regime are very different across literacy
groups. All the crowd-out for illiterate households is from no or sub-therapeutic care. For literate
households, there is important crowd out of the health center for the middle and upper tertiles of
positivity, and crowd out of no/subtherapeutic care in the lower tertile. This is consistent with our
theoretical scenario with heterogeneous impacts, as sketched in Figure 1.
In what follows, we analyze the impacts of the subsidy regimes on treatment-seeking behavior in
more detail. To do so, we unpack treatment seeking into three domains: (a) provider choice (where
to seek treatment) (b) use of diagnostic testing, and (c) drug choice. We then go on to study how
ACT price variation within a range of subsidized prices impacts ACT demand and targeting.
Provider Choice Table 4 estimates the effects of the subsidy regimes on health provider choice.
The first panel examines overall mean effects of the different subsidy regimes by presenting results
2 1Some households reported more than one member getting sick at once. In these cases, we include all concurrent
first episodes, and therefore cluster the standard errors in all illness episode regressions at the household level. Results
are similar, though slightly attenuated, if we also include second illness episodes following the baseline survey.
2 2 Consequently, our results are largely unchanged, though less precisely estimated, when excluding these surprise
tested households.
from the following regression:
Yeh = 0 + cACTsubh + f3RDTsubh + age'7 + / strata - Eeh (3.4)
where Yeh is the outcome of interest, ACTsubh is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household
was randomly allocated to either the ACT or ACT+RDT subsidy treatment group, RDTsubh is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household was randomly allocated to the ACT+RDT subsidy
treatment group, ageeh is the household head's age, and Astrata are strata fixed effects.23 Since
RDTsub is only equal to 1 when ACTsub is equal to 1, the coefficient a gives the difference
between the ACT only treatment group and the control, while 3 gives the difference between the
ACT only subsidy group and the ACT+RDT subsidy group.
The first three columns present results for all households and show that the ACT subsidy in-
creased treatment seeking at the drug shop by 15.9 percentage points (32 percent), while decreasing
treatment seeking at the health center by 7.6 percentage points (26 percent). Furthermore, the
subsidy encouraged care-seeking for a substantial number of illness episodes - the fraction of house-
holds not seeking any care decreased by 9 percentage points (41 percent) in both subsidy treatment
groups. These effects are significant at conventional levels (though only marginally so for the health
center). While the subsidy decreased rates of not seeking care for both illiterate- and literate-headed
households (though our estimates are just short of marginal significance for illiterates), only literate-
headed households were crowded out of the health center, as we had hypothesized given baseline
treatment-seeking behaviors. Our estimates of # illustrate that provider choice patterns in the ACT
and ACT+RDT treatment groups were essentially identical. This suggests that RDTs had a limited
extensive margin effect (they do not draw more illness episodes to the drug shop). We therefore
expect that any targeting effects of RDTs will be driven primarily by changes in medication taking
among households who would have come to the drug shop anyway (i.e. the intensive margin).
The second panel of Table 4 examines impacts of the subsidy treatments by tertile of predicted
malaria positivity. That is, we report results from the following regression:
3
Yeh = 6 + 1] (aj ACTsubh X tert jeh -- Oj RDTsubh x tertgeh) + Yage + A strata + &eh (3.5)
j=1
where tertjh is a dummy variable equal to 1 if episode e in household h is in tertile j of overall
predicted malaria positivity. 24 The first three columns in this panel illustrate that crowding into
the drug shop is most substantial in the first two tertiles of predicted positivity - with crowding out
2 3As mentioned earlier, we control for household head's age because the age composition of control households
is tilted more towards adults, as illustrated by Table 1. When head age is missing we recode it to the mean and
separately dummy these observations out.
2 4 Note that although the tertile dummies are generated regressors, the null hypothesis of interest specifies that
their coefficients are equal to zero. In this case, traditional standard errors are consistent (Newey and McFadden
1994).
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from doing nothing concentrated in the lower tertile of predicted positivity and crowding out from
the health center concentrated in the middle tertile of predicted positivity (note, however, that we
can only reject that crowd-out patterns are the same across tertiles for "sought no care").
These impacts are largely concentrated among literate-headed households - this observation,
coupled with the increase in ACT purchases by illiterate-headed households observed in Figure 4,
suggests that illiterate-headed households may not have substantially changed where they went,
but may have substantially changed what they bought. That said, general patterns with respect to
health center and no care crowd out are similar for illiterate-headed households (indeed, the overall
point estimate for "sought no care" suggests a nontrivial reduction for illiterated-headed households
due to the subsidy). A notable exception is that we estimate that the ACT and ACT+RDT subsidy
treatments significantly increase rates of seeking no care for the middle tertile of illiterate-headed
households. However, this result is most likely aberration - the control group in the middle tertile
cell is relatively small, and the estimates are not robust to recalculating positivity tertiles within
the subset of illness episodes among illiterate-headed households.
Diagnostic Testing The ACT subsidies clearly draw additional households to the drug shop,
sometimes at the expense of the health center. A primary concern with this particular form of
crowd out is that it will reduce access to diagnostic services. Figure 5 and Table 5 conduct analyses
analogous to those just discussed, but with indicators of malaria testing as outcomes of interest.
Panel A of Figure 5 graphs how reported rates of RDT testing, microscopy testing, and the superset,
"any malaria test" vary with treatment group and predicted malaria positivity. The ACT+RDT
subsidy significantly increased rates of RDT taking, which is to be expected. Furthermore, we
find no evidence of crowd out of microscopy overall, despite health center crowd out. (Although
microscopy results in Panels B and C of Figure 5 suggest some impacts of the treatments on rates of
microscopy testing, our analysis by positivity tertile in Table 5 finds no significant impacts.) Overall,
the ACT+RDT subsidy regime nearly doubled the share of illness episodes tested for malaria, from
a base of 21.6 percent in the control group up to 42.6 percent.2 5
These large impacts reflect a very high willingness to experiment with RDTs in our sample. As
mentioned earlier, over 80 percent of the ACT+RDT treatment households who sought care at the
drug shop chose to take an RDT test before deciding whether or not to purchase an ACT. One
important caveat is that we cannot tell whether health center crowd out leads to reduced use of
other types of diagnostic tests. Although an RDT test provides a very useful signal as to whether
or not to take an antimalarial, households faced with a negative test result may then face a great
deal of uncertainty as to what to take instead. In this situation, consultation with a trained health
professional could be particularly valuable.
Table 5 also reveals some evidence that exposure to the ACT-only subsidy increased rates of
2 5This result is not driven by including the surprise tested RDT households. When excluding them, we estimate
a strikingly similar increase in testing of 21.5 percentage points.
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RDT test taking for illiterate households. This is likely due to the fact that, at each study drug
shop, we had to make RDTs available for general purchase at cost (Ksh 50, or $0.64) so as not to
deny any households access to diagnostics if they had not received an RDT voucher but had heard
about tests being performed at the drug shop and asked for one. We did not advertise for this,
but nevertheless some households coming to the study drug shop to redeem ACT vouchers asked to
purchase an RDT at the general price.
Drug Choice Finally, we study the impact of the subsidy regimes on access to ACTs and other
medications. Figure 6 presents local linear regression results for whether or not an illness was:
1)treated with an ACT, 2) treated with some other ineffective antimalarial or an antipyretic (which
could improve symptoms but not clear malaria infection), or 3) treated with an antibiotic. Table
6 presents the analogous regression analysis. Overall, both subsidy treatments increase access to
ACTs by almost 60 percent. The results by literacy reveal desirable distributional properties-of the
subsidy. In the control group, literate-headed households are substantially more likely to take an
ACT at all levels of malaria positivity (36.5 percent of illness episodes in control literate-headed
households were treated with an ACT, as compared to 10.8 percent of episodes in control illiterate-
headed households). However, the two subsidy treatments substantially decrease the access gap -
illiterate-headed households in the ACT treatment groups took an ACT 38 percent of the time,
whereas their literate-headed counterparts took an ACT 44.6 percent of the time.
Furthermore, the subsidy regimes crowded out the use of less effective malaria therapies and
antibiotics at higher levels of predicted positivity. Inspection of the graphs and Table 6 reveal that
this is concentrated among literate-headed households. In the upper tertile of predicted positivity,
the subsidy treatments decreased these households' use of substandard malaria therapies by 28-29
percentage points and antibiotics by 19-20 percentage points. Yet at the same time, ACT access
did not significantly increase. This could be driven by a "lowest cost first" approach to malaria
treatment. Specifically, a household may first treat a suspected case of malaria with an antipyretic
or low-cost antimalarial, hoping that the illness gets better. If the illness does not improve, the
household may then try taking a more expensive ACT. If literate-headed households were following
this approach and the ACT subsidy made ACTs the "first response" choice to suspected malaria
cases, this could generate the patterns in our data.
Overall, rates of ACT taking are similar in the ACT and ACT+RDT treatment groups. The
RDT treatment did not significantly change rates of ACT taking in any of the predicted positivity
tertiles. However, there is some evidence that RDTs actually increased use of antibiotics in the
lowest tertile of malaria positivity. This suggests that some individuals may have still taken an
ACT just to be safe, but also took other medication in case they were indeed malaria negative.
Summary To summarize, our results comparing the subsidy treatments to the control imply that:
* Both subsidies increased treatment seeking at the drug shop. No care is crowded out at the
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lowest malaria positivity tertile, while the health center is crowded out in the middle tertile.
" The add-on RDT subsidy significantly increases access to diagnostics for malaria, doubling
the share of illness episodes that received a malaria test. The ACT-only subsidy does not
significantly reduce access to microscopy.
" Both subsidy regimes significantly increase access to ACTs. The gain is particularly pro-
nounced among illiterate-headed households, who have the lowest rates of access in the control
group.
Both subsidy regimes represent a substantial improvement versus the status quo. However, these
results are not informative about differences in outcomes between different subsidized price levels.
This is important for two reasons: First, the final retail price of ACTs is uncertain under the
AMFm. If access falls sharply as the retail price creeps up from the official target price, a larger
subsidy may be warranted. Second, an important policy alternative to the AMFm would be to
divert some of the ACT subsidy to subsidies for RDTs. The attractiveness of this alternative will
depend both on the price elasticity of demand for ACTs across a range of subsidized prices, as well
as the benefits of RDTs in terms of improving targeting and access to illness-appropriate treatment.
The next subsection investigates these issues by exploiting the within-subsidy price variation in our
experimental design.
3.5.4 Within-Subsidy Price Variation, ACT Access, and ACT Targeting
We begin by asking whether higher subsidized ACT prices significantly decrease ACT access. To do
so, we make use of two different data sources. First, we use administrative data from the drug shop
to determine whether or not higher voucher prices resulted in fewer ACT purchases. These results
shed light on the impact of price variation on ACT demand within the private sector. However,
overall changes in access will depend on public sector crowd out as well. Consider increasing the
price of an adult ACT dose from Ksh 40 (a 92 percent subsidy) to Ksh 100 (an 80 percent subsidy).
If the marginal episodes crowded out of the drug shop instead go to the health center and obtain an
ACT anyway, then the net impact on access will be zero. In contrast, if the marginal episodes instead
do nothing or take a less effective antimalarial, then overall access will decline. To study overall
impacts on access, we exploit our endline data (again, excluding those households who received no
RDT voucher and who were selected for surprise testing).
Table 7 contrasts results from our administrative drug shop data and endline data. In order
to focus on within-subsidy impacts, we exclude the control group from this analysis. For the drug
shop analysis, we include all households in all treatment arms, and present results of the following
regression:
Yh = /o + 01ACT88h + /32ACT80h + f3ACT92 x RDTh --04ACT88 x RDTh + (3.6)
p35ACT80 x RDTh + ageey + /\strata + Eh
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where ACT88h, ACT80h, and ACT92h are dummy variables for the three different ACT subsidy
treatments, RDTh is a dummy variable for the RDT subsidy treatment, and yA is the outcome
of interest. The table presents results for three outcomes: whether or not a household used an
ACT voucher at the drug shop (this is equal to zero for households who never redeemed any
vouchers), whether the household used an ACT voucher for a patient aged 13 and below, and
whether the household used an ACT voucher for a patient aged 14 and older. We only consider
voucher redemption for the first visit to the drug shop, as surprise testing could have changed a
household's subsequent redemption behavior. We also present results of a specification where we
constrain the impact of ACT price (in USD) on outcomes to be linear:
y =,3o + f1ACTpriceh + 02RDTh + B3ACTprice x RDTh + agenhY + Astrata + Eh (3.7)
The first column of Table 7 reveals minimal impacts of higher ACT prices on ACT access at the
drug shop. Increasing the ACT price by 150 percent (from Ksh 40 to Ksh 100) decreases the share of
households using an ACT voucher by 5.5 percentage points (a decline of 13 percent), which implies
a price elasticity of demand of just -0.084 over the subsidy range we consider. This is considerably
lower than the price elasticity of the demand for malaria-preventing bednets estimated by Cohen
and Dupas (2010) in the same area of Kenya. However, a comparison of columns 2 and 3 reveal
strikingly different patterns by age. Specifically, households are slightly more likely to use an ACT
voucher for a child at higher prices, while they are significantly less likely to use an ACT voucher
for an adult (the implied price elasticity of demand for adults is -0.318). This likely reflects the
fact that the price of an ACT dose declines with age. Since we only use information on the first
voucher redemption, this could generate the appearance of an upward sloping demand curve for
doses for young children if households are willing to treat all ages at the high subsidy level, but only
young children at the lower subsidy level (in this case, the overall estimated elasticity of demand
will correspond to the elasticity of demand for children). Since malaria positivity is substantially
higher at younger ages, this price selection is potentially advantageous from a targeting perspective.
The first three columns do not reveal many significant impacts of RDTs on ACT access. However,
this result does not have a clear interpretation. RDTs may reduce rates of ACT taking by screening
out malaria negative patients. At the same time, RDTs may also have a selection effect (though our
earlier results suggest this may be limited) by which more households may choose to come to the
drug shop to use their vouchers. The combined impact of these two effects are of ambiguous sign.
The next three columns present comparable results from our endline data. The first column
presents results using all first illness episodes, whereas the second column limits the sample to first
episodes in which the patient was aged 13 or younger. The final column presents results for first
episodes among individuals aged 14 and above. Although less precisely estimated, our endline data
generates similar point estimates and similar patterns of demand by age. This implies that the
adults screened out by the higher price at the drug shop did not obtain ACTs elsewhere. Moreover,
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there is suggestive (though statistically insignificant) evidence that RDTs were useful for targeting,
particularly at the highest subsidy level - they increased the share of ACT takers among children
while decreasing the share among adults, who were less likely to be malaria positive.
Table 8 studies targeting more directly, again making use of both our administrative (redemp-
tion) data and endline data. All columns present regressions of the same forms specified by equations
3.6 and 3.7, but limited to ACT takers. We also omit strata and age controls so as not to absorb
selection effects. 26 In the first three columns, we use the sample of ACT redemptions in which the
patient was also selected to receive a surprise RDT test to study the relationship between ACT
prices, RDTs, and actual positivity at the drug shop (that is, we study the impact of the RDT
subsidy on policy parameter T at the drug shop). The results indicate that both prices and RDTs
improve targeting - higher prices and RDT provision are associated with higher rates of positivity.
Furthermore, RDTs appear to be particularly valuable at the highest level of ACT subsidy. These
impacts are concentrated among adult patients, and are very large. Just 21 percent of adults who
took ACTs in the 92 percent ACT subsidy only group were actually malaria positive. Increasing
the ACT price by 50 percent (to the 88 percent subsidy) more than doubles this share, as does
providing an RDT at the highest subsidy level.
The next three columns of Table 8 examine impacts on predicted positivity (here we include ACT
takers who were and were not selected for the surprise test). If our predicted positivity measure
performs well, patterns should be similar to what we observe using actual positivity data. This is
broadly what we observe, though point estimates are substantially attenuated. This is expected - as
illustrated in the Appendix, using predicted positivity instead of actual positivity will bias targeting
estimates down. Our endline results should therefore be taken as a conservative lower bound on
actual targeting impacts.
The final three columns make use of our endline sample of first illness episodes and the predicted
positivity measure. Point estimates in column 7 suggest that higher prices and RDTs increase
positivity among ACT takers, though estimates are not significantly different from zero. However,
our results are similar to the administrative results using predicted positivity - this suggests our
initial results using actual positivity in the surprise tested population may be an accurate assessment
of overall targeting impacts.
However, comparing the overall endline results to separate results by age group reveals an
apparent puzzle. Consider specification 2 - the RDT main effect is positive overall, but negative
when conducting the analysis for subgroups based on age. This is because the overall positive effect
is driven by shifting the age distribution of ACT takers towards children aged 13 and younger.
Since younger children have higher predicted positivity, cutting the sample by age will wash out
this composition effect.
Figure 7 provides a graphical summary of our targeting results, comparing the distribution of
predicted positivity among endline ACT takers in four different policy regimes: no ACT subsidy
2 6Our three subsidy price treatment groups are balanced in terms of age of the household head.
(the control group), high (92 percent) ACT subsidy-no RDT, low (80 percent) ACT subsidy-no
RDT, and low ACT subsidy-RDT. Overall, the low ACT subsidy-RDT regime appears to perform
the best, though we cannot reject that the distributions are all equivalent.
Taking our point estimates at face value, we estimate that moving from the 92 percent ACT
subsidy-no RDT regime to the 80 percent ACT subsidy with RDT regime would increase predicted
positivity among ACT takers by 5 percentage points (off of a base of 65.8 percent) while leaving the
share of illness episodes treated with an ACT virtually unchanged. This estimate relies on predicted
positivity and may be a substantial underestimate, however - our estimates using actual positivity
among drug shop clients imply the targeting benefit would be around 24 percentage points. How
beneficial are these changes? The next section takes our estimates and puts them in sharper focus
by calculating a variety of cost-effectiveness metrics for the different subsidy regimes.
3.6 Cost Effectiveness
3.6.1 Methodology
In order to assess the benefits of the different subsidy regimes, we construct estimates of the three
policy parameters outlined in Section 3:
" UT: The share of malaria episodes that are not treated with ACTs
* OT: The share of non-malaria episodes that are treated with ACTs
" T: The share of ACT takers who actually have malaria
These parameters assess how well the subsidy regimes perform in terms of access (making sure
malaria positive patients get ACTs) and targeting (minimizing the number of malaria negative
patients taking ACTs). However, the subsidy optimization problem is subject to a budget constraint,
so we also calculate the following measures of subsidy cost:
" The subsidy cost per malaria episode - this captures overall program costs
" The subsidy cost per ACT taken by a malaria positive individual
We make use of our endline data and predicted positivity estimates to calculate the metrics above.
Specifically, among the first illness episode sample, we run regressions of the form specified by
equation 3.7, where outcomes of interest include (1) the share of episodes treated with an ACT,
(2) the share of episodes treated with an RDT, and (3) predicted positivity among ACT/RDT
takers and non-takers. We then predict values of each outcome for each ACT-RDT subsidy regime
included in our experimental design. Since the subsidy cost of ACTs, malaria positivity, and the
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price elasticity of ACT demand varies with patient age, we perform these calculations separately
for adults (aged 14 and older) and children (aged 13 and younger).2
In terms of costs, we assume that each RDT costs $0.51 to subsidize. (This is equal to 85 percent
of the cost we paid to obtain the RDTs - subsidizing RDTs on a very large scale could bring this
cost down since we only ordered a small quantity of tests). The Global Fund currently provides two
different scenarios for per-dose subsidy amounts (Roll Back Malaria 2011). For each age group we
took the midpoint of the two scenarios, assumed this would be the subsidy cost in our 92 percent
scenario, and scaled the other subsidy amounts accordingly. We then combined the subsidy cost
and demand/targeting estimates and aggregated up to the population level using the observed age
distribution of illness episodes to calculate our measures of subsidy performance.
In addition to our ordinary estimates, we calculated cost effectiveness measures for the ACT+RDT
regimes in a "perfect adherence" scenario. Here, we assumed that demand for RDTs was unchanged,
but that compliance with test results was perfect, in that only patients who test malaria positive
take ACTs.
3.6.2 Results
Table 9 presents results of our cost effectiveness calculations. Panel A reveals results that are
consistent with our earlier targeting and demand results. Most regimes perform comparably in
terms of UT, although somewhat surprisingly the ACT 92, no RDT regime performs worst, while
the ACT 92+RDT regime performs best. The driver of this result can be found in Table 7 - ACT
taking is highest among adults and lowest among children in the high subsidy-no RDT regime, while
highest among children and lower among adults once RDTs are provided.
The results for policy parameter OT reveal that both price and RDTs are effective tools for
limiting overtreatment. Here, RDTs appear to be most valuable at higher ACT subsidy levels. This
is intuitive - when diagnosis is uncertain lower ACT prices will select more "marginal" illnesses that
are less likely to be malaria. When RDTs are sufficiently low cost to be attractive to these marginal
cases, the test has the potential to provide a great deal of screening value. Indeed, this is apparent
in Table 8 - the benefit of RDTs is largest at the highest ACT subisdy level.
We also note that comparing changes in UT and OT across regimes conforms to our theoretical
predictions regarding RDTs. The introduction of RDTs reduce both UT and OT, so T consequently
increases (this is Result 2). Although UT increases slightly with price across the ACT+RDT regimes
(as predicted by Result 1), the measure is essentially flat in the ACT-only regimes - this is largely
driven by the very low price elasticity of demand across the range of subsidies that we consider.
Taken together, the results in columns 1-3 suggest that a slight increase in the subsidized price
27 As illustrated by Figure A2, ACTs come in 4 different dose sizes, determined by age. Since we do not have
sufficient sample size to estimate predicted outcomes for each age group separately, we assume that outcomes are
equivalent for all young children. We then combine these estimates with the age distribution in the population and
the four different dose sizes to calculate cost effectiveness metrics.
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of ACTs could have beneficial targeting impacts while not harming ACT access. However, these
results do not imply that a subsidy is unwarranted - the stark differences in access between our
subsidy group and the control group presented in Table 6 make this very clear.
Should this saved subsidy money be shifted to RDTs? The RDT regimes perform better in
terms of targeting, but RDTs are also costly, as reflected by the last two columns of Table 9. In
particular, the 80 percent ACT subsidy with no RDTs performs just as well in terms of UT, OT,
and T as compared to the same subsidy level plus RDTs, but costs 19 percent less per malaria
positive episode treated with an ACT.
However, this does not imply that RDTs do not have the potential to be cost effective. RDT
noncompliance in our population was high - while we explicitly advised that patients aged 5 and
under take an ACT even when testing negative (consistent with WHO guidelines at the time of the
study), 49 percent of patients over 5 still took an ACT when RDT negative. This "cautiousness" in
learning from test results is not surprising given the fact that the status quo diagnostic technology
is often ignored by health practitioners and has a high rate of false negatives. While RDTs have
a lower rate of false negatives (5 percent), it might take some time for households to learn this.
Another possible explanation for the high ACT purchase rate after a negative RDT result observed
in our experiment is hoarding - households might have decided to buy the ACT dose and to keep it
for later (the next malaria episode). Such hoarding could have been encouraged by the experimental
design (if households were afraid the vouchers would expire or that the supply of ACTs at drug shops
would dry up). Both these issues (lack of information about RDTs and hoarding) could disappear
if an ACT+RDT subsidy were to be implemented as the steady state. It is therefore relevant to
consider the potential cost-effectiveness of RDTs in the case where compliance with RDT results
is improved. We present the "best case scenario" in Panel B of Table 9, where we assume tested
individuals only take ACTs when the RDT is positive.
Calculations for OT suggest that RDTs have great potential to limit overtreatment and improve
targeting. Furthermore, when RDT compliance is high, the additional cost of subsidizing them
is lower as they reduce the number of subsidized ACT doses consumed. Our results suggest that
moving from the 92 percent ACT subsidy regime to an 80 percent subsidy combined with RDTs
would reduce the cost per ACT to malaria positive person by 5 percent while reducing the share
of malaria negative illnesses treated with an ACT by 58 percent. Additional research is needed to
understand longer run use of and adherence to RDTs - without this information, it is difficult to
say how close steady state policy could come to our best case scenario.
Another important benefit of RDTs that are not captured by our calculations is that they may
increase the likelihood that a non-malaria illness is treated with appropriate medication promptly.
Indeed, we find that illnesses least likely to be malaria were more likely to be treated with an
antibiotic in the ACT+RDT treatment group. Given that pneumonia, a bacterial illness, is the
largest cause of childhood mortality, this benefit could be substantial, even if individuals who test
RDT negative continue to take ACTs.
3.7 Conclusion
There is a large class of health issues for which both under-medication and over-medication generate
negative spillovers. Under-medication is a public bad for any communicable disease, since the
number of untreated individuals increases transmission rates. Over-medication is a public bad
whenever the cost of treatment is subsidized. Over-medication is also a public bad when it leads to
drug resistance. For this class of health issues, it is thus critical to find the right balance between,
on one hand, access and affordability when the medicine is truly needed, and on the other hand,
disincentive to overuse the medicine.
Malaria is by far the deadliest in this class of health issues. Malaria kills close to 1 million
people each year because of lack of access to effective treatment (World Health Organization 2009).
At the same time, parasite resistance to treatment has been developing faster and faster with
each new generation of antimalarials. Learning how to reduce malaria mortality and morbidity
through prompt access to effective treatment, while at the same time limiting resistance to the
latest generation of antimalarials, the ACT, is one of the most pressing and important questions
facing the global health community today.
This paper is one step forward in the direction of answering this question. We use detailed
data on treatment-seeking behavior among close to 3,000 households in a malaria-endemic area of
Kenya, combined with an innovative experimental design that enables us to identify essential pieces
of the puzzle: the price elasticity of demand for effective medication, how demand for ACTs varies
by malaria risk level, and how access to proper diagnosis affects the demand for medication and
targeting. Our analysis leads to three main findings.
First, we find that the demand for ACTs is very elastic at unsubsidized prices, but inelastic
over a relatively large range of subsidized prices. This suggests that subsidies for ACTs are clearly
needed in order to increase rates of effective treatment among those that suffer from malaria, but
these subsidies need not be as large as currently planned by the donor community. Furthermore, we
find evidence that price is a useful tool for selection - slightly higher ACT prices reduce ACT taking
among adults, who are substantially less likely to be malaria positive, while leaving access among
young children unchanged. Second, we find that overdiagnosis of malaria is extremely common,
therefore ACT subsidies alone would lead to an important increase in inappropriate use of ACTs.
Third, we find that demand for Rapid Diagnostic Testing is extremely high when it is readily
affordable and available. Put together, these three findings suggest that bundling the currently
proposed ACT subsidy with a subsidy for Rapid Diagnostic Testing is critical in order to achieve
the goal of reducing the burden of malaria not only today, but also tomorrow.
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3.A Appendix: Predicted Positivity and Regression Bias
Here we illustrate the downward bias inherent in using predicted malaria positivity to assess tar-
geting impacts. We are interested in differences in outcomes between two groups: ACT subsidy, no
RDT (RDT = 0) and ACT+RDT subsidy (RDT = 1). We make the following assumptions:
1. Predicted positivity is an unbiased measure of a patient's actual malaria probability, condi-
tional on seeking either an ACT or RDT test : E [ireh] = 7Teh.
2. A share Q of patients in the RDT treatment group choose to take an RDT.
3. 100 percent of patients testing RDT positive for malaria take an ACT (this matches our data).
4. A fraction y E [0, 1] of patients testing RDT negative for malaria also take an ACT (RDT
adherence may depend on fr.
To measure targeting, we wish to estimate the difference in actual malaria positivity among ACT
takers in the RDT treatment and control groups. First, consider the sample of episodes that seek
malaria treatment (they take an ACT in the control, or they take an ACT or RDT in the treatment).
The share of malaria positive individuals who seek care in the control group can be expressed as:
E[r|RDT=0,care=1] = Ho
In the treatment group, there are two subgroups: those who choose to take an RDT (test = 1) and
those who choose to take an ACT without first redeeming their RDT voucher (test = 0). The share
of malaria positive individuals in these two groups can be expressed as:
E[ir|RDT=1,care=1,test=0] = H0
E[i|RDT=1,care=1,test=1] = ll
We can then express overall malaria positivity among care seekers in the RDT treatment group as:
E [r I RDT = 1, care = 1] = QHI + (1 - Q) HI = Hi
Note that if the RDT offer changes selection into treatment seeking, we may have Hi # Ho. In
particular, the RDT may select in "marginal" suspected malaria cases, in which case Hi1 < H0 .
In the control group, Ho is the share of ACT takers who test positive. In the treatment group, the
RDT will improve targeting: all of the HI positive episodes will take an ACT, but only
Qy (1 - HI) + (1 - Q) (1 - HO) of the negative episodes the will take an ACT. So, the share of
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ACT takers who are malaria positive in the treatment and control groups can be written as
So = Ho
SO = HIJ
Hil
11
Hy+ (1-0) >11
Hi
Si = @S1+(1-P)S? = H1+Y(1- HI)+(1- Q)(1- H) 1
= (fI+'r 1
where @= (')) -)is the share of treatment group patients taking the ACT who were
first tested with an RDT. If we could observe true positivity among all ACT takers, the regression:
pos = o 1RDT + e
(where we limit the sample to those who take ACTs) would give us what we seek:
E [4 1] = Si - So = 01
Which approaches (1 - Ho) when -f -+ 0 and Q -4 1. However, if we can only measure predicted
positivity, we will get:
E[41] = E[r IRDT=1,ACT= 1]-E[r|RDT=O,ACT=1]
= E[ir|RDT= 1,ACT= 1] -E[ir RDT=0,ACT= 1]
where the second equality holds by assumption 1. Furthermore, since there is no screening in the
control group: E [iir RDT = 0, ACT = 1) = Ho. However, RDT-induced screening in the
treatment group presents problems. First, we can decompose E [r I RDT = 1, ACT = 1] into
contributions from the tested and untested groups:
E[*IRDT=1,ACT=1] = (1-$)E[irj|RDT=1,ACT=1,test=0]+
E [i | RDT = 1, ACT = 1,test = 1]
Again, by assumption 1, the untested population poses no problems:
E [ir I RDT = 1, ACT = 1, test = 0] = So. The issue lies with the tested group - expected
positivity in the group that actually tests positive will always be less than one (too low), while
expected positivity in the group that actually tests negative (but still takes an ACT) will always
be greater than zero (too high).
Hi
E [ir ACT = 1,test = 1] = -E [ir ACT = 1,test = 1,pos = 1] +
Y(E [r ,ACT = 1, test = 1, pos = 0]
I +'Y (1 - Hil)
Now, by assumption 3
E [*2 |,test = 1]
E [ ACT= 1,test= 1,pos = 1] = E[z test = 1,pos = 1] =
Similarly, if we further assume that RDT noncompliance, y , is unrelated to r
E [* | ACT = 1,test = 1,pos = 0] = E [* | test = 1,pos = 0] = E[fl(-i*) I test 1
putting all of this together
E [F2 | ACT = 1, test = 11 (1 - -Y) + -UYIE[i| IACT=1I,test=1] =$j=+ ( rHi +7(1 -- J])
since E [72 I ACT = 1, test = 1] < lI1, the numerator is less than HI so $j < S1. Specifically:
E [1] = $ + (1 -0@) So - So
= 1 +qP (Si - SO)
This illustrates that our targeting estimates will be biased downwards - so much so that the sign
of /31 could actually flip to be negative. Of course, if some of the assumptions that we made are
violated in practice, the bias on our targeting estimates may be more complicated. (For example,
if RDT noncomplicance is positively correlated with 7r, then we could have $' > Sl). Very
generally, we can decompose the bias on #1 into three parts - one from estimation of predicted
positivity in the control group, one from estimation of predicted positivity among RDT non-takers
in the treatment group, and a final part from RDT takers in the treatment group:
E [1] = #1 + (So - $o) + (1 - 0) ($o - SO) + 0 ($' - Sl)
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Table 3-1:
Characteristics of Interviewed Household Head
Female
Age (years)
Education (years)
Literate
Married
Number Dependents
Household Characteristics
Number members
Fraction Adults (Ages 14+)
Fraction Infants (Under 4)
Acres Land
Distance from drug shop (km)
Distance from closest clinic (km)
Baseline Malaria Knowledge and Health Practices
Number bednets
Share HH members slept under net
Heard of ACTs
Heard of RDTs
Treats water regularly
Number of presumed malaria episode last month
Cost Per Episode (Among Those Seeking Any care)
Total Cost (US $)
Summary Statistics
0.867
41.7
5.10
0.575
0.783
4.12
5.48
0.623
0.113
2.72
1.68
6.57
1.77
0.561
0.399
0.128
0.408
1.20
0.895
38.8
5.36
0.621
0.789
4.07
5.29
0.582
0.139
2.08
1.66
6.55
1.77
0.585
0.425
0.153
0.390
1.20
0.907
38.8
5.54
0.621
0.777
4.13
5.34
0.580
0.141
2.28
1.67
6.60
1.78
0.573
0.427
0.140
0.416
1.23
0.292
0.041**
0.424
0.258
0.860
0.822
0.382
0.044**
0.033**
0.045**
0.873
0.919
0.994
0.450
0.519
0.365
0.648
0.985
0.125
0.036**
0.158
0.236
0.841
0.979
0.521
0.029**
0.018**
0.175
0.966
0.891
0.929
0.698
0.467
0.646
0.841
0.744
0.333
0.981
0.253
0.973
0.456
0.586
0.585
0.836
0.790
0.087*
0.809
0.635
0.875
0.455
0.904
0.375
0.190
0.508
1.63 1.54 1.68 0.694 0.825 0.405
2789
2646
2774
2782
2784
2663
2789
2337
2337
2250
2788
2785
2784
2661
2771
2786
2779
2789
1319
percent levels respectively.Notes: Household averages. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90
The exchange rate at the time of the study was around 78 Ksh to US$1.
Table 3-2: Baseline Treatment Seeking Behavior
By Household SES By Patient's Age
p-value Patient 13 Patietn 14 p-value
All Illiterate Literate Illit=Lit or Younger or Older Child=Adult
Household Level Malaria and Diagnostic Incidence
Number of presumed malaria episodes last month 1.22 1.36 0.994 0.000*** 0.617 0.568
At least one presumed malaria episode last month 0.685 0.739 0.600 0.000*** 0.435 0.387
Household member took RDT test (in last month) 0.029 0.034 0.023 0.077* - -
Household member took microscopy test (in last month) 0.180 0.209 0.133 0.000*** - -
Treatment Seeking for All Presumed Malaria Episodes
Did not seek care 0.182 0.260 0.147 0.000*** 0.139 0.218 0.000***
Went to health center 0.413 0.331 0.448 0.000*** 0.470 0.364 0.000***
Went to drug shop 0.369 0.354 0.376 0.337 0.357 0.382 0.159
Medication for All Presumed Malaria Episodes
No antimalarial taken 0.221 0.302 0.186 0.000*** 0.184 0.252 0.000***
Took ACT 0.213 0.120 0.255 0.000*** 0.240 0.193 0.002***
Took Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine (SP) 0.100 0.074 0.112 0.004*** 0.075 0.130 0.000***
Took Amodiaquine (AQ) 0.181 0.166 0.187 0.240 0.212 0.153 0.000***
Took Other Antimalarial 0.072 0.055 0.079 0.029** 0.095 0.050 0.000***
Forgot Name of Antimalarial Taken 0.217 0.285 0.185 0.000*** 0.198 0.225 0.089*
Source of Antimalarials (Among Antimalarial Takers)
Health Center 0.444 0.413 0.454 0.130 0.475 0.416 0.005***
Drug Shop 0.523 0.540 0.518 0.437 0.498 0.552 0.011**
Another Source 0.033 0.048 0.028 0.069* 0.027 0.032 0.414
Cost Per Episode (Among Antimalarial Takers)
Total Cost ($US) 1.68 1.38 1.80 0.014** 1.44 1.97 0.000***
Notes: Standard errors clustered at household level for episode-level statistics. * * and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90
percent levels respectively.
Table 3-3: Predicting Malaria Positivity - Probit Marginal Effects
Coefficient Standard Error
Cough -0.107*** (0.038)
Chills 0.096** (0.043)
Headache 0.021 (0.048)
Diarrhea -0.031 (0.046)
Runny Nose -0.020 (0.066)
Vomiting 0.008 (0.033)
Body Pain 0.118 (0.085)
Malaise -0.051 (0.087)
Poor Appetite -0.013 (0.038)
Age 14 or Above -0.017 (0.127)
Age 0.081*** (0.017)
Age Squared -0.007*** (0.001)
(Age 14 or Above) x Cough 0.017 (0.062)
(Age 14 or Above) x Chills -0.051 (0.074)
(Age 14 or Above) x Headache 0.016 (0.065)
(Age 14 or Above) x Diarrhea 0.057 (0.093)
(Age 14 or Above) x Runny Nose -0.365 (0.240)
(Age 14 or Above) x Vomiting 0.074 (0.051)
(Age 14 or Above) x Body Pain -0.168 (0.131)
(Age 14 or Above) x Malaise 0.055 (0.091)
(Age 14 or Above) x Poor Appetite 0.052 (0.075)
(Age 14 or Above) x Age -0.094*** (0.018)
(Age 14 or Above) x Age Squared 0.007*** (0.001)
DV Mean / N 0.702 1386
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes all individuals who were
tested with an RDT by the research team at the drugstore and had nonmissing
symptom and age data. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90
percent levels respectively.
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Table 3-4: Impact of ACT and RDT Subsidy on Treatment Seeking by Literacy and Predicted Malaria Probability
All Illiterate Literate
Sought Care Sought Care Sought Care Sought Care Sought Care Sought Care
at Drug at Health Sought No at Drug at Health Sought No at Drug at Health Sought No
Shop Center Care Shop Center Care Shop Center Care
Specification 1 - Main Effect
O ACT Subsidy 0.159*** -0.076* -0.091*** 0.072 0.002 -0.096 0.215*** -0.135** -0.085**
(0.047) (0.043) (0.036) (0.074) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.043)
# ACT Subsidy x RDT Subsidy 0.000 -0.006 0.006 -0.031 0.034 0.013 0.018 -0.025 0.001
(0.027) (0.023) (0.018) (0.046) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030) (0.021)
p-val for F-Test a+p=0 0.000*** 0.042** 0.010*** 0.530 0.468 0.138 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.037**
Specification 2 - Impact by Predicted Probability
ai ACT Subsidy * Lower Tertile 0.195*** -0.021 -0.186*** 0.054 0.080 -0.153 0.298*** -0.088 -0.221***
(0.071) (0.060) (0.062) (0.109) (0.077) (0.101) (0.097) (0.088) (0.078)
a2 ACT Subsidy * Middle Tertile 0.171** -0.182*** 0.010 0.091 -0.213 0.124** 0.201** -0.180** -0.024
(0.083) (0.075) (0.054) (0.165) (0.147) (0.060) (0.096) (0.088) (0.069)
03 ACT Subsidy * Upper Tertile 0.072 -0.047 -0.040 0.023 0.027 -0.097 0.120 -0.142 0.021
(0.089) (0.088) (0.047) (0.119) (0.088) (0.087) (0.129) (0.130) (0.048)
#1 (ACT x RDT) * Lower Tertile -0.009 -0.012 0.024 0.056 -0.010 -0.028 -0.064 -0.012 0.072*
(0.045) (0.037) (0.034) (0.070) (0.056) (0.060) (0.060) (0.052) (0.042)
#2 (ACT x RDT) * Middle Tertile -0.026 0.018 -0.005 -0.142* 0.054 0.081 0.036 -0.004 -0.047
(0.046) (0.040) (0.033) (0.084) (0.067) (0.063) (0.057) (0.050) (0.039)
#3 (ACT x RDT) * Upper Tertile 0.036 -0.024 -0.002 -0.016 0.065 -0.011 0.054 -0.055 -0.002
(0.043) (0.039) (0.023) (0.083) (0.065) (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.025)
p-val: ai + 01 = 0 0.004*** 0.542 0.005*** 0.253 0.279 0.043** 0.008*** 0.214 0.049**
p-val: a2 + #2 = 0 0.056* 0.019** 0.920 0.740 0.259 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.021** 0.245
p-val: 03 + /3 = 0 0.192 0.397 0.343 0.942 0.246 0.180 0.158 0.111 0.674
p-val: ai = a2 = 03 0.535 0.217 0.049** 0.944 0.202 0.024** 0.507 0.755 0.030**
p-val: ai + #1 = a2 + 02 = 03 + #3 0.742 0.304 0.081* 0.620 0.275 0.000*** 0.907 0.688 0.129
DV Mean (Control Group) 0.494 0.290 0.216 0.585 0.154 0.262 0.438 0.375 0.188
N 2042 2042 2042 705 705 705 1332 1332 1332
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level. Regressions include first illness episode that occured after baseline. A few households have
more than one first illness episode if two family members were sick simultaneously. All regressions control for household head age and a full set of strata dummies. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Table 3-5: Impact of ACT and RDT Subsidy on Diagnosis Seeking, by Literacy and Predicted Malaria Probability
All Illiterate Literate
Microscopy Any Malaria Microscopy Any Malaria Microscopy Any Malaria
RDT Test Test Test RDT Test Test Test RDT Test Test Test
Specification 1 - Main Effect
a ACT Subsidy
# ACT Subsidy x RDT Subsidy
p-val for F-Test ot+ =0
Specification 2 - Impact by Predicted Probability
ai ACT Subsidy * Lower Tertile 0.023
(0.030)
a 2 ACT Subsidy * Middle Tertile 0.012
(0.048)
a3  ACT Subsidy * Upper Tertile 0.001(0.058)
31 (ACT x RDT) * Lower Tertile 0.155***
(0.028)
#2 (ACT x RDT) * Middle Tertile 0.219***
(0.031)
#3 (ACT x RDT) * Upper Tertile 0.292***
(0.036)
p-val: ai + #1 = 0 0.000***
p-val: a2 + 02 = 0 0.000***
p-val: 03 + #3 = 0 0.000***
p-val: al = a2 =a3 0.938
p-val: al + 1 =a 2 + #2 = a3 +#3 0.178
DV Mean (Control Group) 0.068
N 2042
-0.019
(0.033)
-0.010
(0.019)
0.327
-0.017
(0.051)
-0.010
(0.059)
-0.031
(0.063)
-0.027
(0.032)
0.002
(0.033)
-0.001
(0.029)
0.324
0.886
0.587
0.969
0.874
0.148
2042
-0.011
(0.038)
0.221***
(0.024)
0.000***
0.006
(0.057)
0.002
(0.070)
-0.030
(0.076)
0.128***
(0.040)
0.221***
(0.041)
0.291***
(0.042)
0.009***
0.001***
0.000***
0.923
0.307
0.216
2042
0.054
(0.034)
0. 154***
(0.029)
0.000***
0.075*
(0.042)
0.054
(0.043)
0.016
(0.084)
0.111***
(0.043)
0.177***
(0.047)
0.216***
(0.065)
0.000***
0.000***
0.005***
0.796
0.681
0.031
705
-0.005
(0.046)
0.015
(0.027)
0.820
0.037
(0.072)
-0.082
(0.112)
-0.006
(0.064)
-0.029
(0.048)
0.018
(0.052)
0.064*
(0.035)
0.906
0.548
0.384
0.658
0.657
0.108
705
0.049
(0.056)
0.169***
(0.037)
0.000***
0.112
(0.082)
-0.029
(0.113)
0.010
(0.108)
0.082
(0.060)
0.195***
(0.065)
0.279***
(0.072)
0.006***
0.131
0.005***
0.525
0.690
0.138
705
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level. Regressions include first illness episode that occured
-0.005
(0.036)
0.266***
(0.024)
0.000***
0.009
(0.049)
0.009
(0.064)
-0.007
(0.079)
0.177***
(0.038)
0.237***
(0.039)
0.319***
(0.043)
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.983
0.395
0.094
1332
after baseline.
-0.036
(0.047)
-0.016
(0.025)
0.219
-0.041
(0.053)
0.250***
(0.031)
0.000***
-0.047 -0.037
(0.075) (0.086)
-0.012 -0.002
(0.070) (0.087)
-0.063 -0.071
(0.102) (0.106)
-0.024 0.153***
(0.042) (0.056)
0.006 0.243***
(0.042) (0.050)
-0.029 0.289***
(0.039) (0.052)
0.297 0.144
0.930 0.003***
0.339 0.028**
0.899 0.879
0.673 0.528
0.177 0.271
1332 1332
A few households have
0.008
(0.025)
0.231***
(0.019)
0.000***
more than one first illness episode if two family members were sick simultaneously. All regressions control for household head age and a full set of strata dummies.
and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Table 3-6: Impact of ACT and RDT Subsidy on Diagnosis Seeking and Medication Choice by Literacy and Predicted Malaria Probability
All Illiterate Literate
Took Other Took Other Took Other
Anti- Anti- Anti-
malarial or Took malarial or Took malarial or Took
Took Anti- Anti- Took No Took Anti- Anti- Took No Took Anti- Anti- Took No
ACT Pyretic biotic Medicine ACT Pyretic biotic Medicine ACT Pyretic biotic Medicine
Specification 1 - Main Effect
a ACT Subsidy 0.153*** -0.052 -0.071** -0.017 0.272*** -0.008 -0.062 -0.012 0.081 -0.092 -0.089* -0.012
(0.041) (0.045) (0.035) (0.022) (0.056) (0.075) (0.052) (0.032) (0.057) (0.056) (0.047) (0.022)
# ACT Subsidy x RDT Subsidy 0.006 -0.002 0.022 0.012 -0.055 0.009 0.039 0.008 0.037 -0.015 0.014 0.005
(0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.011) (0.046) (0.027) (0.019) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.023) (0.013)
p-val for F-Test ao-tp0 0.000*** 0.187 0.134 0.775 0.985 0.628 0.894 0.021** 0.021** 0.035** 0.091* 0.731
Specification 2 - Impact by Predicted Probability
a1 ACT Subsidy * Lower Tertile 0.157*** 0.054 -0.050 -0.054 0.222*** -0.004 -0.009 -0.005 0.122 0.089 -0.084 -0.086
(0.056) (0.072) (0.051) (0.040) (0.070) (0.112) (0.075) (0.053) (0.088) (0.096) (0.074) (0.053)
a2 ACT Subsidy * Middle Tertile 0.123 -0.089 -0.060 0.020 0.222 0.042 -0.165 -0.014 0.071 -0.129 -0.028 0.039
(0.079) (0.083) (0.068) (0.018) (0.143) (0.168) (0.145) (0.020) (0.096) (0.094) (0.077) (0.026)
a3 ACT Subsidy * Upper Tertile 0.160* -0.175** -0.120* 0.001 0.330*** -0.063 -0.063 0.006 0.021 -0.282*** -0.193** 0.012
(0.083) (0.076) (0.064) (0.023) (0.111) (0.122) (0.076) (0.042) (0.107) (0.090) (0.092) (0.016)
#1 (ACT x RDT) * Lower Tertile -0.029 -0.010 0.059* 0.027 -0.032 -0.008 0.044 -0.004 -0.034 -0.016 0.062 0.040*
(0.043) (0.046) (0.033) (0.019) (0.063) (0.070) (0.048) (0.034) (0.060) (0.064) (0.045) (0.023)
#2 (ACT x RDT) * Middle Tertile 0.013 -0.044 0.012 0.020 -0.112 -0.095 0.016 0.052** 0.074 -0.033 0.015 -0.002
(0.045) (0.046) (0.032) (0.018) (0.079) (0.086) (0.050) (0.022) (0.056) (0.056) (0.040) (0.025)
#3 (ACT x RDT) * Upper Tertile 0.017 0.039 0.001 -0.013 0.008 0.140 0.040 -0.032 0.018 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012
(0.046) (0.046) (0.028) (0.015) (0.088) (0.087) (0.044) (0.035) (0.055) (0.055) (0.035) (0.016)
p-val: ai + #1 = 0 0.007*** 0.484 0.837 0.484 0.000*** 0.907 0.595 0.865 0.258 0.383 0.748 0.395
p-val: a2 + 02 = 0 0.062* 0.077* 0.465 0.000*** 0.404 0.730 0.293 0.127 0.097* 0.055* 0.862 0.003***
p-val: a3 + #3 = 0 0.020** 0.046** 0.053* 0.536 0.000*** 0.478 0.753 0.470 0.690 0.000*** 0.019** 0.958
p-val: ai = a2 = a3 0.929 0.082* 0.670 0.211 0.695 0.865 0.620 0.908 0.759 0.019** 0.396 0.096*
p--val: ai + #1 a2 + 02 = a3 + 03 0.861 0.090* 0.241 0.038** 0.289 0.737 0.488 0.330 0.728 0.007*** 0.178 0.038**
DV Mean (Control Group) 0.259 0.494 0.185 0.049 0.108 0.446 0.138 0.062 0.365 0.531 0.219 0.042
N 2042 2042 2042 2042 705 705 705 705 1332 1332 1332 1332
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level. Regressions include first illness episode that occured after baseline. A few households have more than one
first illness episode if two family members were sick simultaneously. All regressions control for household head age and a full set of strata dummies. * *, and * indicate
significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Table 3-7: Price Elasticity, Within ACT Subsidy Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Administrative Data Endline Data
HH Used ACT HH Used ACT Dep. Var:
Voucher for Voucher for Took ACT at First Illness Episode
HH Used ACT Patient Age Patient Age Age 13 and Age 14 and
Voucher 13 or Below 14 or Above All Below Above
Specification 1: ACT Price Dummies (Omitted Category: ACT 40 Only)
ACT Subsidy = 88%
ACT Subsidy = 80%
ACT 92% x RDT Subsidy
ACT 88% x RDT Subsidy
ACT 80% x RDT Subsidy
Mean DV (ACT 92%, no RDT)
N
Total Effect (ACT 80% & RDT)
P-val (ACT 80% & RDT)
Specification 2: Linear ACT Price
ACT Price (US$)
RDT Subsidy
ACT Price (US$) x RDT Subsidy
Mean DV (No RDT)
N
-0.027
(0.038)
-0.055
(0.037)
-0.005
(0.036)
0.005
(0.033)
-0.039
(0.032)
0.439
2609
-0.094
0.004***
-0.069
(0.047)
0.034
(0.057)
-0.054
(0.060)
0.414
2609
0.032
(0.034)
0.027
(0.034)
0.023
(0.032)
0.024
(0.031)
-0.035
(0.030)
0.268
2609
-0.008
0.777
0.028
(0.043)
0.085
(0.052)
-0.091
(0.055)
0.291
2609
-0.058**
(0.027)
-0.082***
(0.026)
-0.028
(0.027)
-0.018
(0.021)
-0.004
(0.019)
0.171
2609
-0.086
0.000***
-0.097***
(0.032)
-0.051
(0.039)
0.037
(0.040)
0.123
2609
-0.042
(0.060)
-0.017
(0.058)
0.000
(0.052)
0.028
(0.046)
-0.007
(0.044)
0.457
1880
-0.024
0.625
-0.010
(0.073)
-0.019
(0.085)
0.022
(0.081)
0.426
1880
0.001
(0.081)
0.021
(0.080)
0.063
(0.069)
0.053
(0.061)
0.011
(0.060)
0.462
1085
0.032
0.633
-0.128
(0.087)
-0.091
(0.083)
-0.107
(0.075)
-0.008
(0.067)
-0.020
(0.061)
0.450
794
-0.112
0.111
0.030 -0.085
(0.101) (0.104)
-0.071 0.093
(0.115) (0.120)
0.103 -0.128
(0.108) (0.115)
0.490 0.344
1085 794
a full set of strata dummy
variables and age of the household head. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for
Table 3-8: Targeting Effects of ACT Price and RDTs
ACT Takers at the Drug Shop (Administrative Records) ACT Takers at Endline (Self Reports)
Dep Var: Tested Positive Dep Var: Predicted Positivity Dep Var: Predicted Positivity
All Age<14 Age 14+ All Age<14 Age 14+ All Age<14 Age 14+
Specification 1: ACT Price Dummies (Ksh 40 Omitted)
ACT Subsidy = 88% 0.187** 0.060 0.256* 0.074* 0.007 0.046 0.057 -0.004 -0.021
(0.080) (0.081) (0.146) (0.039) (0.017) (0.039) (0.044) (0.018) (0.048)
ACT Subsidy = 80% 0.182** 0.066 0.170 0.107*** 0.015 0.086* 0.030 -0.003 -0.011
(0.084) (0.083) (0.158) (0.038) (0.015) (0.051) (0.043) (0.015) (0.035)
ACT 92% x RDT Subsidy 0.163** 0.053 0.251** 0.064* 0.016 0.026 0.053 -0.011 -0.004
(0.070) (0.073) (0.110) (0.034) (0.013) (0.031) (0.036) (0.015) (0.034)
ACT 88% x RDT Subsidy 0.018 0.015 -0.001 0.019 0.005 -0.036 -0.001 -0.011 0.003
(0.062) (0.059) (0.143) (0.030) (0.014) (0.037) (0.035) (0.016) (0.043)
ACT 80% x RDT Subsidy 0.061 0.036 0.142 -0.020 0.000 -0.080 0.021 -0.001 0.013
(0.067) (0.061) (0.160) (0.030) (0.012) (0.050) (0.033) (0.012) (0.027)
Specification 2: Linear ACT Price
ACT Price (US$) 0.214** 0.075 0.227 0.131*** 0.019 0.111* 0.025 -0.004 -0.011
(0.107) (0.104) (0.206) (0.048) (0.019) (0.066) (0.054) (0.019) (0.044)
RDT 0.181 0.046 0.260 0.117** 0.023 0.087 0.052 -0.021 -0.021
(0.113) (0.111) (0.206) (0.053) (0.021) (0.060) (0.057) (0.023) (0.054)
ACT Price (US$) x RDT -0.116 -0.013 -0.143 -0.111* -0.019 -0.136* -0.030 0.015 0.027
(0.123) (0.118) (0.251) (0.057) (0.023) (0.075) (0.061) (0.024) (0.054)
DV Mean (Act 40, No RDT) 0.563 0.791 0.214 0.637 0.822 0.358 0.658 0.846 0.407
N 687 499 188 806 591 215 816 569 247
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level when applicable (columns 6-9). * * and * indicate significance
at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
Table 3-9: Cost Effectiveness Estimates
Share of Total
UT: Share OT: Share T: Fraction of Cost/ACT Subsidy
Malaria+ Malaria- ACT Takers to Malaria Budget Spent
Not Treated Treated With Who Are Cost/Malara Positive on Malaria+
With ACT ACT Malaria+ Episode Episode Episodes
A. Actual RDT Adherence
ACT 92% 0.550 0.414 0.676 0.667 1.48 0.605
ACT 92% - RDT 0.517 0.370 0.705 0.868 1.80 0.653
ACT 88% 0.548 0.392 0.687 0.633 1.40 0.620
ACT 88% - RDT 0.523 0.366 0.708 0.815 1.71 0.658
ACT 80% 0.543 0.349 0.711 0.570 1.25 0.653
ACT 80% - RDT 0.536 0.357 0.713 0.713 1.54 0.669
B. Perfect RDT Adherence
ACT 92% 0.550 0.414 0.676 0.667 1.48 0.609
ACT 92% - RDT 0.517 0.122 0.830 0.757 1.57 0.749
ACT 88% 0.548 0.392 0.687 0.633 1.40 0.629
ACT 88% - RDT 0.523 0.140 0.820 0.721 1.51 0.744
ACT 80% 0.543 0.349 0.711 0.570 1.25 0.674
Notes: Assumes unsubsidized costs of $1.46, $1.20, $0.84, and $0.43 for ACT doses for adults, teens, children, and
infants respectively. Assumes $0.51 subsidy cost for RDTs. "Care seekers" are defined to be patients purchasing
an ACT in the ACT-only regimes and patients purchasing an ACT or RDT in the ACT-RDT regimes. The
perfect RDT adherence scenario assumes perfect compliance with RDT test results (for ACT-RDT regimes only)
and no change in RDT takeup.
Figure 3-1: Theoretical Treatment Seeking Scenarios
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Figure 3-2: Experimental Design and Attrition: Number of Households per Study Arm
Catchment Area Census: Target 2,928 Households
Households Administered Baseline
2,789
ACT Subsidy ACT+RDT Subsidy No Subsidy
984 1,625 180
Within-Subsidy Price Variation
92% 88% 80% 92% 88% 80%
328 326 330 394 619 612
Endline Follow Up
92% 88% 80% 92% 88% 80% No Subsidy
306 310 317 366 586 587 173
Notes: 49 percent of ACT subsidy only households and 80 percent of ACT+RDT Subsidy households were
selected for surprise RDT testing at the drug shop.
Figure 3-3: Baseline Malaria Treatment Seeking Behavior by Predicted Positivity and SES
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Notes: Data from "No Subsidy" group. Local linear regression lines trimmed at 2.5 percent. Tertiles demarcated by gray vertical lines.
Median demarcated by dashed gray vertical line.
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Figure 3-4: Impacts of Subsidy Regimes on Treatment Seeking Behavior by Predicted Positivity and SES
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without RDT vouchers but randomly selected for surprise RDT testing at drug shop.
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Figure 3-5: Malaria Testing by Predicted Positivity, Subsidy Treatment and Head Literacy
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Notes: Local linear regression lines trimmed at 2.5 percent. Gray vertical lines demarcate tertiles. Excludes households
without RDT vouchers but randomly selected for surprise RDT testing at drug shop.
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Figure 3-6: Drug Choice by Predicted Positivity, Subsidy Treatment and Head Literacy
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Notes: Local linear regression lines trimmed at 2.5 percent. Gray vertical lines demarcate tertiles. Excludes households
without RDT vouchers but randomly selected for surprise RDT testing at drug shop.
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Figure 3-7: Distribution of Predicted Positivity Among ACT Takers by Subsidy Treatment
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Table 3-Al: Reporting Bias With Endline Illness Episodes: Comparison Across Subsidy Levels
ACT 92%
ACT 88%
ACT 80%
Any RDT
Ex-Post Tested
P-value (92=88=80)
DV Mean
N
Notes: Robust standai
Reported Any N
Illness E
Episode R
0.015
(0.020) (
0.002
(0.021) (
-0.020
(0.021) (
0.006
(0.010) (
0.001
(0.010) (
0.005***
0.950
2621
d errors (clustered
umber
pisodes
eported
0.024
0.157)
-0.063
0.155)
-0.168
0.155)
-0.025
0.078)
0.089
0.079)
0.101
3.05
2621
at the
Predicted
Malaria
Positivity --
First Episode
0.037
(0.023)
0.039*
(0.023)
0.031
(0.023)
0.004
(0.010)
-0.017
(0.011)
0.765
0.627
2473
household level
Days Ago -
First
Episode
1.73
(3.86)
4.72
(3.75)
3.19
(3.78)
-1.27
(1.87)
5.09***
(1.95)
0.388
64.7
2438
when relevant)
Patient Age -
First
Episode
-1.71
(1.65)
-2.92*
(1.61)
-1.69
(1.62)
0.906
(0.777)
0.988
(0.797)
0.221
19.1
2473
in parentheses.
All regressions include full set of strata dummies and a control for household head age.
and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels respectively.
*** **
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Figure 3-Al: ACT Voucher and Translation
Bei nafuu kwa wagonjwa wanaougua malaria!
Peleka hii kadi:
Kwa Duka la Dawa la Funyula Chemist
Lililo karibu na Pop Inn Hotel
Ili kupata dawa ya malaria ya Coartem (AL):
Ksh 100/- walio na umri wa miaka 14 au zaidi
Ksh 75/- watoto kati ya miaka 9 hadi 13
Ksh 50/- watoto kati ya miaka 4 hadi 8
Ksh 25/- watoto wa umri wa miezi 3 hadi miaka 3
0,pQ
A special value for those sick with malaria!
Bring this card to:
Funyula Chemist
Directions
To obtain the anti-malarial Coartem at a special price:
Ksh 100/- for individuals 14 and older
Ksh 75/- for children aged 9-13
Ksh 50/- for children aged 4-8
Ksh 25/- for children aged 3 months-3 years
di inakubaiika kuanzia saa tatu - hadi saa kumi na moja (Jumatatu ha
Jumamosi)
Coartem (artemether-lumefantrine, or AL) ni dawa mpya ya malaria iliyo na nguvu kuliko
dawa zingine za malaria.
Hii kadi inakuwezesha kununua dawa ya malaria ya coartem iwapo mtu atangojeka kwa
nyumba yako. Lazima mtu huyo aje na hii kadi kwenye duka la dawa ili aweze kununua dawa
hii. Kumbuka: Bei ni tofauti kulingana na umri kwa sababu watoto humeza kiwango kidogo
kuliko watu wazima.
Muhimu: Watoto chini ya miezi 3 na wamama wajawazito kwa miezi 3 za kwanza
hawatakikani kumeza hii dawa ya Coartem
This voucher can only be redeemed from 9AM-5PM Monday-Saturday
Coartem (artemether-lumefantrine, or AL) is a new anti-malaria drug that is more effective than other drugs currently
available to you.
This card may only be used to purchase Coartem for someone in your household. A household member must come with this
card to the chemist to make the purchase. Note: dose prices vary by age because children need less medicine than adults.
It is important that infants under the age of 3 months and women in the first trimester of pregnancy do not take Coartem.
Notes: Figure shows voucher front, front translation, voucher back, and back translation
respectively.
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Figure 3-A2: ACT Price and Dosing Guide
Recommended Dose and Corresponding Dose Cost for:
Adult (14+) Ages 9-13 Ages 4-8 Ages 3m-3 y
Dose 4 pills, twice 3 pills, twice 2 pills, twice 1 pill, twice a
a day for a day for a day for day for three
Price Per three days three days three days days
Pill
Ksh 20.83 (Control) Ksh 500 Ksh 375 Ksh 250 Ksh 125
Ksh 4.16 (92% Subsidy) Ksh 100 Ksh 75 Ksh 50 Ksh 25
Ksh 2.50 (88% subsidy) Ksh 60 Ksh 45 Ksh 30 Ksh 15
Ksh 1.66 (80% subsidy) Ksh 40 Ksh 30 Ksh 20 Ksh 10
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